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METHODS IN (DIS)AMENITY VALUATION WITH HOUSING DATA: THE CASE 
OF COMMUNICATION ANTENNAS, AND THE VALUE OF BRAND NAME 
FRANCHISES COMPARED TO LOCAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE FIRMS 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays on housing, the first on estimation 
strategies for the valuation of a local disamenity and the second on the structure of the 
market for the services of real estate brokers. 
 
The purpose of the first essay is to apply hedonic and quasi-experimental methods 
to measure the value of any disamenity caused by communication antennas.  Crucial to 
unbiased estimates is accounting for both endogenous antenna location and changes in 
unobservable housing and neighborhood characteristics.  Spatial fixed effects are used to 
control for unobservable characteristics that can influence the location decisions of 
residents and the location of antennas. Panel data techniques are used to address both 
time invariant and time varying unobservables and to account for possible changes in the 
hedonic price function after construction of a nearby antenna.  The estimates indicate that 
houses near communication antennas sell less than comparable houses not located near a 
communication antenna, and also highlight a shortcoming of applying the difference-in-
differences technique to value a local disamenity when houses are affected by the 
presence of multiple sites.      
 
The second essay compares the performance of brand name franchised and 
independent real estate brokers with respect to list price, sales price, time on the market, 
and prevalence in areas with more out-of-state buyers using techniques that control for 
the different types of agents that choose to affiliate with franchised real estate brokerage 
firms.  The results indicate that most of the difference in the sales price and the time it 
takes to locate a buyer can be explained by the types of agents that choose to affiliate 
with franchised brokerage firms, and that on average weaker agents choose to affiliate 
with franchised real estate firms.  In addition, there is an indication that properties in 
areas with larger shares of out-of-state residents are more likely to be sold by a franchised 
broker.  This result is consistent with the industrial organization literature on franchising 
that says franchising should be more prevalent in areas where consumers are less familiar 
with the local market.  
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1 Introduction
Housing markets contain a vast amount of information that is valuable to both economists
and policy makers. Whether it is the percentage of owner-occupied units, the number of
foreclosures, or the number of new construction starts, housing markets are often analyzed
to determine the health of our economy. A less discussed aspect of housing markets is
their usefulness in valuing goods and services that are not explicitly traded in formal
markets. This dissertation uses information revealed in the housing markets in the
Louisville and Elizabethtown areas in Central Kentucky to estimate the disamenity value
associated with communication antennas and the value of using franchised real estate
brokerage firms.
Using the equilibrium framework developed by Rosen (1974), and econometric advances
of the subsequent 39 years, the first essay estimates the disamenity value associated with
communication antennas located near residential properties. Surprisingly, this topic has
received little attention in the economics literature. As the demand for cell phones and
mobile technology increases, it is followed by an increase in demand for reliable
coverage, which in turn leads to an increase in the number of antennas. A recent article by
Alcantara (2012) with AOL Real Estate highlights the concerns residents have about
having a communication antenna located near their property. As reported, a group of
residents in Mesa, Arizona are protesting the siting of a cell phone tower in their
neighborhood. One resident is quoted as saying "apart from the tower being so tall, we all
feel that property values will go down if they build it so close. Most people I know
wouldn’t want to buy a house near a cell phone tower." This essay combines detailed
house sales data combined with data from the Federal Communication Commission’s
Antenna Structure Registration Database to determine resident’s willingness to pay to
avoid living near communication antennas.
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Omitted variables are a constant concern when estimating hedonic price functions.
Following Rosen (1974), the hedonic price function of property i can be represented by
Pi = P (Si, Ni, Qi) where Pi is the price of property i. Si, Ni, and Qi are the structural,
neighborhood, and environmental characteristics, respectively. Once the hedonic price
function Pi has been estimated, the partial derivative of Pi with respect to the
environmental characteristic Qi is equal to the implicit price of the environmental
characteristic. However, when there are characteristics unavoidably omitted from Pi that
are correlated with Qi, the estimate of willingness to pay for Qi will be biased.
Endogeneity in the location of the antenna structures is the greatest concern in estimation.
Holding all else constant, owners of the antenna structures are going to locate them in
areas where it costs the least. If not taken into account, this incentive will lead to an
overestimate of the negative impact these structures have on property values. Following
the recommendation of Kuminoff et al. (2010), spatial fixed effects are used to control for
any time invariant unobservables that are correlated with proximity to an antenna, and
panel data techniques are used to address time invariant and time varying unobserved
characteristics that could affect the equilibrium hedonic price function.
The data used contain over 140,000 transactions over a period of 12 years, and contain
over 20,000 properties that are sold at least twice during the sample period. The data
contain the list and sales price, an extensive set of structural characteristics, and precise
location information for each sold property. These data are much richer than data extracted
from a local Property Valuation Administrator or data from DataQuick that are commonly
used to value localized disamenities. First, they are actual sales data that are recorded by
the real estate agent that listed the property. Second, the extensive set of structural
characteristics reduces the number of omitted variables that could potentially be correlated
with proximity to a communication antenna. Lastly, the data contain the structural
characteristics at the time of each sale so the assumption that structural characteristics
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remain constant when a house is sold more than once can be relaxed. The richer data
enables estimation that overcomes econometric issues that limited previous studies.
First, regressions are estimated that rely on cross-sectional variation in distance to the
nearest antenna and do not exploit the panel aspect of the data. The precise location
information contained in the dataset allow for the inclusion of spatial fixed effects that will
absorb the effect of any time-invariant unobservables that are correlated with proximity to
a communication antenna. Proximity measures are included that allow the effect
communication antennas have on property values to vary with distance. These include a
quadratic in distance to the nearest antenna, the inverse of distance to the nearest antenna,
distance bands that indicate whether or not an antenna is located within a specified radius
from the property, and distance bands that count the number of antennas within a specified
radius from the property. The second set of regressions exploits the panel aspect of the
data to reduce the potential bias caused by time invariant unobservables. These
regressions include the repeat sales and difference-in-difference specifications.
The best estimate of reduction in sales price caused by communication antennas comes
from the the cross-section specification that includes census block group fixed effects and
holds constant the the number of antennas that are located near each house. These
estimates show that a house within 1,000 feet of the nearest antenna when it is sold will
sell for 1% ($1,836) less than a similar house that is 4,500 feet from the nearest antenna.
Consistent with Kuminoff et al. (2010), the estimates from the repeat sales specification
confirm that the spatial fixed effects captured the effect of any time-invariant
unobservables that were spatially correlated with distance to the nearest antenna in the
cross section specifications. The quasi-experimental results highlight a shortcoming of
applying the difference-in-differences technique to estimate the value a local disamenity
when houses are affected by the presence of multiple sites.
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Using the same data as essay 1, the second essay compares the performance of franchised
and independent real estate brokerage firms. The data identify the listing and selling firms
and agents for each sold property and allow for the first comparison of franchised and
independent real estate brokers using house level sales data. Previous studies on
franchising in real estate brokerage have relied on aggregated survey data and focus on the
cost effectiveness and profitability of franchised and independent real estate brokerage
firms. This essay compares the different types of brokers in terms of the list price, the sales
price they are able to get for the homeowner, the length of time it takes to locate a buyer,
and their prevalence in areas where home buyers are less familiar with the local market.
A model of real estate brokerage is developed that takes into account the differences
between franchised and independent real estate brokerage firms. This model builds upon
the model of discount brokerage presented in Rutherford and Yavas (2012) by relaxing
assumptions about the contest success functions that relate the efforts exerted by real
estate brokers to the probability of locating a buyer for a listing. The model also extends
the model presented in Rutherford and Yavas (2012) by allowing there to be n selling
agents so that the effort levels of the listing and selling brokers can be compared when
there are multiple brokers competing to locate a buyer. The model provides two testable
hypotheses. The first is that houses listed with franchised and independent brokers will
have the same list price for a given house, and the second is that franchised brokers sell
their own listings less often than independent brokers. Each of these hypotheses are tested
using the detailed sales data discussed earlier.
Brokers that choose to affiliate with a real estate franchise gain access to a unique set of
benefits that are not available to brokers who choose to work for an independent firm. For
example, real estate brokers that choose to affiliate with franchise have access to extensive
training resources, referral networks, and lead generating systems that brokers who choose
to start an independent company do not have access to. Because of this, homeowners who
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choose to list their house with a franchised listing broker may benefit from having their
house sold sooner if these benefits allow franchised brokers to more efficiently match
buyers and sellers. However, a quicker sale may not always be ideal if it is at the cost of a
lower sales price. These benefits also give weaker and less experience agents an incentive
to affiliate with a franchise to increase their productivity while establishing themselves in
the real estate industry. The tradeoff between the sales price and length of time it takes to
locate a buyer will be estimated using the method from Levitt and Syverson (2008) and
accounts for the possibility that franchised and independent brokerage firms may perform
differently simply because of the types of agents who choose to affiliate with each type of
firm. This is something that previous studies on franchising in real estate brokerage have
not been able to do.
One of the most commonly discussed reasons for franchise affiliation is that association
with a franchise gives the franchisee access to a highly recognizable brand name that
serves a signal of quality (Rubin, 1978; Brickley and Dark, 1987; Frew and Jud, 1986;
Anderson and Fok, 1998). If people are moving into an area where they are unfamiliar
with the local housing market and the quality of real estate brokerage firms in the area,
they may choose to work with a franchised real estate broker if they associate the brand
name with a certain level of quality. Brickley and Dark (1987) argue that in general
consumers less familiar with the local market will choose a franchise if they associate the
franchise with a certain level of quality, while Frew and Jud (1986) and Anderson and Fok
(1998) make the same argument specifically for real estate brokerage services. Access to a
recognizable brand name may provide weaker and less experienced agents even more
incentive to affiliate with a real estate franchise. The precise location information for each
house in the sample is used to estimate the number of out-of-state buyers that are located
in the census tract in which each house is located that serves as a measure of familiarity
with the local real estate market. This essay is the first to use housing sales data to test the
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hypothesis that franchising should be more prevalent in areas where consumer are less
familiar with the local market.
Results for the test of the theoretical models predictions show that franchised listing
brokers do sell their own listing less often, as expected, but that houses listed with
franchised brokers are listed for less than comparable houses listed with independent
brokers. This result is unexpected and suggests that franchised brokers may be
strategically underpricing houses in order to get them off the market sooner. When
franchised and independent brokers are compared in terms of the sales price they are able
to get for the homeowner and the length of time it takes to locate a buyer, the results
suggest that most of the difference can be explained by the agents who affiliate with a
franchised broker. The results also suggest that on average, weaker agents are the ones
who chose to affiliate with a franchise. Lastly, the results show that franchised selling
brokers are more active in areas where consumers are less familiar with the local real
estate market.
Overall, this dissertation strives to contribute to the body of knowledge about using
information revealed in housing markets to value a localized disamenity and to compare
the value of choosing franchising as an organizational form. First, the dissertation
demonstrates how detailed sales data can be used to overcome econometric issues related
to time invariant spatially correlated unobservables. Second the dissertation demonstrates
how real estate firms that choose franchising as an organization form compare to
independent brokerage firms after controlling for differences in the types of agents that
choose to affiliate with franchised real estate brokers. Lastly this dissertation shows that
franchising is more prevalent in areas where a higher percentage of the residents are less
familiar with the local market; this is the first known study to show this using housing
6
market data.
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2 Using Hedonic and Quasi-Experimental Methods in (Dis)Amenity Valuation with
Housing Data: The Case of Communication Antennas
2.1 Introduction
Cell phone usage worldwide and especially in the United States is growing faster than
ever. In December of 1997 it was estimated there were 55.3 million wireless subscribers.
Fifteen years later in December 2012, that number was estimated to be 326.4 million
(CTIA-The Wireless Association (2013)). To put this in perspective, the United States
Census Bureau estimated the population to be 267.8 million in 1997 and 319.9 million in
2012. This means the United States has gone from 20.6% of the population having a
wireless subscription in 1997 to more than one subscription per individual in 2012. With
the advances in mobile technology it is possible to do nearly every task that was once only
possible on a desktop computer on a mobile device that fits in the palm of a hand. Like
any other good or service, the added convenience of mobile technology has costs.
An area that has received little attention in the economics literature is the disamenity
associated with the structures on which these antennas are mounted. As the demand for
cell phones and mobile technology increases, it is followed by an increase in demand for
reliable coverage, which in turn leads to an increase in the number of antennas. Beginning
in the mid-1990’s there was a sharp increase in the number of antenna structures which
roughly corresponds to the time when mobile phone technology became more prevalent.
Choosing the location for an antenna involves conflicting incentives for residents. Land
owners may want to have an antenna located on their property since it provides an
additional source of income and better cell phone reception for residents in its vicinity1.
However, these structures are not pleasant to look at and residents tend to object to having
them located nearby because of the visual disamenity they create or because of any
1Airwave Management LLC. provides some insight into the amount of income these cell phone towers can
generate for a land owner. According to their website, payments can reach as high as $60,000 per year.
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adverse health effects they associate with the antennas2.
Figures 2.1a and 2.1b illustrate when an externality is likely to exist, and the situation
when a nearby antenna could provide a net benefit to nearby residents. In Figure 2.1a, an
antenna is located on a property adjacent to a residential subdivision. Regardless of any
compensation, the antenna structure is likely to be considered a disamenity by nearby
residents3. Figure 2.1b shows an antenna that could provide a net benefit to nearby
residents. The structure located at point A is hidden behind a thicket of trees and far
enough away from the nearest neighbor (point C) to impose any cost. If the owner of the
property at point B owns the land where the antenna is located, the owner is receiving
payments from the antenna’s owner, while nearby residents receive the benefit of
improved coverage. In this situation the potential disamenity is mitigated by trees. Having
an antenna located nearby should not decrease property values; it probably increases
property values where the antennas are located.
The purpose of this paper is to apply hedonic and quasi-experimental methods to measure
any disamenity caused by communication antennas controlling for endogenous antenna
location and changes in unobserved housing and neighborhood characteristics. Spatial
fixed effects are used to control for any time invariant unobservables that are correlated
with proximity to an antenna. The repeat sales method and quasi-experimental techniques
are used to address time invariant and time variant unobserved characteristics that could
affect the equilibrium hedonic price function. Quasi-experimental techniques are
2Despite concerns about negative health effects from the radio waves emitted from mobile devices, a compre-
hensive study of the health effects related to cell phone and cell phone antennas by Röösli et al. (2010) finds
that there is no conclusive evidence that using cell phones or living near cell phone towers harms human
health. Nevertheless, the perception of such risks may be sufficient to alter ones behavior.
3If the structure was constructed before the residents moved in or built a house in this subdivision, no uncom-
pensated externality exists. They have preferences such that the structure does not affect them, or they were
compensated for the visual aspect of the structure though a lower purchase price. However, if the structure
was constructed after the residents moved in or built in this subdivision, they are affected by the sight of the
structure and a lower sales price if they do decide to sell the property. The land owner where the structure
is located is receiving payments from the antenna’s owner, while all affected nearby residents are not being
compensated.
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becoming increasingly common in the environmental economics literature and are used
instead of instrumental variables when there is not random assignment into treatment and
control groups(Greenstone and Gayer, 2009).
2.2 Recent Work on Valuing Amenities/Disamenities
Omitted variables are a constant concern when estimating hedonic price functions.
Following Rosen (1974), the hedonic price function of property i can be represented by
Pi = P (Si, Ni, Qi) where Pi is the price of property i. Si, Ni, and Qi are the structural,
neighborhood, and environmental characteristics, respectively. Consumers have utility
U = U(X,Si, Ni, Qi) which is maximized subject to the budget constraint Pi +X = M ,
where X is a Hicksian composite commodity with price equal to $1, and M is income.
This gives the following first order condition:
(∂U/∂Qi)/(∂U/∂X) =
∂Pi
∂Q
(2.1)
This says the marginal rate of substitution between the environmental characteristic and
the composite good X is equal to the slope of the hedonic price function (market clearing
locus) in the environmental characteristic Qi. Once the hedonic price function Pi has been
estimated, the partial derivative of Pi with respect to the environmental characteristic Qi is
equal to the implicit price of the environmental characteristic. However, when there are
characteristics unavoidably omitted from Pi that are correlated with Qi, the estimate of
willingness to pay for Qi will be biased. Endogeneity in the location of the antenna
structures is the greatest concern in estimation. Holding all else constant, owners of the
antenna structures are going to locate them in areas where it costs the least. If not taken
into account, this will lead to an overestimate of the negative impact these structures have
on property values. Other issues that have to be addressed in estimation concern buyers
sorting and the stability of the hedonic price function. To address the sorting concern,
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spatial fixed effects are included to control for unobservables that may influence both
buyer’s location choices and the location of communication antennas. The most recent
panel data techniques that address both time-invariant and time-varying unobservables are
used to account for the possibility of a changing hedonic price function after the
construction of a nearby antenna.
Rosen (1974) makes two critical assumptions in his characterization of the hedonic
equilibrium. The first is that buyers have complete information about their available
alternatives. In the study of housing markets, this implies that consumers have perfect
information about local amenities and disamenities. Currie et al. (2013) check this
assumption by estimating the external costs associated with the opening and closing of
toxic industrial facilities. They compare the willingness to pay to avoid these facilities
(estimated using housing data) to the costs associated with the increased incidence of
children born with low birth weight caused by the same toxic facilities. They estimate an
aggregate reduction in housing values per plant of $1.5 million within a one mile radius,
and costs associated with the increased incidence of low birth weight of about $700,000.
Since the reduction in property values reflect the costs associated with adverse health
effects along with factors such as increased congestion, the visual disamenity associated
with the facilities, decreased utility from outdoor activity, they conclude that the evidence
fails to contradict the assumption of unbiased or perfect information in the housing
market. Since the disamentiy associated with communication antennas is visual, and the
antenna structures are highly visible, the assumption of full information is appropriate for
this study.
The second assumption is that households move freely among locations, and that
consumers have homogeneous preferences over the bundle of goods being purchased.
Cameron and McConnaha (2006) find evidence that households do migrate in response to
perceived changes in environmental conditions. Bayer et al. (2009) find that the estimates
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of willingness to pay for a reduction in ambient concentrations of particulate matter that
incorporate the cost of moving are three times greater than the estimates from a
conventional hedonic model using the same data. Bieri et al. (2012) use the 5% public use
sample from the 2000 Census that contain the housing prices, wages, and location specific
amenities for over 5 million households to estimate aggregate amenity expenditures for
the United States. The precise household level data allow them to relax the assumption of
homogeneous households and to precisely estimate the cost of moving between possible
locations. Their preferred estimates come from a specification that uses historical
migration data for each location to identify a consideration set of possible locations for
each household combined with location to location specific moving costs. They show that
the estimates of aggregate amenity expenditures are sensitive to the way in which
migration is modeled. Kuminoff et al. (2012) provide an overview of the current state of
the equilibrium sorting literature housing markets. All four of these studies suggest that
estimates of disamenity value should consider migration, sorting, and changes over time.
While Rosen (1974) show that the partial derivative of Pi with respect to Qi provides an
estimate of the willingness to pay for a small change in the environmental good Qi, the
appropriate functional form for the hedonic price function is uncertain. Cropper et al.
(1988) use simulations to see determine how different functional forms perform when
there are omitted variables in the hedonic price regression. They find that flexible function
forms perform well when all of the attributes are included, but recommend using a more
parsimonious function forms when there are omitted variables. The linear, semi-log,
double-log, and linear Box-Cox functional forms have remained the most prevalent
functional forms used to estimate the marginal willingness to pay for environmental
amenities to reduce bias caused by omitted variables.
Since Cropper et al. (1988), sample sizes have increased dramatically, advances in
geographical information systems allow researchers to control for previously unobserved
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spatial characteristics, unobserved structural housing characteristics are much less of a
concern, and quasi-experimental techniques have become more prevalent. Kuminoff et al.
(2010) use a theoretically consistent Monte Carlo framework to test the performance of
six functional forms when time-varying and time-constant spatial variables are omitted.
After addressing advances, Kuminoff et al. (2010) find that the recommendations in
Cropper et al. (1988) should be reconsidered. When using cross-section data, Kuminoff
et al. (2010) find that the quadratic Box-Cox functional form with spatial fixed effects
performs best. However, for practical purposes, including spatial fixed effects significantly
reduces bias regardless of the functional form used4.
Kuminoff et al. (2010) also show that exploiting variation in an environmental amenity for
properties that sell multiple times can reduce bias in willingness to pay estimates
compared to pooled OLS with fixed effects. If the spatially correlated unobservables are
time invariant, their effect will be purged from the model when first differences are taken.
However, if the unobservables are not time invariant, the estimates from a repeat sales
model will be biased. Repeat sales models have recently been used to estimate the impact
of changing cancer risks (Gayer et al., 2002), the siting of wind farms (Heintzelman and
Tuttle, 2012), Superfund site remediation (Mastromonaco, 2011), and reductions in three
of the Environmental Protection Agency’s criteria air pollutants (Bajari et al., 2012).
Kuminoff et al. (2010) find that a generalized difference-in-difference estimator with
interactions between the time dummy variables and housing characteristics to allow the
shape of the price function to change over time performs the best when panel data are
available. Linden and Rockoff (2008) provide a technique for defining treatment and
control groups so that difference-in-differences can be used to estimate the impact of
environmental (dis)amenities when treatment and control groups are not clearly defined.
They used this technique to define treatment and control groups to estimate the
4Since the quadratic Box-Cox is still computationally intensive and the coefficients are difficult to interpret,
semi-log and linear Box-Cox models are commonly used.
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willingness to pay to avoid living near a registered sex offender. Their technique has
recently been used to estimate the impact of brownfield remediation (Haninger et al.,
2012) and shale gas developments (Muehlenbachs et al., 2012)5. Parmeter and Pope
(2012) provide a thorough overview of difference-in-difference method and other
quasi-experimental techniques. By differencing over time, the difference-in-difference
method controls for time invariant unobservables just like the fixed effects and repeat sales
methods, but also overcomes problems with time-varying unobservables with the
“common trends" assumption. While this assumption cannot be formally tested, Linden
and Rockoff (2008) provide visual evidence that it holds in their study. Once treatment
and control groups are defined, they plot housing prices against the days relative to a sex
offender’s arrival. Since prices in the control group trend similarly before and after
offenders arrive, but prices in the treatment group fall significantly, they are confident they
have identified a valid control group. A similar approach will be used here6.
Hedonic property value models are used to estimate the marginal willingness to pay for
environmental amenities, ∂Pi/∂Q. While there are advantages of using the repeat sales
method and quasi-experimental techniques to eliminate the bias caused by time-invariant
unobservables, these methods estimate a capitalization rate that is not necessarily equal to
the marginal willingness to pay. It is possible that the presence of, or change in an
environmental (dis)amenity can cause the hedonic price function to change over time.
Kuminoff and Pope (2012) and Haninger et al. (2012) show that as long as the hedonic
price function is constant over time, there should be no difference between the
5Muehlenbachs et al. (2012) use a difference-in-difference-in-differences model. They use the Linden and
Rockoff (2008) technique to find the distance at which shale gas developments do not impact property val-
ues, but also use the local public water service area to define a second treatment group. Similar to owners
of land where shale gas wells are drilled, owners of land where communication antennas are located receive
payments from the antenna’s owner. Assuming that conditional on a property’s observable characteristics
and being within 2000 meters of a drilled well, every property has an equal chance of receiving lease pay-
ments regardless of water source, they are able to separate the impact of lease payments and decreased water
quality.
6In this study, a majority of communication antennas were built several years before the property is sold
making a visual check of the “common trends" assumption difficult.
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capitalization rate and the marginal willingness to pay. Given that the communication
antennas are expected to have relatively small impacts on property values, it is unlikely
that the construction of a new antenna structure will lead to a change in the hedonic price
function. But, this issue will be addressed.
Mastromonaco (2011) and Bajari et al. (2012) both propose methods for reducing bias
caused by time-varying spatially correlated unobservables. Mastromonaco (2011)
includes census tract-year fixed effects that allow the effect of unobservables at the
neighborhood level to vary over time in a repeat sales model. Bajari et al. (2012) also use
a repeat sales model, but exploit information contained in the residual from the first sale to
learn about the characteristics of the house that the researcher cannot observe directly.
Specifically, they argue that after controlling for the characteristics that are observable, if
the sales price was abnormally positive (negative) the first time it was sold, this value of
the characteristics that were not observed is positive (negative). They show that not
controlling for time-varying unobservables leads to estimates of willingness to pay for
reductions in air pollution that are considerably smaller than when these unobservables are
considered. Bajari et al. (2012) are not able to control for changes in house characteristics
directly because they have characteristics for the last sale only. In contrast the data used in
this study has house characteristics at the time of each sale and allows for control of
changes in them. The results below show that the unobservables that are correlated with
proximity to a communication antenna are time invariant and are adequately controlled for
using spatial fixed effects.
2.3 Data on Housing and Antennas
Housing data cover a period of 12 years from 2000 to 2011 and were extracted from two
Multiple Listing Services that serve the Louisville and Elizabethtown areas in central
Kentucky. The housing data contain an extensive set of structural housing characteristics,
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closing dates, and sales price for every property sold. All property addresses were
geocoded using a program that accessed MapQuest and provided a standardized address
and latitude and longitude for each property7. This standardized address is used to identify
houses that are sold multiple times.
These data are much richer than data extracted from a local Property Valuation
Administrator or data from DataQuick that are commonly used. While data from each of
those sources identify properties that are sold more than once, the structural housing
characteristics are only recorded for the most recent transaction. The data used here
identify properties that are sold more than once during the sample period and record the
structural housing characteristics each time the property is sold. This detail allows for a
check of the assumption that structural housing characteristics are constant over time, an
assumption that is often made when using the repeat sales method.
Data for the communication antennas come from the Federal Communication
Commission’s (FCC) Antenna Structure Registration database. This database includes all
communication antennas in the United States that are registered with the FCC. All
antennas that may interfere with air traffic must be registered with the FCC to make sure
the lighting and painting requirements are met. These data contain antenna characteristics
such as dates for construction and demolition, latitude and longitude, antenna height, and
antenna type. It is possible there are antennas located in the study area that are not
registered, but this is rare. Since the construction date for each antenna needs to be known
to ensure the antennas located near houses were standing when the property sold, antennas
that did not include a construction date were dropped8. In this study, data cover a large
7One issue with geocoding addresses is that the coordinates will correspond to the location on the street where
the property is located and not the exact coordinates of the actual house; Filippova and Rehm (2011) were
able to overcome this using the coordinates where the home was located within the plot. In the current study,
properties that were not assigned a standardized address and a unique latitude and longitude were excluded
from the final sample. Properties with less than 500 square feet or more than 10,000 square feet or zero
bedrooms or zero full baths were also dropped.
8Since the earliest construction year in the sample of antennas is 1927 and the latest 2011, it cannot be
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area. Google Earth was used to verify whether or not an antenna was standing when the
property sold if there was a dismantled date recorded. Since the images include the date
the image was captured, it was possible to identify whether or not the antenna was
standing when the property sold9.
ArcGIS was used to determine several location-specific characteristics. They include (1)
the census tract in which each house is located, (2) the census block group in which each
house is located, (3) distance to the nearest communication antenna, (4) distance to the
nearest parkway/interstate, (5) distance to the nearest railroad, and (6) distance to the Fort
Knox military base. Since the visual disamenity of communication antennas is the focus
of this study, all proximity measures were calculated using straight line distances. All
antennas within a ten mile radius of each property that were standing when the property
was sold were identified. This information was used to determine the number of antennas
located within specified distances from each property.
Summary statistics for the housing characteristics are given in Table 2.1. The typical
house sold for $183,619, has three bedrooms, two full bathrooms, is 1,655 square feet in
size, has a lot size of about eight-tenths of an acre, and is 33 years old. Holding all else
constant, the owner of a communication antenna will attempt to locate the antenna in an
area that minimizes the owner’s cost. To check if antennas are located in areas where
property values are low to begin with, Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for houses
within and beyond 4,500 feet of an antenna10. Houses within 4,500 feet of an antenna sell
for $32,979 (16%) less than a house more than 4,500 feet away, have slightly fewer
bedrooms and bathrooms, are smaller, and are on smaller lots. The most notable
assumed that the absence of a construction date means the antennas with missing dates were built before the
year 2000 and can be included in the final sample.
9This was a concern for only a handful of antennas. Multiple antennas were assigned the same coordinates
and it was determined that this corresponded to multiple antennas being mounted on the same structure.
Some demolition dates indicated that an antenna was removed, and some demolition dates indicated that the
actual structure was taken down. Being dismantled refers to the latter.
104,500 feet is approximately the median value of distance to the nearest standing antenna in this sample.
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difference is that houses within 4,500 feet of an antenna are about 18 years older on
average than houses more than 4,500 feet away from an antenna. It appears that
communication antennas are in fact located in areas where properties are less valuable.
While most of the difference in sales prices for houses within and beyond 4,500 feet of a
tower can be explained by differences in the types of houses, the primary focus of this
study is controlling for differences that are unobservable. The precise location information
for each house provided in the data is used to control for these unobservables11.
Summary statistics for the proximity measures of all antennas are shown in Table 2.312.
The average house is located 5,794 feet (1.1 miles) away from the nearest antenna, with a
median value of 4,500 feet (.85 miles). Only 0.6% of houses are within 600 feet of their
nearest antenna, and 12.4% of the houses in the sample have antennas within 2,100 feet.
The lower panel in Table 2.3 summarizes the number antennas that are located within
certain distances from each house. While the majority of houses only have one antenna
within each radius, there are are non-trivial number of houses that are likely affected by
the presence of multiple antennas. For example, there are 204 houses that have two
antennas within 1,500 to 1,800 feet, and 9 that have 3 antennas within that same radius.
This means that estimating the disamentity value caused by communication antennas
using distance to the nearest antenna could be biased due to the presence of multiple
antennas. Estimates would tend to be biased upwards because all the value of the
disamenity would be attributed to the nearest antenna when it should be attributed to the
combination of antennas.
Before moving to estimation of any disamenity value of antennas, it is worth addressing
11A regression of the number of communication antennas in a census tract on the median sales price and
census tract demographics suggest that the number of antennas in a census tract is negatively correlated
with property values. However, even though the coefficient has the expected sign, the coefficient is not
statistically different from zero at conventional levels, and the median sales price and demographics only
explain 8% of the variation in the number of communication antennas in a census tract.
12Antennas refer to all of the structures in the sample regardless of their type. Towers refer to the largest type
of structure that are the most visually disruptive due to their size and the distance at which they can be seen.
Summary statistics for only tower type structures are shown in Table A1.1.
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an overall concern about housing market analysis during the Great Recession. The
concern is how an equilibrium framework such as that in Rosen (1974) can produce
misleading results during a period of disruption13. Without question housing prices
declined between 2006 and 2009, but as Carson and Dastrup (2013) report there was
considerable spatial variation. Across metropolitan areas, housing prices declined none at
all to more than 60%.
The four-quarter percent change in the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s housing price
index is shown in Figure 2.2 for the study area and the Los Angeles and Miami
Metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). Even though the Louisville MSA was affected by
the recent housing crisis, house prices remained relatively stable compared to the larger
MSAs that were affected the most. This stability minimizes concerns that the results
presented below are being affected by a rapidly changing and unstable housing market.
Changes in demographic characteristics for the study from 2000 to 2010 are compared to
changes for the entire United States in Table 2.4. The only notable difference is that
unemployment more than doubled nationally while there was only a 62% increase in the
study area. For the entire United States, the percent change in the number of people who
moved from out of state fell by 71% while it increased by 12% in the study area; since the
study area contains the Fort Knox military base, the above average number of out-of-state
movers is to be expected14.
13This issue is discussed in detail in Boyle et al. (2012).
14A regression of the change in the number of communication antennas in a census tract on the percent
changes in demographic characteristic the same tract suggests that changes in demographics are not lead-
ing to significant changes in the number of communication antennas in an area. There were statistically
significant coefficients on median income, unemployment, percent of the population that owns their home,
and the percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. However, the changes in these char-
acteristics required to cause one additional antenna to be constructed or dismantled are extremely large. For
example, it would take a 1,067% increase in unemployment to lead to the dismantling of one antenna.
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2.4 Empirical Model
To determine the impact proximity to an antenna structure has on property values, hedonic
property value models and quasi-experimental methods are used. The first regressions rely
on cross-sectional variation in distance to the nearest antenna and do not exploit the panel
aspect of the data. The second set of regressions exploit the panel aspect of the data to
reduce the potential bias caused by time invariant unobservables. The data cover a period
of twelve years with communication antennas being built and dismantled throughout the
period as well as in between sales of the same property. These changes allow for
estimation of the traditional cross section specifications as well as the repeat sales and
difference-in-difference specifications that are becoming more prevalent in the hedonic
literature (Gayer et al. (2002); Linden and Rockoff (2008); Parmeter and Pope (2012);
Haninger et al. (2012); Muehlenbachs et al. (2012); Bajari et al. (2012)).
2.4.1 Cross-Section Specification and Proximity Measures
Following Kuminoff et al. (2010) and Heintzelman and Tuttle (2012), a semi-log
specification with spatial fixed effects is used to address the potential bias caused by time
invariant, spatially correlated unobservables. The first specification is:
lnPijt = zijtβ + xijtδ + λt + γj + ijt (2.2)
where zijt is the set of variables describing proximity to the nearest antenna structures,
xijt includes an extensive set of structural housing characteristics, λt are year-month time
dummy variables, γj are spatial fixed effects, and ijt is the error term. To demonstrate the
importance of including the spatial fixed effects, equation (2.2) will be estimated without
spatial fixed effects and again with census tract or census block group fixed effects. If
there are unobserved spatial characteristics that are correlated with the proximity
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variables, β in equation (2.2) should be more precisely estimated the tighter the fixed
effect.
Three proximity measures are used that allow distance to a communication antenna to
have a non-linear effect on the sales price of a house. The first is a continuous, quadratic
measure of distance to the antenna nearest a property when it was sold15. By including
distance and distance squared in the regression, the point at which an antenna has no effect
on property values can be estimated. The spatial fixed effects ensure that this continuous
measure of distance is measuring the impact of a nearby antenna and not proximity to an
area that may be a magnet for communication antennas. As a robustness check, the inverse
of distance to the nearest antenna that was standing when the property sold is also used.
The second measure is a set of dummy variables equal to one if the nearest antenna is
located within some specified radius from the property and is similar the method used in
Heintzelman and Tuttle (2012). Distance bands of 300 feet are used and the base category
is the situation in which the closest antenna structure is more than 4,500 feet away. This
specification allow for a discrete non-linear effect of distance to the nearest tower,
however, there is no rule of thumb as to the width of distance bands that should be used or
the distance from an antenna that should be used as the base category. Distance bands of
300 feet are used because they are sufficiently large to contain enough antennas to provide
the variation needed to precisely estimate their effect, but small enough to allow for a
higher degree of non-linearity than larger rings would allow. Houses more than 4,500 feet
away from an antenna were chosen as the base category since this is the median value for
distance to the nearest antenna.
The third measure uses the same 300 foot distance bands used in the previous method but
counts the number of antennas located within a specified radius of the property.
15This method is used in Banfi et al. (2008), Bond (2007b), and Bond (2007a) to estimate the impact of cell
phone towers on property values.
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Mastromonaco (2011) uses this type of proximity measure to estimate the impact of
Superfund sites on property values in Greater Los Angeles area of California. He points
out that using the distance to the nearest site ignores the presence of additional nearby
sites that could bias the results upward if only the nearest site is considered. By estimating
the average impact of all nearby sites, some of the bias inherent in the nearest site method
can be removed. If each house has only one antenna within a specified radius, this method
would provide estimates identical to the nearest site method using dummy variables equal
to one if an antenna is located within the specified radius. The summary statistics in Table
2.3 show that there are multiple properties that will be affected by the presence of multiple
antennas. Including the number of antennas within in specified distance bands provides
estimates of the marginal impact of adding one additional antenna within a specified
distance, and this effect is allowed to vary with distance.
2.4.2 Panel Analysis - Repeat Sales and Difference-in-Differences
One strategy for removing time invariant unobservables is exploiting the variation in
distance to the nearest antenna for properties that sell multiple times. During the study
period, new antennas were constructed and old antennas were dismantled. This allows for
variation in distance to the nearest antenna over time for the same property. This approach
eliminates any time invariant unobservables that may be correlated with the proximity
variables and is is the primary method used in Gayer et al. (2002), Heintzelman and Tuttle
(2012), Mastromonaco (2011), and Bajari et al. (2012). The following regression is
estimated:
lnPit − lnPit′ = (zit − zit′)β + (xit − xit′)δ + λt + it − it′ (2.3)
where zit is the distance to the nearest standing antenna at time t, xit are structural housing
characteristics that may vary over time. Following Gayer et al. (2002), λt is a set of year
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variables equal to -1 if the year indicates the first year the property sold, 1 if the year
indicates the year of the last sale, and 0 for all other sales. This allows for appreciation in
housing values over time. it is the error term. This specification is different from the
repeat sales model that is typically estimated. In the typical repeat sales model, only the
proximity variables that measure distance to the nearest antenna would be allowed to vary
over time while the structural housing characteristics are assumed to be constant. Some
previous studies that use the repeat sales method use data from a source similar to this
study and have housing characteristics at the time of each sale (Gayer et al., 2002).
However, several recent studies use data from sources that do not record the structural
housing characteristics each time a house is sold and make the assumption of constant
structural characteristics (Heintzelman and Tuttle (2012); Mastromonaco (2011); Bajari
et al. (2012)). The number of observations in the sample that have structural housing
characteristics that change over time are shown in Table 2.5. Of the 26,579 houses that
sold more than once, a non trivial number experienced a change in a major structural
characteristic between sales. For example, 4,311 (17%) of houses had a change in the
number of bedrooms between sales. Equation 2.3 will be estimated with and without the
changing structural housing characteristics to control for changes and determine how
sensitive the estimate of β is to the assumption of constant structural characteristics.
There are shortcomings when using the repeat sales approach. There is the possibility that
the unobservables are not time invariant. Kuminoff et al. (2010) show that when the
omitted spatial characteristics are time varying, the bias in the first differenced estimates
increases substantially. Since not all properties are sold multiple times, the repeat sales
approach leads to much smaller sample sizes. In addition, properties that sell multiple
times may be systematically different than properties that only sell once. Properties that
turn over multiple times may be repeatedly priced below market value, or more
importantly, the local disamenity has an above average effect on those properties. With an
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extensive list of housing characteristics at the time of all sales, the number of time varying
unobservables is smaller than in a number of recent studies.
A second strategy for removing the influences of time invariant unobservables is discussed
in detail in Parmeter and Pope (2012) and used in Linden and Rockoff (2008),
Muehlenbachs et al. (2012), and Haninger et al. (2012) is difference-in-differences. A
difficulty that arises when using difference-in-differences in a hedonic property value
model is defining the treatment and control groups. To determine the distance at which
communication antennas impact nearby property values, the method used in Linden and
Rockoff (2008) will be used. Figure 2.3a illustrates the method used to define treatment
and control groups in Linden and Rockoff (2008). The dashed line is the relationship
between sales price and distance from a sex offender’s property after the sex offender
arrives. Sales price is increasing with distance until about 0.1 miles and then flattens out.
The solid line is the relationship between sale price and distance from a sex offender’s
property before the sex offender arrives. Sales price is decreasing with distance until about
0.1 miles and then flattens out. Since the prices of homes are similar between 0.1 and 0.3
miles from an offender’s location, properties within that distance are in the control group
and properties within 0.1 mile of a sex offender’s location are in the treatment group.
Figure 2.3b shows the relationship between sales price and days relative to a sex
offender’s arrival. For properties in the treatment group, there is a significant decrease in
property values after the sex offender’s arrival. Properties within 0.1 and 0.3 miles of a sex
offender’s location remained relatively steady post arrival suggesting properties within
that distance can indeed be considered “untreated."
Once the treatment and control groups have been defined, the following regression will be
estimated:
lnPijt = pi1D1ijt + pi2Postijt + pi3D
1
ijt · Postijt + xijtδt + λt + γj + ijt (2.4)
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where D1ijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the property is located in close enough to an
antenna site to be in the treatment group, Postijt is a dummy variable equal to one if the
property sold after the nearest antenna was constructed. pi3 is the parameter of interest.
xijt contains an extensive set of housing characteristics, λt are year-month dummy
variables, and γj are spatial fixed effects. Notice that this specification allows the
equilibrium price function for the housing characteristics to vary over time. This is the
specification shown to produce the smallest amount of bias in mean willingness to pay in
Kuminoff et al. (2010). Since house prices in the study area appear to be relatively stable
over time, a separate regression assumes δt = δ for all t will be estimated.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Cross-Section Results
Results for the first specification that uses a continuous measure of distance to the nearest
antenna are shown in Table 2.6. The first two columns do not include any spatial fixed
effects to control for time-invariant unobservables that may be correlated with proximity
to an antenna. Without these spatial fixed effects, the estimates in Columns 1 and 2
suggest that houses located adjacent to a communication antenna sell for more than a
comparable house further away from an antenna. This result is opposite of what is
expected. Column 3 includes census tract fixed effects and the results show that holding
constant the characteristics of the house, the time the property was sold, and the area of
the property, consumers are willing to pay a premium to be located further away from a
communication antenna16. Unobservables that are correlated with distance to a
communication antenna are likely biasing the estimates in Columns 1 and 2. The
estimates in Column 3 show that the sales price of a house is increasing at a rate of
16The results in Table A1.2 show that when census tract fixed effects are included, the coefficients on the
structural housing and neighborhood characteristics change indicating they are also correlated with unob-
servables at the census tract level.
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approximately 0.98% at a distance of 1,000 feet, and at a rate of about 0.88% at 2,500
feet17. No effect is found beyond 16,050 feet (approximately 3 miles). Column 4 includes
census block-group fixed effects which are more precise rather than the census tract fixed
effects used in Column 3. These estimates suggest that the sales price of a house increases
at a rate of about 0.83% at a distance of 1,000 feet, and a rate of 0.75% at 2,500 feet. No
effect is found beyond 15,540 feet (approximately 2.9 miles). Even though the effect of
distance is identified by variation in distance within a smaller geographic area, the
specification using census block group fixed effects provides estimates that are smaller
and more precisely estimated than the census block specification. This provides further
evidence that there are spatially correlated unobservables that are negatively correlated
with distance to a communication antenna18.
The results from the specification that uses the inverse of distance to the nearest antenna
are shown in Table 2.7. As in Table 2.6, the first two columns do not include spatial fixed
effects and the coefficients on the inverse of distance indicate that houses near antennas
sell for more than houses further away. Once again, Column 3 shows that the census tract
fixed effects are absorbing the effect of time invariant unobservables that are correlated
with distance to an antenna, and the coefficient on the inverse of distance now has the
expected sign. These estimates show that the sales price of a house is increasing at a rate
of approximately 3.6% at a distance of 1,000, feet, and at a rate of about 0.57% at 2,500
feet19. When census block-group fixed effects are included (Column 4), the estimates
show that the sales price of a house is increasing at a rate of about 2.8% at a distance of
17Using the quadratic of distance, the change in expected sales price with respect to distance is βˆ1 +2 · βˆ2 ·D,
where D is distance to the nearest antenna in thousands of feet.
18Regressions were estimated that included the percentage of rural residents in a census tract instead of census
tract fixed effects. The results show that the sales price of a house is decreasing as the number of people
living in rural areas increases, and that proximity to a communication antenna has a positive effect on the
sales price of a house in highly urban areas, and a negative effect in more rural areas. This is consistent
with the idea that antennas in more urban areas are more likely to be disguised than in rural areas where
the antennas structures tend to be much larger. Urban areas have multiple structures such as tall buildings,
smoke stacks, clocks, and church steeples that antennas can be located on or around. The R2 for the
urban/rural specification was 0.72 compared to 0.85 in the census tract specification in Table 2.6.
19Using the inverse of distance, the change in expected sales price with respect to distance is −βˆ/D2.
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1,000 feet, and a rate of 0.45% at 2,500 feet. Since the derivative with respect to distance
is never zero for the inverse of distance, the distance at which sales prices are increasing at
a rate of 0.01% was found using the estimates from Column 4 in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. This
distance is equal to 15,366 feet (2.9 miles) for the quadratic specification and 16,850 feet
(3.2 miles) for the inverse of distance.
Overall, the results do not appear to be extremely sensitive to functional form when using
a continuous measure of distance, but there are some differences. The inverse distance
shows the effect declining more with distance and a greater effect for houses closer to an
antenna. When using the inverse of distance, the partial derivative of the hedonic price
function with respect to distance is 0.0284/Distance2 in the census block group
specification. In the limit, this is equal to infinity as distance goes to zero, and equals zero
as distance goes to infinity. At the median value of 4,500 feet, the inverse distance
specification shows that the sales price of a house is increasing at a rate of 0.14% and at a
rate of 0.6% using the quadratic specification. The distances at which the sales prices are
increasing at the same rate for the two specifications are 1,905 and 15,330 feet. It is
reassuring that the latter distance is only 210 feet short of the distance at which no sales
price effect is found using the quadratic specification.
The results in Table 2.8 estimate the same quadratic specification that was used in Table
2.6, but the sample is restricted to only include the tower-type antenna structures. These
structures are larger and are visible at greater distances than the smaller antenna structures
and are expected to have a larger effect on property values and have an effect at greater
distances. Columns 1 and 2 do not include spatial fixed effects and again indicate that
houses in close proximity to an antenna sell for more than a comparable house further
away. Once census tract fixed effects are included (Column 3), the estimates have the
expected sign and indicate that the tower-type structures do in fact have a larger effect on
property values and have an effect further away. Sales prices are increasing at a rate of
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1.1% (up from 0.98%) at 1,000 feet, and a rate of 1.1% (up from 0.88%) at 2,500 feet. No
effect is found beyond 16,667 feet (3.16 miles). Column 4 includes census block-group
fixed effects and once again the effect of distance to a tower on property values is
estimated more precisely than in the census tract specification. With this specification,
sales prices are increasing at a rate of 1% (up from 0.83%) at 1,000 feet and 0.92% (up
from 0.75%) at 2,500 feet. No effect is found beyond 16,269 feet (3.08 miles). While the
effects are not extremely different, the estimates are larger when the sample is reduced to
only tower-type structures. This provides additional confidence that the proximity
measures being used are capturing the visual disamenity associated with communication
antennas20.
The estimates in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 use 300 foot distance bands to measure either the
effect of having an antenna located within a specified radius from the house (Table 2.9) or
the marginal effect of an additional tower within the same radius (Table 2.10). The
summary statistics in Table 2.3 show that there are only 127 houses whose nearest
antennas is less than 300 feet away so the 0 to 300 foot and 300 to 600 foot distance bands
were combined to ensure there is enough variation to identify the effect of distance for
houses located closest to an antenna. The estimates in Columns 1 and 2 in Tables 2.9 and
2.10 do not include spatial fixed effects and indicate houses near antennas sell for more
than houses further away. Row 1 of Columns 1 and 2 suggest that houses within 600 feet
of an antenna sell for 13-14% more than a house more than 4,500 feet from an antenna
(Table 2.9) and that an additional antenna within 600 feet leads to an additional 9 to 10%
increase in sales price (Table 2.10). Again, when census tract fixed effects are included,
the estimates have the expected sign and suggest that a house located within 600 feet of an
antenna sell for 6.3% less than a comparable house more than 4,500 feet from the nearest
antenna, and an additional antenna leads to a 3.8% reduction in sales price. When census
20Each specification discussed below is also estimated using only tower-type antenna structures. To save
space, the results for these specifications are given in the appendix. In general, the estimates using only the
tower-type antenna structures show a larger effect and have an effect at greater distances.
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block-group fixed effects are included, the effect of having an antenna within 600 feet of a
property falls to a 5.7% reduction in sales price with an additional antenna leading to a
3.1% reduction. In both specifications, the effect of communication antennas on property
values diminishes with distance21.
The results in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 are consistent with the argument made in
Mastromonaco (2011) that only considering distance to the nearest site will lead to biased
estimates if there are multiple sites that could adversely affect a property’s sale price. As
is expected, adding an additional antenna near a residential property has a smaller effect
than an antenna being located near a property that did not previously have one nearby.
Since every coefficient in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.9 is larger than the corresponding
coefficient in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.10, the estimates that measure proximity with
distance to the nearest site are likely biased. To address this concern, the results in Table
2.11 use the same quadradic measure of distance to the nearest antenna that was used
Table 2.6 but include the number of antennas near a property using the 300 foot distance
bands from Table 2.10. As expected, the results suggest that only considering proximity to
the nearest antenna is biased if there are multiple antennas that could be affecting the
property’s sale price. The results from Column 4 of in Table 2.11 show that holding
constant the number of nearby antennas, the sales price of a house is increasing at a rate of
0.34% at a distance of 1,000 feet from an antenna, and at a rate of 0.30% at 2,500 feet
21Bond and Wang (2005) and Bond (2007a) are two similar studies that measure the impact of cell phone
towers on property values in New Zealand, but the studies have limitations. The first lacked precise location
information for the houses and used street name fixed effects as a proxy for distance to a tower. The second
geocodes houses, but the model is misspecified. They use a continuous distance measure but set distance
equal to zero if the house sold before the tower was constructed. Bond (2007b) is the only study found
that uses U.S. data. It is limited to sales from one area of Orange County Florida and includes the latitude
and longitude of each property in each regression. Banfi et al. (2008) looks at the impact of cell phone
towers on rents in Zurich Switzerland and finds a significant decrease in rents of about 1.5% on average.
Filippova and Rehm (2011) is the most recent study. They use data from the Auckland region of New
Zealand and also use distance bands and a continuous distance measure. Their distance band specification
yields insignificant results, and the coefficient on the continuous distance measure has a significant, but
wronged signed coefficient. They report a negative but insignificant impact on property values. The authors
failed to consider the interaction terms between distance and their location variables. Given they used 50
meter increments for their distance bands, it is likely there was not enough variation within each band to
identify any impact.
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from an antenna. These estimates are significantly smaller than those in Table 2.6 that
only considered distance to the nearest antenna.
2.5.2 Panel Results
Results from the first repeat sales specification that assumes the structural housing
characteristics are constant over time are shown in Table 2.12. In this specification, the
change in sales price is assumed to be a function of the change in distance to the nearest
antenna and a set of year dummy variables that are equal to -1 if the year indicates the
time of the first sale, 1 if the year indicates the year of the last sale, and 0 for all other
sales. Comparing the change in sales price for houses that are sold more than once
eliminates any bias that could be caused by time-invariant spatially correlated
unobservables. Comparing Columns 3 and 4 for each cross-section specification shows
that as more precise spatial fixed effects are used, the estimated effect of communication
antennas on the sales price of a house is smaller and more precisely estimated. This
indicates that the spatially correlated unobservables are negatively correlated with
proximity to an antenna. If this is true, and the unobservables are time invariant, the repeat
sales estimates of the impact communication antennas have on property values should be
similar to the estimates using the more precise census block group fixed effects.
The results in each Column of Table 2.12 are consistent with this hypothesis. Column 1
includes all houses that sold more than once during the sample period. For every 1,000
foot change in distance to the nearest antenna, on average, the sales price if a house
increases by 0.75%. This estimate is similar the rate at which sales prices are increasing in
Table 2.6 at a distance of 1,000 feet (0.83%). Columns 2 and 3 included houses that are
sold four or fewer times and three or fewer times, respectively. Both provide estimates
similar to Column 1 where all repeat sales are included. Column 4 includes the set of
houses that are sold only twice during the 12 years the data cover. Since repeat sales are
30
identified by the standardized address provided by the Mapquest scraping program,
limiting the sample to houses that sale only two times reduces the chance of including
houses that are being considered repeat sales due to a coding error. Even though the
sample size is reduced by 8,910 observations compared to the sample of all repeat sales,
the R2 increases by 3.2 points, and the effect of distance is still precisely estimated. In this
specification, for every 1,000 foot change in distance to the nearest antenna, on average,
the sales price if a house increases by 0.33%. This is slightly smaller than the estimate in
Column 4 of Table 2.11 that holds the number of antennas near a house constant when
estimating the effect of proximity of an antenna, but much smaller than the estimates in
Column 4 of Tables 2.9 and 2.10 that used the 300 foot distance bands.
The repeat sales results in Table 2.13 relax the assumption that structural housing
characteristics are constant over time. As is expected, including the changes in structural
housing characteristics lead to a higher R2, increases in each characteristic lead to a larger
positive change in sales price, and the effect of distance is more precisely estimated. This
suggests that the change in distance to the nearest antenna between sales of the same
property is not orthogonal to the change in housing characteristics, an assumption that
must be made when detailed sales data is not used. Again, Columns 1 through 3 include
all repeat sales, houses that sell four or fewer times, or houses that sell three or fewer
times. These results show a slightly larger effect than the results shown in Table 2.12.
When the sample is reduced to houses that only sell twice during the sample period, the
estimated impact is slightly larger than the estimate in Table 2.12. In this specification, for
every 1,000 foot change in distance to the nearest antenna, on average, the sales price of a
house increase by 0.38% compared to 0.33% when the structural characteristics are
assumed to be constant. While these estimates are not statistically different at conventional
levels22, a larger effect when the changing structural housing characteristics are included
is consistent with the results from Bajari et al. (2012) that show ignoring time-varying
22P-value from a Chow test=.12.
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correlated unobservables leads to underestimates of the benefits of pollution reduction.
The method used for determining the treatment and control groups for the
difference-in-differences specification is shown in Figure 2.4. The solid line shows the
relationship between the sales price of a house and distance to the nearest antenna that was
standing at the time it was sold. Sales prices are increasing until about 2,000 feet and then
flatten out. The dashed line shows the relationship between the sales price of a house and
distance to the nearest site where an antenna will be located. Sales prices are decreasing
with distance from the site where an antenna will be located and flatten out at about 2,000
feet. Since 2,000 feet is the point at which the sales price is not affected by an antenna that
is standing, or the site where an antenna will be located, houses within 2,000 feet of an
antenna site are considered “treated" and those beyond are in the control group.
Estimates from the difference-in-differences specification are shown in Table 2.14.
Column 1 says that holding constant the structural characteristics and the time of sale,
houses within 2,000 feet of where an antenna is located or will be located sell for 2.9%
more on average than a comparable house more than 2,000 feet of an antenna site.
Holding constant the areas in which houses are located, Column 2 shows that a house
within 2,000 feet of an antenna site sells for about 1% less than a comparable house more
than 2,000 feet away. This result is consistent with all of the results above and reinforces
the importance of including the spatial fixed effects to capture the effect of spatially
correlated unobservables. Column 3 reports results from a typical difference-in-difference
specification. Houses that are within 2,000 feet of an antenna at the time they were sold
sell for about 3.3% less than a comparable house more than 2,000 feet away from an
antenna at the time it was sold. The results in Column 4 are from a specification that
allows the equilibrium price function with respect to structural housing characteristics
change over time and also includes spatial fixed effects. Kuminoff et al. (2010)
recommend this specification for estimating willingness to pay when using panel data.
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The results from this specification show an effect of about 2.2% that is estimated more
precisely than in the specification that does not allow the equilibrium price function to
change over time, however, the effect is not significantly different from zero at
conventional levels.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions
The results above show that houses located near communication antennas sell for less on
average than comparable houses located further away from an antenna. There are a few
important points to note about these results. First, regardless of the specification,
time-invariant spatially correlated unobservables biased the cross-sectional estimates of
the reduction in sales price caused by nearby communication antennas. Columns 1 and 2
in Tables 2.6-2.11 do not include any spatial fixed effects and all show that houses near a
communication antenna sells for more than a similar house further away from an antenna.
Following the recommendation from Kuminoff et al. (2010), Columns 3 and 4 of Tables
2.6-2.11 include spatial fixed effects to capture the effect of time invariant spatially
correlated unobservables. Once included, each proximity measure that was used indicates
that houses near communication antennas sell for less than a similar house located further
away from an antenna. When the more precise census block group fixed effects are
included, the estimated reduction in sales price caused by a communication antenna
becomes smaller and is estimated more precisely in each of the cross-section
specifications. This reinforces the importance of the carefully controlling for spatial
correlated unobservables that are correlated with proximity to a localized disamentiy.
The results also show that when using a continuous measure of distance, the results are
robust to functional form. When the quadratic specification is used, the sales price of a
house is increasing at a rate of 0.75% at a distance of 2,500 feet from an antenna, and at a
rate of 0.57% at 2,500 feet using the inverse of distance. At an average sales price of
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$183,619, this amounts to a difference of $275. Even though the differences are small, the
results from the continuous specifications also provide evidence that the proximity
measures are capturing the visual disamenity associated with communication antennas.
Comparing the results in Column 4 of Table 2.6 to the results in Column 4 in Table 2.8,
the bigger tower-type structures have a larger effect on the sales price of a house and have
an effect further away. Using all antennas, the sales price of a house is increasing at a rate
of 0.75% at 2,500 feet from an antenna, and the sales price of a house is increasing at a
rate of 0.92% at the same distance from a tower-type antenna, a difference of $312.
Consistent with the conjecture made by Mastromonaco (2011), estimating the effect of
communication antennas on property values using distance to the nearest antenna is likely
biased due to the presence of multiple nearby antennas. The results in Column 4 of Table
2.9 say that a house located within 600 feet of an antenna sells for 5.7% ($10,466) less
than a similar house more than 4,500 feet away from its nearest antenna. The results in
Column 4 of Table 2.10 show that adding an additional antenna within 600 feet of a house
leads to a reduction in sales price of 3.1% ($5,692). Since houses are being affected by
multiple nearby antennas, Table 2.11 uses the same quadratic specification from Table 2.6
but includes the number of antennas located near each house using the same distance
bands that were used in Table 2.10. Holding constant the number of communication
antennas near a property, the sales price increasing at a rate of 0.34% at a distance of
1,000 feet compared to a rate of 0.83% at 1,000 feet when only the nearest antenna is
considered. Using the average sales price of $183, 619, this is a difference of $881.
The results suggest that the omitted spatial characteristics that are correlated with
proximity to a communication are time invariant and are being captured by the census
block group fixed effects. First, the effect communication antennas have on nearby
properties is smaller and is estimated more precisely when census block group fixed
effects are used compared to the census tract estimates. This confirms that there are
34
unobservables that are spatially correlated with distance to a communication antenna.
Second, the repeat sales method eliminates any bias caused by time-invariant
unobservables and provides results very similar to the cross sectional estimates that
include census block group fixed effects. This can be seen by comparing the results in
Column 4 of Table 2.11 to the results in Column 4 of Table 2.13. Using the continuous
measure of distance, Table 2.11 shows that the sales price of a house is increasing at a rate
of 0.34% at a distance of 1,000 feet from an antenna, and Table 2.13 show that for every
1,000 foot change in distance to the nearest antenna, the sales price increases by 0.39%.
Using the average sales price of $183,619, this amounts to a difference of $92.
Kuminoff et al. (2010) recommend using difference-in-differences to estimate marginal
willingness to pay for localized (dis)amenities when panel data is available. They suggest
including spatial fixed effects to capture the effect of time-invariant spatially correlated
unobservables, and interacting time dummy variables with the housing characteristics to
allow the equilibrium price function to vary over time. Table 2.14 shows the results from
this specification. The estimates in Column 3 are from the typical difference-in-difference
specification that assumes the equilibrium price function is constant over time and show
that houses within 2,000 feet of a standing antenna sell for 3.3% ($6,059) less than a
similar house more than 2,000 feet away from antenna. In the more flexible specification
that allows the equilibrium price function to change over time, the 2.2% ($4,040) effect is
estimated more precisely, but is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels.
It is not surprising that the difference-in-differences specification does not produce results
similar to the repeat sales estimates or the cross-section estimates that include census
block group fixed effects. The primary reason is that the presence of multiple antennas
near a property makes defining the treatment and control groups difficult. To define the
treatment and control groups, the distance from each house to a site where an antenna is
standing or will be standing is determined. This distance may identify distance to a site
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where an antenna will be located, but will ignore the already standing antenna that is just
beyond that site. The summary statistics in Table 2.3 show that this is a valid concern.
There are 804 houses that are located within 2,100 feet of at least two antennas when they
sold. Since the distance to a site where an antenna will be located will be highly correlated
with distance to the nearest standing antenna for a lot of the houses in the sample,
identifying the treatment and control groups using the method from Linden and Rockoff
(2008) is not likely to be effective. While the difference-in-differences specification has
become increasing popular in the recent literature, the nature of the disamenity evaluated
here does not appear meet the criteria necessary to successfully implement this
quasi-experimental technique.
The best estimate of reduction in sales price cause by communication antennas shows that
the sales price of a house is increasing at a rate of about 0.34% ($624) at a distance of
1,000 feet from the nearest antenna (Table 2.11 Column 4). This relationship is shown
graphically in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. This suggests that a house within 1,000 feet of the
nearest antenna when it is sold will sell for 1% ($1,836) less than a similar house that is
4,500 feet from the nearest antenna. The results in Column 2 of Table 2.11 do not include
any spatial fixed effects and show that the sales price of a house is decreasing at a rate of
0.4% at a distance of 1,000 feet. This suggests that is within 1,000 feet of the nearest
antenna will sell for 1.1% ($2,020) more than a similar houses that is 4,500 feet from the
nearest antenna. This reinforces how important it is to include precise spatial fixed effects
to capture the effect of time invariant spatially correlated unobservables.
This effect is smaller than the estimated reduction caused by similar disamenities. Kroll
and Priestley (1992) provide a review of the literature concerning overhead transmission
lines and property values through the early 1990s. They find that in studies where a
significant decrease was found, the decrease in property values typically falls in the range
of 2% to 10%, and the effect diminishes beyond a few hundred feet. Hamilton and
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Schwann (1995) estimate the impact of high voltage electric transmission lines have on
property values, but primarily focus on the importance of using the correct functional
form. They find that properties that are adjacent to a line lose about 6.3% of their value,
but more distant properties are hardly affected. Using a repeat sales model, Heintzelman
and Tuttle (2012) find that having a wind turbine located 0.5 miles away leads to a
reduction in sales price from 8.8-15.81%.
Figure 2.1a illustrates the potential externality caused by these antennas. If antennas are
constructed near residential properties after the homeowner purchases the property, they
suffer a small but non-trivial decrease in their property value and are unlikely to be
compensated by the land owner where the antenna is located or the antenna’s owner.
“Camouflaging" is one solution to this problem that has been implemented in some areas.
Camouflaged towers blend in with the landscape or are constructed in already standing
structures such as church steeples and clock towers. A stated preference study of the
disamenity associated with communication antennas would allow various types of
camouflaging to be valued in different locations. Such developments will change the
disamenity associated with communication antennas.
Copyright c©Stephen L. Locke, 2013
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Structural Housing Characteristics.
Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011. N=142,164.
Variable Mean/Share Std. Dev. Min Max
Sales Price (2011 Dollars)a 183,619 143,162 1,028 4,859,483
Bedrooms 3.241 0.785 1 13
Full Bathrooms 1.811 0.751 1 9
Partial Bathrooms 0.368 0.522 0 6
Square Feet of Living Space 1,655 7,181 500 9,688
Lotsize (Acres) 0.820 40.661 0 436
Lotsize Missing 0.047 0.211 0 1
Has < in Lot Dimensionsb 0.127 0.333 0 1
Has > in Lot Dimensionsb 0.003 0.058 0 1
Age (Years) 33.154 29.074 0 223
Age Unknown 0.010 0.101 0 1
Fireplace 0.479 0.500 0 1
Basement 0.602 0.490 0 1
Finished Basement 0.175 0.380 0 1
Central Air 0.909 0.287 0 1
Brick Exterior 0.346 0.476 0 1
Vinyl Exterior 0.162 0.369 0 1
Metal Roof 0.010 0.099 0 1
Composition Roof 0.940 0.238 0 1
Ranch Style 0.447 0.497 0 1
Modular Style 0.014 0.116 0 1
Cape Cod Style 0.084 0.277 0 1
Carport 0.057 0.233 0 1
Garage 0.663 0.473 0 1
One Car Garage 0.169 0.374 0 1
Multiple Car Garage 0.563 0.496 0 1
Within 1 Mile Parkway/Interstate 0.485 0.500 0 1
Within 1 Mile Railroad 0.511 0.500 0 1
Within 1 Mile Ft. Knox 0.014 0.116 0 1
a Sales prices were converted to 2011 dollars using the CPI.
b The lot dimensions indicated the lot size was less (greater) than the listed size.
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Table 2.2: Averages and Test for Differences in Means for Houses
Within and Beyond 4,500 Feet of an Antenna. Central Kentucky
Data, 2000-2011.
Mean/Share
Variable <4,500 Feet >4,500 Feet Test Statistic
Sales Price (2011 Dollars) 167,247 200,226 43.61
Bedrooms 3.161 3.323 39.00
Full Bathrooms 1.687 1.937 63.66
Partial Bathrooms 0.347 0.390 15.83
Square Feet of Living Space 1,573 1,739 43.70
Lotsize (Acres) 0.383 1.263 35.52
Lotsize Missing 0.044 0.049 3.96
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.149 0.105 -24.96
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.003 0.004 2.81
Age (Years) 42.078 24.096 -122.86
Age Unknown 0.006 0.014 14.65
Fireplace 0.474 0.485 4.09
Basement 0.613 0.590 -8.96
Finished Basement 0.153 0.197 21.80
Central Air 0.898 0.921 15.050
Brick Exterior 0.322 0.370 18.89
Vinyl Exterior 0.157 0.168 5.69
Metal Roof 0.006 0.013 13.16
Composition Roof 0.944 0.936 -6.90
Ranch Style 0.409 0.485 29.19
Modular Style 0.004 0.024 31.68
Cape Cod Style 0.102 0.066 -24.23
Carport 0.066 0.049 -13.44
Garage 0.657 0.668 4.34
One Car Garage 0.209 0.128 -41.29
Multiple Car Garage 0.494 0.632 53.00
Within 1 Mile Parkway/Interstate 0.629 0.338 -114.93
Within 1 Mile Railroad 0.569 0.452 -44.19
Within 1 Mile Ft. Knox 0.014 0.014 -0.560
Sample Size 71,604 70,560
a Sales prices were converted to 2011 dollars using the CPI.
b The lot dimensions indicated the lot size was less (greater) than the listed size.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for the Communication
Antenna Proximity Measures. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011. N=142,164.
Continuous Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Distance to Closest Standing
Antenna When Sold (feet)a 5,794 4,703 59 51,663
Equal to 1 if Within Share Number
Distance0to300 0.001 127
Distance300to600 0.005 752
Distance600to900 0.010 1,467
Distance900to1200 0.017 2,458
Distance1200to1500 0.026 3,641
Distance1500to1800 0.031 4,350
Distance1800to2100 0.034 4,831
Distance2100to2400 0.041 5,832
Distance2400to2700 0.044 6,262
Distance2700to3000 0.049 6,959
Distance3000to3300 0.050 7,128
Distance3300to3600 0.050 7,055
Distance3600to3900 0.051 7,193
Distance3900to4200 0.049 7,018
Distance4200to4500 0.046 6,531
Number Within # Equal to 1 # Equal to 2 # Equal to 3
Count0to300 122 5 0
Count300to600 733 23 0
Count600to900 1,471 54 0
Count900to1200 2,473 80 0
Count1200to1500 3,744 148 3
Count1500to1800 4,620 204 9
Count1800to2100 5,538 290 2
Count2100to2400 6,829 365 12
Count2400to2700 7,764 475 22
Count2700to3000 8,965 690 10
Count3000to3300 10,031 757 48
Count3300to3600 10,580 848 62
Count3600to3900 11,595 1043 109
Count3900to4200 12,898 1268 128
Count4200to4500 13,511 1364 128
a Distance in thousands of feet is used in the analysis that
follows.
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Table 2.4: Changes in Census Tract Demographics from 2000 to 2010. 322 Census
Tracts in Central Kentucky.
U.S. Mean Sample Mean
Variable 2000 2010 % Change 2000 2010 % Change
Mean Incomea 71,728 70,883 -1.18 63,924 60,290 -6.00
Median Incomea 53,176 51,914 -2.37 51,805 48,649 -6.00
% Unemployed 3.70 7.90 113.51 5.24 8.49 62.00
% No High School Diploma 12.10 8.70 -28.10 13.91 10.41 -25.00
% High School Diploma 28.60 29.00 1.40 34.43 35.36 3.00
% Bachelors Degree or Higher 24.40 27.90 14.34 17.38 20.46 18.00
% Black 12.00 12.00 0.00 9.01 9.62 7.00
% White 75.00 74.00 -1.33 88.21 86.66 -2.00
% Owns Home 66.00 67.00 1.52 72.73 71.05 -2.00
% Out of State 8.40 2.40 -71.00 8.13 9.12 12.00
a Incomes were converted to 2010 dollars using the CPI.
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics for Changing House
Characteristics for Houses that Sold More Than Once.
Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011. 26,579 Unique Repeat
Sales.
Variable Number Changed Percent Changed
Number of Bedrooms 4,311 17
Number of Full Bathrooms 2,617 10
Number of Partial Bathrooms 1,486 6
Finished Basement 4,558 18
Central Air 2,783 11
Has Garage 3,097 12
Has Carport 666 3
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Table 2.6: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas on
Property Values using a Continuous Measure of Distance. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Distance to
Any Antenna -0.00922*** -0.0113*** 0.0104*** 0.00892***
(0.000624)b (0.000610) (0.00195) (0.00176)
Distance2 to
Any Antenna 0.000162*** 0.000182*** -0.000324*** -0.000287***
(2.34e-05) (2.28e-05) (6.18e-05) (5.81e-05)
Constant 10.37*** 10.38*** 10.50*** 10.23***
(0.0104) (0.0204) (0.0315) (0.0200)
Observations 142,161 142,161 142,161 142,161
R-squared 0.703 0.718 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 1 mile Ft. Knox.
b Standard errors are clustered at the level of included fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas on
Property Values using the Inverse of Distance to the Nearest Antenna. Central
Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Inverse Distance to
Any Antenna 0.0805*** 0.0902*** -0.0358*** -0.0284***
(0.00372) (0.00364) (0.00887) (0.00755)
Constant 10.29*** 10.28*** 10.56*** 10.28***
(0.00994) (0.0202) (0.0302) (0.0187)
Observations 142,161 142,161 142,161 142,161
R-squared 0.703 0.717 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 1 mile Ft. Knox.
b Standard errors are clustered at the level of included fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
44
Table 2.8: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of Towers Only on
Property Values using a Continuous Measure of Distance. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Distance to
Tower -0.00446*** -0.00737*** 0.0119*** 0.0109***
(0.000597)b (0.000585) (0.00213) (0.00187)
Distance2 to
Tower 2.23e-05 6.31e-05*** -0.000357*** -0.000335***
(2.24e-05) (2.19e-05) (6.54e-05) (6.04e-05)
Constant 10.34*** 10.36*** 10.49*** 10.22***
(0.0104) (0.0204) (0.0315) (0.0205)
Observations 142,161 142,161 142,161 142,161
R-squared 0.702 0.717 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 1 mile Ft. Knox.
b Standard errors are clustered at the level of included fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
45
Table 2.9: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas on
Property Values Using the Nearest Antenna Method with the Closest Rings
Combined. Central Kentucky Sales Data. 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Distance0to600 0.131*** 0.140*** -0.0630*** -0.0572***
(0.0136)b (0.0133) (0.0196) (0.0178)
Distance600to900 0.0982*** 0.111*** -0.0756*** -0.0699***
(0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0168) (0.0152)
Distance900to1200 0.105*** 0.121*** -0.0697*** -0.0727***
(0.00829) (0.00809) (0.0160) (0.0141)
Distance1200to1500 0.110*** 0.122*** -0.0509*** -0.0581***
(0.00689) (0.00672) (0.0119) (0.0107)
Distance1500to1800 0.0798*** 0.0911*** -0.0600*** -0.0687***
(0.00634) (0.00619) (0.0114) (0.0106)
Distance1800to2100 0.0623*** 0.0736*** -0.0516*** -0.0544***
(0.00603) (0.00589) (0.0113) (0.0102)
Distance2100to2400 0.0425*** 0.0565*** -0.0511*** -0.0536***
(0.00554) (0.00541) (0.0114) (0.00964)
Distance2400to2700 0.0413*** 0.0547*** -0.0476*** -0.0448***
(0.00535) (0.00523) (0.0106) (0.00862)
Distance2700to3000 0.0115** 0.0239*** -0.0512*** -0.0457***
(0.00510) (0.00499) (0.0108) (0.00849)
Distance3000to3300 0.00454 0.0164*** -0.0525*** -0.0489***
(0.00504) (0.00492) (0.00990) (0.00825)
Distance3300to3600 0.0232*** 0.0337*** -0.0406*** -0.0360***
(0.00507) (0.00495) (0.00940) (0.00778)
Distance3600to3900 0.0130*** 0.0230*** -0.0419*** -0.0356***
(0.00501) (0.00489) (0.00918) (0.00712)
Distance3900to4200 0.0239*** 0.0327*** -0.0275*** -0.0201***
(0.00505) (0.00493) (0.00837) (0.00660)
Distance4200to4500 0.0210*** 0.0270*** -0.0168** -0.00857
(0.00521) (0.00509) (0.00707) (0.00627)
Constant 10.29*** 10.28*** 10.56*** 10.30***
(0.00993) (0.0201) (0.0295) (0.0194)
Observations 142,164 142,164 142,164 142,164
R-squared 0.703 0.718 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 1 mile Ft. Knox.
b Standard errors are clustered at the level of included fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas
on Property Values Using the Antenna Count Method with the Closest Rings
Combined. Central Kentucky Sales Data. 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Count0to600 0.0993*** 0.100*** -0.0384** -0.0307**
(0.0129)b (0.0126) (0.0166) (0.0148)
Count600to900 0.0636*** 0.0693*** -0.0502*** -0.0458***
(0.00981) (0.00957) (0.0146) (0.0133)
Count900to1200 0.0697*** 0.0784*** -0.0432*** -0.0483***
(0.00766) (0.00748) (0.0131) (0.0118)
Count1200to1500 0.0732*** 0.0787*** -0.0307*** -0.0371***
(0.00617) (0.00602) (0.00973) (0.00900)
Count1500to1800 0.0493*** 0.0536*** -0.0397*** -0.0480***
(0.00551) (0.00538) (0.00810) (0.00769)
Count1800to2100 0.0453*** 0.0494*** -0.0291*** -0.0315***
(0.00502) (0.00490) (0.00795) (0.00719)
Count2100to2400 0.0299*** 0.0363*** -0.0264*** -0.0303***
(0.00451) (0.00440) (0.00870) (0.00702)
Count2400to2700 0.0305*** 0.0362*** -0.0289*** -0.0277***
(0.00418) (0.00408) (0.00706) (0.00635)
Count2700to3000 0.00339 0.00958** -0.0307*** -0.0286***
(0.00385) (0.00376) (0.00739) (0.00608)
Count3000to3300 0.00398 0.00951*** -0.0299*** -0.0311***
(0.00362) (0.00353) (0.00694) (0.00557)
Count3300to3600 0.0167*** 0.0213*** -0.0251*** -0.0239***
(0.00349) (0.00340) (0.00608) (0.00482)
Count3600to3900 0.00973*** 0.0147*** -0.0291*** -0.0274***
(0.00323) (0.00315) (0.00626) (0.00504)
Count3900to4200 0.0255*** 0.0304*** -0.0237*** -0.0196***
(0.00306) (0.00299) (0.00652) (0.00465)
Count4200to4500 0.0215*** 0.0266*** -0.0191*** -0.0140***
(0.00302) (0.00295) (0.00613) (0.00458)
Constant 10.29*** 10.29*** 10.56*** 10.31***
(0.00992) (0.0201) (0.0294) (0.0206)
Observations 142,164 142,164 142,164 142,164
R-squared 0.703 0.718 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 1 mile Ft. Knox.
b Standard errors are clustered at the level of included fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.11: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas
on Property Values using a Continuous Measure of Distance with the Density of
Nearby Antennas. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Distance to
Any Antenna -0.00166** -0.00306*** 0.00587*** 0.00370*d
(0.000785)b (0.000766) (0.00210) (0.00193)
Distance2 to
Any Antenna -6.54e-05** -6.39e-05** -0.000202*** -0.000145**
(2.73e-05) (2.66e-05) (6.18e-05) (5.93e-05)
Constant 10.32*** 10.33*** 10.53*** 10.29***
(0.0108) (0.0206) (0.0332) (0.0222)
Observations 142,161 142,161 142,161 142,161
R-squared 0.704 0.718 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Density of Antennasc Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 1 mile Ft. Knox.
b Standard errors are clustered at the level of included fixed effects.
c Density is measured as the the number of antennas located within specified distances from the
property as in Table 2.10.
d The P-value (0.0001) from a Chow test confirms that the estimates in columns 3 and 4 for distance
and distance squared are statistically different.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12: Repeat Sales Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas
on Property Values Using a Continuous Measure of Distance. Constant Structural
Characteristics. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price)
∆ Distance
to any Antenna 0.00754*** 0.00748*** 0.00727*** 0.00332***
(0.00103)b (0.00103) (0.00105) (0.00111)
Constant 0.0545*** 0.0553*** 0.0610*** 0.151***
(0.00308) (0.00311) (0.00332) (0.00525)
Observations 29,886 29,719 28,387 20,976
R-squared 0.102 0.103 0.107 0.144
All Repeats Yes No No No
Four or Less No Yes No No
Three or Less No No Yes No
Sold Only Twice No No No Yes
a Year dummy variables were also included. The dummy variables are equal to -1 if the year
indicates the first sale of the property, 1 if the year indicates the year of the last sale of the
property, and 0 otherwise.
b Standard errors are clustered at the property level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.13: Repeat Sales Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas on
Property Values Using a Continuous Measure of Distance. Changing Structural
Characteristics. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price)
∆ Distance
to any Antenna 0.00746*** 0.00739*** 0.00722*** 0.00388***
(0.000965)b (0.000968) (0.000987) (0.00104)
∆ Bedrooms 0.0785*** 0.0770*** 0.0740*** 0.0619***
(0.00558) (0.00554) (0.00557) (0.00621)
∆ Full Bathrooms 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.168***
(0.00792) (0.00795) (0.00814) (0.00897)
∆ Partial Bathrooms 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.110***
(0.00950) (0.00951) (0.00979) (0.0113)
∆ Finished Basement 0.0210*** 0.0213*** 0.0210*** 0.00960**
(0.00383) (0.00384) (0.00393) (0.00455)
∆ Central Air 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.251*** 0.243***
(0.00974) (0.00979) (0.0100) (0.0116)
∆ Carport 0.0592*** 0.0600*** 0.0554*** 0.0391***
(0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0150)
∆ Garage 0.0158** 0.0156** 0.0136* 0.0204**
(0.00772) (0.00775) (0.00793) (0.00899)
Constant 0.0354*** 0.0361*** 0.0411*** 0.122***
(0.00286) (0.00289) (0.00309) (0.00489)
Observations 29,886 29,719 28,387 20,976
R-squared 0.202 0.202 0.203 0.230
All Repeats Yes No No No
Four or Less No Yes No No
Three or Less No No Yes No
Sold Only Twice No No No Yes
a Year dummy variables were also included. The dummy variables are equal to -1 if the year indicates
the first sale of the property, 1 if the year indicates the year of the last sale of the property, and 0
otherwise.
b Standard errors are clustered at the property level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.14: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of All Antennas on
Property Values. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sold Price) ln(Sold Price) ln(Sold Price) ln(Sold Price)
Within 2000 Feet of
an Antenna Site 0.0289*** -0.0101*** 0.0135 0.00303
(0.00294)b (0.00250) (0.0144) (0.0133)
Antenna Standing When Sold -0.0164** -0.0206***
(0.00801) (0.00736)
Within 2000 Feet x
Antenna Standing When Sold -0.0334** -0.0221
(0.0152) (0.0135)
Constant 10.29*** 10.55*** 10.56*** 10.78***
(0.0202) (0.0905) (0.0302) (0.0324)
Observations 142,164 142,164 142,164 142,164
R-squared 0.716 0.853 0.853 0.861
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Allows Effect of Housing
Characteristics to Vary
Over Timec No No No Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 1 mile Ft. Knox.
b Standard errors are clustered at the level of included fixed effects.
c Structural housing characteristics were interacted with time dummy variables.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 2.1a: Houses Likely Affected by Nearby Tower
Figure 2.1b: Houses Likely Unaffected by Nearby Tower
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Figure 2.2: Four Quarter Percent Change in the FHFA Housing CPI
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Figure 2.3a: Figure 2B in Linden and Rockoff (2008)
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Figure 2.3b: Figure 3B in Linden and Rockoff (2008)
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Figure 2.4: Non-Parametric Plot of the Relationship Between Sales Price and
Distance to the Nearest Antenna
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Figure 2.5: Partial Relationship Between Sales Price and Distance to the Nearest Antenna
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Figure 2.6: Marginal Effect of Distance to the Nearest Antenna on Sales Price
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3 A Comparison of Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokerage Firms
3.1 House Selling, House Buying, and Real Estate Brokers
Purchasing a house is one of the biggest financial decisions a person can make. Only
about 9 percent of houses sold in 2012 were for sale by owner; the majority of home
buyers work with licensed real estate agents to guide them through the process (National
Association of Realtors (2013)), and the majority of agents are affiliated with a franchise
(National Association of Realtors (2011a)). Whether it is the seller seeking advice on the
appropriate list price and marketing tactics, or the buyer looking for insight about the
market value of a property, both sides of the transaction can benefit from working with a
real estate professional1. Homeowners who decide to list their property with a broker pay
a non-trivial sum of money if their property sells. With a median house price of around
$208,000 nationally in May 2013, and commissions of, say, 6% of the final sales price,
there is $12,480 at stake. Since the commission paid to a real estate broker is the largest
monetary cost in selling a house, it is important the homeowner chooses a broker that is
able to efficiently locate potential buyers and get a high sales price after a brief time on the
market.
3.2 Previous Studies of Agent Behavior, Franchised Brokers: Implications and Findings
While this paper is not the first to study the effectiveness of real estate brokerage firms, or
to analyze agent behavior and the incentives they face, it is the first to use actual sales data
to compare franchised real estate brokerage firms that have offices across the United
States to brokerage firms that are locally owned. Since a franchised brokerage firm can
take advantage of national advertising campaigns, there is reason to believe properties
listed with these firms are marketed differently and exposed to a wider range of buyers.
1Zumpano et al. (1996) show that buyers with high opportunity costs and little information about the local
market are more likely to use a broker to search for a house.
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They are likely more efficient in reaching potential home buyers that live outside of the
local area looking to move into the area. For example, a person selling a house in Florida
through the local Florida RE/MAX office can more easily be referred to an agent at a
RE/MAX office in Kentucky where that broker helps in finding a new house, even if there
is not a price effect. The ability of the franchised broker to match buyers and sellers across
broad geographic areas could lead to houses listed with these firms being sold more
quickly without sacrificing sales price.
A notable recent contribution to the literature on agent behavior is Levitt and Syverson
(2008). They compare sales price and days on market for houses that are agent-owned to
sales price and days on market for houses agents list for their clients. They find that
agent-owned properties stay on the market longer and sell for more than equivalent houses
that are not agent-owned. They show also that the greater the asymmetry is between
agent’s and seller’s knowledge, the larger are the distortions. Beck (2009) does not focus
on who owns the property being sold, but rather on the characteristics of the agents and
how they impact the sales price and time on market of the houses they sell. Using data
from a region in Kentucky similar to the data in this study, he finds that more active agents
do sell houses faster, but at the expense of sales price. He also finds that agents who hold a
large number of listings at any given time produce slightly lower sales prices. Huang and
Rutherford (2007) look at the “Realtor" designation and compare properties sold by
agents with and without this designation. They find that properties sold by agents with the
Realtor designation are more likely to sell, sell for more, and spend less time on the
market than properties sold by agents who do not have the Realtor designation. The
attribute this to the access Realtor’s have to the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) that
non-Realtors are unable to take advantage of, and that the “Realtor" designation represents
a signal of quality to which the market responds.
There are a few papers that discuss franchising in real estate brokerage. Using data
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collected by the National Association of Realtors, Jud et al. (1994) and Benjamin et al.
(2006) compare revenues and profits for franchised and non-franchised real estate
brokerage firms. Benjamin et al. (2006) find that franchised real estate brokerage firms
generate more revenue but they are not necessarily more profitable than independent
brokerage firms, while Jud et al. (1994) find that the initial fees charged by the franchisor
are substantially less than the present value of the stream of incremental profits attributed
to franchise affiliation2. Frew and Jud (1986) use survey data on real estate brokerage
firms from three cities in North Carolina to estimate the benefit of franchise affiliation and
find results similar to Jud et al. (1994).
While this paper does not focus on the decision to franchise, a discussion of why
franchising is a common organization form in the real estate industry is warranted.
Anderson and Fok (1998) note that consumers are usually infrequent participants in the
housing market and rely on the expertise of real estate professionals to guide them through
the process. The brand name associated with a real estate franchise serves as a signal of
quality to those who are unfamiliar with the quality of real estate professionals and the
local housing market (Anderson and Fok (1998); Brickley and Dark (1987); Rubin (1978);
Caves and Murphy (1976); Mathewson and Winter (1985)). The quality assurance
provided by a franchise’s brand name is most important when consumers are moving to a
particular area in which they have no experience in the housing market. If consumers are
moving within the same geographic area, they likely have knowledge about the the quality
of the local real estate professionals through discussions with others who have experience
in the local market. If the market is characterized by mostly local transactions where
consumers are moving within the same geographic area, the quality assurance provided by
a franchise’s brand name would have little value.
2They estimate the benefit of affiliating with a franchise to be approximately a 9% increase in annual revenues
to the average franchised firm. They do not have data on the net income of firms so they only are able
to compare the additional revenue associated with franchise affiliation to the estimated cost of franchise
affiliation using industry averages.
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Even though the brand name that is associated with a franchise provides a signal of quality
and uniformity to consumers, an opportunistic franchisee has an incentive to shirk on the
quality of service they provide if doing so can increase their profits (Klein (1980); Caves
and Murphy (1976); Rubin (1978); Mathewson and Winter (1985); Brickley and Dark
(1987); Anderson and Fok (1998)). In their discussions of company owned versus
franchised outlets, Brickley and Dark (1987) and Minkler (1990) suggest that locations
that rely heavily on repeat business are more likely to be franchised compared to locations
that rely mostly on a transient customer base3. If a franchisee caters to mostly non-repeat
customers, they can substitute low quality inputs or service for the level of quality
required by the franchisor since the consumers will not retaliate by shopping at
competitor’s location in the future. However, if a franchisee provides low quality to a
non-repeat customer, this will diminish the value of the brand name creating a demand
externality for all other franchisees operating under the same name. If they do rely heavily
on repeat customers, the franchisee must consistently provide quality service to earn the
customers future business. In the real estate industry consumers are infrequent
participants, however, a firm’s reputation can be hurt if they provide low quality service
and the affected consumer spreads this information to other potential clients. This internal
incentive to avoid shirking and deteriorating the brand name give the franchisor an
opportunity to expand without the need for extensive monitoring even when the franchisee
serves mostly non-repeat customers.
There is substantial heterogeneity in housing markets across the United States.
Franchising allows the local real estate franchisees to gain specific knowledge of the local
markets in which they operate while the franchisor specializes in promoting the brand
name at the national and regional levels (Caves and Murphy (1976); Minkler (1990);
Mathewson and Winter (1985); Anderson and Fok (1998)). Since most states require at
3Using distance from a freeway as a proxy for repeat business, Minkler (1990) finds that stores closer to a
freeway are more likely to be company owned, while Brickley and Dark (1987) finds that stores closer to a
freeway are more likely to be franchised.
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least two years of experience before issuing a brokers license, the franchisor can have
confidence that the broker/owner operating the franchise will be experienced in the local
market. This allows the franchisor to provide managerial advice, training programs for the
broker’s sales associates, and broader market research to complement the broker’s
knowledge about the local market (Rubin (1978); Anderson and Fok (1998)). While this is
a common explanation for the prevalence of franchising in a variety of industries, housing
markets are one area where national and local trends are likely to diverge or even be
orthogonal to one another. For example, Carson and Dastrup (2013) report there was
considerable spatial variation in housing prices during the Great Recession. Across
metropolitan areas, housing prices declined none at all to more than 60%!
This paper breaks from the previous literature by comparing the performance of
franchised brokerage firms to independent brokers holding constant the type of agent that
listed the property. The focus of this study is on franchised compared to independent
brokers rather than agents’ characteristics; as in previous studies, performance is
measured by the sales price and the time it takes to locate the buyer. Since franchised real
estate brokers have access to training programs and referral networks, houses listed with
franchised real estate brokers are expected to sell sooner than comparable houses listed
with independent brokers; the effect on sales price is indeterminate. This study is also the
first to test the hypothesis that franchised sales are more prevalent in areas where
consumers are less familiar with the local market using house sales data (Brickley and
Dark (1987); Frew and Jud (1986); Anderson and Fok (1998)). Since franchised brokers
have access to a nationally recognizable brand name, risk averse consumes that are
unfamiliar with the local market should be more likely to work with a franchised real
estate broker if they associate the brand name with a certain level of quality. Guided by a
model of real estate brokerage that includes listing and selling brokers, this paper
compares the performance of franchised and independent brokers. Using detailed data
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from sales by both types of brokers, tests are made for differences in local versus
out-of-state buyers, list price, sales price, and time on the market.
3.3 A Model of Franchised and Independent Brokerage
3.3.1 The Framework
This section provides a simple model that compares franchised and independent real estate
brokers. It builds upon the model of discount brokers in Rutherford and Yavas (2012) by
providing functional forms so that explicit solutions can be found. Table 3.1 illustrates the
difference in revenues for independent and franchised listing brokers. When a franchised
listing broker sells a listed house a certain percentage of the commission must be paid to
the franchisor. This royalty is represented in the model by r and is the percentage of gross
commission revenue4. The revenue to a franchised broker who sells a house as the listing
broker is (1-r)kP where k is the percentage of the sale price charged as commission and P
is the sales price. When a different broker sells the house, independent and franchised
listing brokers pay 1-µ of the total commission to the selling broker and keep µ, where µ
is the percentage of the total commission the listing broker keeps when a different broker
finds the buyer first. If a different broker finds the buyer first for a franchised listing, the
franchised listing broker only pays a royalty on the portion of the commission not given to
the selling broker. For any given sales price, the revenue to the homeowner is the same
regardless of whether it is listed by a franchised or independent broker and is equal to
(1− k)P .
Let the probability a property is sold be:
Θi(L, S) = Φi(L, S) + Γi(L, S) (3.1)
4Royalties typically vary between one and six percent of gross commission revenue, however, some are
capped at a maximum dollar amount per agent per year or are a flat dollar amount per month. The typical
case is what is modeled here (National Association of Realtors (2011b)).
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where i=I indicates an independent broker listing and i=F indicates a franchised brokers
listing. Φi is the probability that the listing broker finds the buyer, and Γi is the probability
that a different broker finds the buyer first and the listing broker pays that broker 1− µ of
the total commission. L is the effort of the listing broker and S is the total effort exerted
by the selling brokers. This specification is similar to Rutherford and Yavas (2012) where
they let S be the average effort of potential selling brokers. This model allows for n
selling agents which means S is the sum of effort exerted by the selling brokers
(S =
∑
sj where sj is the effort of selling broker j).
Let the functional form for Θi(L, S) be5:
Θi(L, S) =
αliL
1 + αliL+ α
s
iS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φi
+
αsiS
1 + αLi L+ α
s
iS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γi
(3.2)
Φi is increasing in L and decreasing in S, Γi is increasing in S and decreasing in L, and
∂2Φi/∂S∂L 6= 0 and ∂2Γi/∂L∂S 6= 0. This type of contest success function ensures that
the more effort the listing agent (selling agent) exerts, the probability the listing agent
(selling agent) finds the buyer first increases and the probability the selling agent (listing
agent) finds the buyer first decreases. This functional form also ensures that Θi is concave
in L and S and is strictly less than one6.
These functional forms are proposed in Blavatskyy (2010) and are shown to be the only
functional forms to possess the important characteristics needed for contest success
functions in this setting. The most important property is that the relative probabilities of
winning are homogeneous of degree 0, i.e, Φ(L,S)
Γ(L,S)
= Φ(λL,λS)
Γ(λL,λS)
. This says that if both listing
5Notice that the ratio Φ/Γ=αliL/α
s
iS. If L = S, this ratio equals α
l
i/α
s
i which can be estimated using the
sales data. Since the percentage of properties sold by the listing broker is known for both types of brokers,
this can be used as the estimate for αli and can be estimated using α
s
i = 1− αli.
6Since listed properties do not sell with certainty there has to be a third state of the world in this model where
neither the listing broker or a different broker locates a buyer. With these functional forms, the probability a
buyer is not found is 1
1+αLi L+α
s
iS
.
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and selling agents increase their effort by the same amount, the relative probabilities of
them winning remains the same. This property also ensures that the probabilities are not
sensitive to the units in which effort is measured. The second property is that if either
agent exerts zero effort, the probability of that agent finding the buyer first is zero. So long
as one of the agents exerts positive effort, there is a positive probability of the property
being sold. For example, when a property is listed at the lower end of the price
distribution there may not be incentive for anyone other than the listing agent to locate a
buyer. Because of the way commissions are split between agents and their brokers, the net
payoff of selling a low-priced house listed with a different firm could be less than what is
necessary to encourage other selling brokers to try and locate a buyer7.
In this model, the probability of buyers being located differs from those presented in
Rutherford and Yavas (2012). They present only two probability functions. The first is
Θ(L, S) which is the probability the buyer is found, and Φ(L, S) which is the probability
that the listing agent finds the buyer first. Since the listing agent keeps the entire
commission (kP ) only if the buyer is located before a different selling broker, a third
probability function is necessary. The probability of this event is missing from their
model8. They also assume that ∂2Θ/∂L∂S = 0 along with being concave in L and S.
Since the contest success functions used here have been shown to be the only functional
form to possess the characteristics needed for contest success functions in this setting, the
assumption that the cross partial is equal to zero should be reconsidered.
7Levitt and Syverson (2008) discusses this in the context of agent-owned vs. non-agent-owned listings.
8This can be seen by looking at the expected payoff functions for the discount and full service listing brokers
on pages 8 and 9 in Rutherford and Yavas (2012). The probability that a buyer is found by a different broker
and the listing broker has to pay µ of the total commission in the expected payoff function is overstated by
Θ− Γ.
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The objective function for the homeowner is:
max

maxPF
∫ B
PF
ΘF (L, S)(1− k)PFdF (Pb)
maxPI
∫ B
PI
ΘI(L, S)(1− k)PIdF (Pb)
(3.3)
where the F subscript indicates a franchised broker, I indicates an independent broker, and
Θ(L, S) is defined as in (3.2) above. PF and PI are the take-it-or-leave-it list prices
chosen by the homeowner under a franchised or independent listing, and k is the
percentage of the sales price paid to the listing broker if the buyer is found9. F (Pb) is the
distribution of potential buyers’ reservation prices and is the same for both franchised and
independent listings10. Reservation prices are assumed to be distributed uniformly on the
(0,B) interval where B is the maximum reservation price of the potential buyers11.
The objective functions for the two types of listing agents are:
max
L
∫ B
PF
ΦF (L, S)(1− r)kPFdF (Pb) +
∫ B
PF
ΓF (L, S)(1− r)µkPFdF (Pb)− CF (L)
(3.4)
max
L
∫ B
PI
ΦI(L, S)kPIdF (Pb) +
∫ B
PI
ΓI(L, S)µkPIdF (Pb)− CI(L) (3.5)
Where r <1 is the percentage of revenue generated by the listing broker that must be paid
to the franchisor, µ is the percentage of the total commission that is kept by the listing
broker if a different broker finds a buyer first, and Ci(L) is a strictly increasing cost of
effort function with constant marginal cost ci. Φ and Γ are the probabilities of the listing
and selling brokers finding the buyer first and are given in (3.2) above. The first term is the
expected revenue when the listing broker locates the buyer first, and the second term is the
9The negotiation process is excluded from this model.
10All potential buyers in the model are assumed to be identical and are indifferent between franchised and
independent firms listings.
11Other distributions were used and the results were similar. The uniform distribution was used for its com-
putational simplicity.
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expected revenue when a different selling broker locates the buyer first and the listing
broker must pay them 1-µ of the total commission.
Selling brokers have the following objective functions:
max
S
∫ B
PF
ΓF (L, S)(1− µ)kPFdF (Pb)− CF (S) (3.6)
max
S
∫ B
PI
ΓI(L, S)(1− µ)kPIdF (Pb)− CI(S) (3.7)
where Ci(S) is a strictly increasing cost of effort function with constant marginal cost ci,
and Γi, µ, k, and Pi are the same as described above. Notice that the revenues for both
types of brokers are identical, but they have different probability and cost functions12.
3.3.2 Effort Levels of Listing and Selling Brokers and Best Reply Functions
The game between the homeowner, listing broker, and selling broker is demonstrated in
Figure 3.1. For each type of listing, the listing and selling brokers will choose their levels
of effort simultaneously13. The homeowner will then observe these levels of effort and
then choose a list price to maximize equation (3.3). Whichever type of broker gives the
higher expected payoff to the homeowner will then get the listing. Since the functional
forms lead to intractable solutions, they are demonstrated graphically using parameter
values consistent with the MLS data that will be used later. The best reply functions for
the listing and selling brokers are given in the appendix.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the best reply functions for each type of listing when the
commission charged is 6%, the franchise fee is set to 5%, there is a 50/50 split of the total
12When a franchised broker locates the buyer for another broker’s listing, the franchised broker still has to
pay a royalty to the franchisor on the portion of commission that they receive. To avoid adding a third
player to the game, only one type of selling broker is represented in the model. Selling brokers are allowed
to exert different levels of effort depending on the type of broker that lists the property.
13In the stylized extensive form of the game shown in Figure 3.1, the listing and selling brokers choose
between a high or low level of effort. In practice, the listing and selling brokers choose any level of effort
greater than or equal to zero.
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commission when a different broker finds a buyer, the marginal cost of effort is equal to
100, and there is only one selling broker14. Other combinations of parameter values were
used and each gives qualitatively similar best reply functions. In this type of game, the
effort levels of the listing and selling brokers are strategic substitutes. This follows from
the probability function shown in equation (3.2) above where the marginal increase in the
probability of finding the buyer first for the listing broker (selling broker) is decreasing in
the level of effort exerted by the selling broker (listing broker). This leads to the
downward sloping best reply functions shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Figures 3.4 and 3.5
show the best reply functions when there are five identical selling brokers. Notice that the
effort exerted by the listing broker does not change when the number of selling brokers
increases. The selling brokers reduce their effort proportional to the number of selling
agents in the market (the effort exerted by a selling broker is one-fifth of the effort level
when there was only one selling broker). Since the listing broker is competing against the
sum of efforts exerted by the selling brokers to locate the buyer, the listing brokers exert
the same amount of effort whether they are competing against one broker exerting S1 units
of effort or n selling brokers each exerting S1/n units of effort. As the number of selling
agents increase, the probability that an individual selling broker locates the potential buyer
decreases, reducing the return on their effort. This leads to each individual selling brokers
exerting less effort to locate the potential buyer.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the expected revenue for the homeowner as a function of the list
price chosen using the same parameter values that were used to derive the best reply
functions in Figures 3.2-3.5 and a maximum reservation price for potential buyers of
$100,000. Notice that the list price that maximizes the homeowner’s payoff is the same
for both types of listings and is equal to $50,000. This value is equal to B/2, the average
reservation price for potential buyers assuming reservation prices are uniformly
14All of the parameter values except for B, ci, and Pi come from the data or stylized facts about the local real
estate market.
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distributed between zero and B15.
Tables 3.2a and 3.2b show the theoretical model’s estimates of the effort, probabilities of
finding a buyer first, and the homeowner’s payoff using two sets of parameter values. The
only difference in the two sets of estimates is that in Table 3.2b the marginal cost for
franchised brokers is less than that of independent brokers. When the marginal cost of
effort is the same for franchised and independent brokers, efforts are such that the
homeowner is better off listing with an independent broker. Because the franchised
brokers have to pay a franchise fee of r on all commissions generated, this discourages
effort and leads to a lower expected payoff to the homeowner. In Table 3.2b, even though
they still have to pay the franchise fee, they are assumed to have a lower marginal cost of
effort. This works in the opposite direction of the franchise fee and increases the effort
levels to a level where it is now in the homeowner’s best interest to list with a franchised
broker.
3.3.3 Different Marginal Costs of Effort for Independent and Franchised Brokers
In this model the marginal cost of effort for franchised brokers is assumed to be less than
the marginal cost of effort for the independent brokers. There is good reason to believe
this assumption is appropriate. Using data from the 1994-1995 National Association of
Realtors’ nationwide survey Lewis and Anderson (1999) estimate a cost frontier and
Anderson et al. (2000) estimate cost and profit frontiers to determine the efficiency of real
estate brokerage firms. Both studies find that franchised real estate brokerage firms are
more efficient from a cost perspective compared to independent brokers and list brand
recognition as a reason for increased efficiency. If potential buyers are unfamiliar with the
market they are moving into and are uncertain about the quality of real estate brokers in
the area, they will be more likely to seek out a “brand name" brokerage firm if they
15Given the properties of the functional forms given in equation 3.2, an analytical proof of this is not possible
at this point. Different combinations of parameter values were used and similar results were found.
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associate that name with a guaranteed level of quality. This behavior results in less effort
having to be exerted by the franchised brokers since potential buyers select into franchised
brokerage firms reducing the amount of effort needed to locate potential buyers.
Some buyers choose to work with a franchised broker because of the quality associated
with their franchise; however, some choose to work with them simply because they were
referred by the broker where they are currently selling a house. If the person is working
with a particular franchise where their current house is for sale, the listing broker can
easily refer them to a broker with the same franchise where they are moving. The effect of
referrals is similar to buyers seeking out a franchised broker due to brand loyalty and
could result in even more efficiency gains. If the broker where the person is selling a
house can inform the broker they are currently working with of their preferences for
characteristics such as house size, price range, and amenities, they can seek out suitable
properties before ever meeting the potential buyer. Time that would be spent meeting with
the client and getting a feel for their preferences can be spent looking at houses that are
more likely to match the consumer’s preferences.
In addition, each of the franchises that are represented in the sample offer training for their
agents and brokers and technology that assists in marketing listed properties and locating
buyers16. Training courses focus on areas such as advertising, sales techniques, referrals,
and business operations, while technology training focuses on topics such as advertising
on mobile devices, website design, and lead and referral systems. Training, technology,
and the previous cost-saving advantages of franchised real estate brokers mentioned lead
to the following: franchised brokers have advantages in making potential buyers aware of
their own listings and locating buyers for all listings. While some skills agents acquired
while working for a franchised real estate firm are transferable and could be used in
independent brokerage firms if the agent chooses to leave (marketing and sales techniques,
16This training is described on the websites of each franchise in the sample.
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and business operation), the primary time-saving advantages such as the referral network,
lead generating systems, and the national advertising campaign only benefit those agents
working for that particular franchise.
3.4 Testable Implications from the Model of Brokerage and the Literature
3.4.1 Implications of the Model
The theoretical model presented above provides two testable hypotheses. The first is that
houses listed franchised brokers and houses listed with independent brokers will have the
same list price for a given house. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show that the homeowner chooses
the same list price to maximize their expected revenue regardless of the type of broker
they choose to list the property.
The second is that franchised brokers sell their own listing less often than independent
brokers which is shown in Tables 3.2a and 3.2b (ΦF < ΦI). In Table 3.2b where
franchised brokers are assumed to have different marginal costs of effort, the model
predicts that the franchised broker will find a buyer for their own listings approximately
5% less often than an independent broker. The percentages of properties sold “in house"
for each type of listing broker are compared to test this prediction.
3.4.2 Implications from the Literature
Levitt and Syverson (2008) compared the sales price and days on market for houses that
were agent-owned to the sales price and days on market for houses that agents listed for
their clients. Since the agents have more knowledge about the local real estate market,
they predict and find that agent-owned houses stay on the market longer and sell for more
than non-agent-owned properties. In this paper, franchised real estate brokers are able to
take advantage of a nationally recognized brand name, nationwide advertising campaigns,
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lead generating systems, and large referral networks. If these assets give franchised real
estate brokers an edge over independent brokers, a franchised broker should be able to
match buyers and sellers more efficiently than independent brokers. This leads to the
another testable hypothesis: houses listed with franchised brokers should sell quicker than
comparable houses listed with independent brokers, but the effect on sales price is
indeterminate. If franchised brokers sell houses sooner without a reduction in sales price,
this implies they are indeed more efficient than independent brokers. Homeowners who
list with franchised brokers can still be made better off even if the quicker sale results in a
slightly lower sales price depending on the size of the reduction in sales price. A
framework similar to Levitt and Syverson (2008) will be used to estimate the tradeoff
between sales price and the time it takes to locate a buyer for franchised and independent
brokerage firms.
Brickley and Dark (1987) argue that in general consumers less familiar with the local
market will choose a franchise if they associate the franchise with a certain level of
quality, and Frew and Jud (1986) and Anderson and Fok (1998) make the same argument
specifically for real estate brokerage services. This provides another testable hypothesis.
If consumers relate the nationally recognized brand names and nationwide advertising
campaigns associated with franchised selling brokers as a signal of quality, franchised
brokers should be more active in areas where more residents are moving from out of state.
Even if local independent brokers have more knowledge of the local real estate market, the
brand name associated with a particular franchise gives a signal of quality that the
consumer can identify. A similar result will be found even if the consumers moving from
out of state do not associate advertising and brand names with a certain level of quality,
but they are referred to the franchised broker by a broker where they are currently living.
To test this hypothesis, each property’s location is used to determine the number of
residents near each property that moved from out of state.
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3.5 Data and Specifications for Estimation
3.5.1 Data on the Markets for Real Estate Brokers and Housing
The data cover 12 years from 2000-2011 and were extracted from two Multiple Listing
Services that serve the central region of Kentucky. The data provide an extensive set of
structural characteristics, closing dates, sales and list price17, and the agent and office
responsible for the listing and sale for each property sold18. These data are much richer
than the data used in previous studies on franchising in real estate brokerage. Benjamin
et al. (2006), Jud et al. (1994), and Frew and Jud (1986) all use survey data to compare
revenues and profitability for franchised and independent real estate brokers and are
unable to control for type and location of the houses sold by the firms in their regressions.
They show that franchised brokerage firms generate more revenue for themselves, but are
unable to show whether or not listing with a franchise can provide the homeowner with a
higher price or a quicker sale holding constant the structural characteristics and location of
the property being sold; this study is the first to answer those questions.
Table 3.3 shows the share of listing and selling agents, and the share of observations in the
sample for each franchise and for the largest independent firm19. The percentages shown
in Column 4 suggest that the higher average number of selling agents for the independent
brokers is due in large part to the largest independent firm in the sample. Twenty-two
percent of all selling agents work for the largest independent firm, and not surprisingly,
the largest independent firm has the highest probability of selling their own listing. Table
17All sales prices were converted to average 2011 dollars using the CPI.
18All properties with less than 500 square feet or more than 10,000 square feet, or zero bedrooms or zero full
baths were dropped. Observations that were clearly miscoded were also dropped. This includes houses with
an abnormally large or small number of bedrooms or bathrooms for the sales price, houses with missing
agent or broker information, and houses that were not successfully geocoded into census tracts.
19More franchises show up in the dataset, however, this study is limited to the four largest franchises as mea-
sured by the total number of sales associates and brokers according to the latest comparison of residential
real estate franchises available at Realtor.org. The four franchised firms included in the sample make up
92% of all franchised listings in the dataset.
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3.3 also shows that RE/MAX lists and sells a disproportionate number of houses given
their percentage of listing and selling agents in the market.
Brokers who are affiliated with Century 21, Coldwell Banker, and Keller Williams all pay
a royalty of 6% of gross commission, while RE/MAX brokers pay a fixed fee of $125 per
month per agent and 1% of gross commissions20. While the total investment to start up a
franchise with each company is hard to predict and depends on many factors, Century 21
and Coldwell Banker require a 10 year commitment, and Keller Williams and RE/MAX
have 5 year terms. Consistent with Caves and Murphy (1976), to ensure the local
franchises are not free riding off of the national advertising campaigns and brand name,
each franchisor requires their franchisees to pay a fixed fee per agent or an ongoing
percentage of commission for advertising. RE/MAX and Keller Williams have fixed fees
of $101 and approximately $30 per month per agent, respectively, while Century 21
charges 2% of monthly gross revenue subject to a monthly minimum and maximum of
$651 and $1,508, and Coldwell Banker charges either 2.5% of gross revenue up to
$2,000,000 and 0.5% of gross revenue over $2,000,000, or 2.5% of gross revenue monthly
with a minimum and maximum of $88 and $1,388.
The financial arrangements between the owners of the franchise and the franchisors will
play some role in the performance of their sales associates, however, the compensation
structure and training programs are arguably the most relevant factors. While all four
franchises advertise nationally, Keller Williams heavily allocates resources to build a local
brand identity and supports their agents at the local level. Keller Williams also is one of
the few franchises to offer a profit sharing program which paid out nearly $35 million to
their associates in 2010 (Wakefield (2011)). Sales associates affiliated with Century 21,
Coldwell Banker, and Keller Williams split their commission with their broker starting at a
20The figures for Century 21, Coldwell Banker and RE/MAX are from from previews of the Franchise Dis-
closure Documents filed with the Federal Trade Commission on franchisedirect.com. The figures for Keller
Williams are from entrepreneur.com.
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split of around 50/50 and becoming more generous as the level of commissions generated
rise. RE/MAX offers their associates the option splitting commissions similar to the other
franchises, however, they also provide the option of keeping 100% of commissions earned
in exchange for fixed monthly fees to cover advertising, administrative costs, and the
brokers fees. While this structure is likely to entice agents who generate high gross
commission to join RE/MAX over a different franchise with a less generous commission
structure, the RE/MAX logo is arguably one of the most recognizable corporate symbols
in the world giving below-average agents something associate with as the begin their real
estate careers. Whether or not it is above or below-average agents that choose to affiliate
with a franchise is an empirical question that will be discussed below.
The sample averages for transaction and house characteristics by listing broker type are
shown in Table 3.421. Independent brokers on average list houses for $5,439 (3.2%) more
than franchised brokers, and have a sales price of $6,150 (2.9%) more. While the list and
sales prices are statistically and economically different, this difference does not appear to
be driven by the two types of brokers selling different types of houses22. Assuming the
difference in sales price and days on market is not a function of the neighborhood
characteristics in which the house is located, waiting an additional 1.5 days for a 2.9%
increase in sales price implies an annual return of 702%23! Yelowitz et al. (2013) show
that some firms specialize in certain segments of the market. If the independent brokers
are specializing in better neighborhoods (holding constant the type of houses), then the
raw difference in means shown in Table 3.4 is overstating the performance of independent
listing brokers24.
21Summary statistics for the full sample are given in Table A2.1.
22There are statistically significant differences in the housing characteristics, however, the houses listed by
each type are economically insignificant.
23If (1+r/365)1.5=1.029, r=7.023.
24The summary statistics in Table A2.2 separate the largest and small independent brokers. The summary
statistics show that franchised listing brokers list and sell houses for a little more than small independent
brokers, but less than the largest independent broker. They also show that franchised brokers sell their own
listing less often than both large and small independent brokers, and that they sell homes quicker than small
independent brokers but not as quick as the largest independent broker.
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Following Rutherford and Yavas (2012), “Degree Overpricing" is the residual from a sales
price regression that includes housing characteristics, year-month dummy variables, and
census tract fixed effects. It measures how over or underpriced a particular house is based
on the average price of a house with similar characteristics. The summary statistics show
that houses listed with independent brokers tend to be priced above the average list price
of a similar house while houses listed with the franchised brokers are underpriced. This
difference is consistent with the days on market where houses listed with franchised
brokers are sold slightly sooner than those listed with independent brokers25.
An important attribute of data used is that the exact address of each sold property is
known allowing the sales data to be merged with data from the United States Census.“%
Out of State 5 Years Ago" is the estimate of the percentage of residents in each census
tract that moved from out of state from the 2000 Census long form, and “% Out of State 1
Year Ago" is defined similarly but comes from the 2010 American Community Survey 5
year estimates. “5 Miles Ft. Knox" is a dummy variable equal to one if the property is
located within five miles of the Ft. Knox military base and is used as a proxy for the
number of out-of-state movers. All three measures suggest that franchised brokers are
more active in areas where a larger share of the population moved from out of state26. This
is consistent with Rubin (1978), Minkler (1990), Frew and Jud (1986), and Anderson and
Fok (1998) which all argue that if consumers who are less familiar with the quality of
local establishments associate familiar franchises with a certain level of quality, they will
be more likely to patronize franchised compared to a locally owned businesses. These
data allow for a first test of this hypothesis using data from housing markets.
The rich data allow for formal tests of the performance of franchised and independent
25The probability that a house is sold (Equation 3.2) is measured by days on market.
26In Table A2.2 where the largest independent broker and small independent brokers are separated, both
Census measures of the percentage of out-of-state movers show that franchised brokers appear to be more
active in areas with a higher percentage of out-of-state movers compared to the small independent brokers,
but less active than the largest independent broker.
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brokerage firms. A simple comparison of means is not sufficient since independent and
franchised brokerage firms could specialize in different market segments (Yelowitz et al.
(2013)). Previous studies on franchising in real estate brokerage use firm level survey data
that do not include any information on the types and location of houses being sold. The
data used in this study include an extensive set of structural characteristics, precise location
information, and the agent responsible for each sale. This ensures that the estimated partial
effect of listing a property with a franchised broker is not biased due to the type and location
of houses they list or the agents they employ.
3.5.2 Empirical Specifications
The first empirical specification follows the theoretical model’s result that the list prices
for franchised and independent brokers are the same (Figures 3.6 and 3.7)27. The
following regression is estimated:
ln(List Price)ijt = Franchisedijtω + xijtψ + σt + δj + ijt (3.8)
where ln(List Price) is the natural log of the list price for house i sold at time t in area j.
Franchisedijt is a dummy variable equal to one if a franchised firm listed the property, xijt
contains structural characteristics of the property and an intercept term, σt are time dummy
variables, δj are location dummy variables, and ijt is the error term. In the first regression
Franchisedijt will contain a single dummy variable that equals one if a franchised firm
listed the property to measure the average effect a franchised listing broker has on the
sales price. In the second regression each franchise will have a separate intercept term to
allow for heterogeneity across different franchises. If the list prices for franchised and
independent listings are the same, ω in (3.8) will not be statistically different from zero.
The second specification follows from the theoretical model’s result that franchised listing
27A comparison of the sales prices for franchised and independent listing brokers will be presented below.
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brokers find buyers for their own listings less often than an independent listing broker. A
problem with simply comparing the means of listings sold in house for the different types
of broker is that one type of broker could systematically list houses that are more
attractive to potential selling brokers. The best measure is a regression that holds constant
the characteristics of the house and its location.
SoldOwnijt = Franchisedijtρ+ xijtψ + σt + δj + ijt (3.9)
where SoldOwn is a dummy variable equal to one if the listing broker also found the
buyer. Franchisedijt is a dummy variable equal to one if a franchised selling broker
located the buyer, xijt contains the structural characteristics of the property and an
intercept, σt are time dummy variables, δj are location dummy variables, and ijt is the
error term. If franchised listing brokers find buyers for their own listings less often than
independent listing brokers, ρ <0 in (3.9).
The performance of franchised and independent brokers will be compared on two
dimensions: sales price and days on market. Homeowners are likely to perceive a tradeoff
between sales price and the length of time the property is on the market and will be
willing to accept a lower price for a quicker sale. Some homeowners are more patient than
others and are willing wait for an offer closer to list price. One way to see if a firm is more
efficient than another is to compare the sales prices, along with the time it takes to locate a
buyer, for different listing brokers. To test this, the natural log of sales price and the days
on market are regressed on an extensive set of structural characteristics, year-month
dummy variables, census tract fixed effects, and dummy variables indicating whether the
property was listed by a franchised brokerage firm. If the franchised brokerage firms are
able to get the homeowner a sales price greater than or equal to the independent firms, and
get the property off the market sooner, this would indicate they are indeed more efficient.
Homeowners can still be made better off if the quicker sale results in a lower sales price if
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the reduction is small relative to the length of time it takes to locate a buyer. Since there is
no direct tradeoff between the sales price and days on market, rather a tradeoff between
the list price of comparable houses (Anglin et al. (2003)), the degree of overpricing (DOP)
is included in the days on market regression. If a house is substantially overpriced
compared to similar houses on the market, this tends to increase the time it takes to locate
a potential buyer28. The following regression is estimated:
Yijt = Firmsijtω + xijtψ +DOPζ + σt + δj + ijt (3.10)
where Yijt is either the natural log of the sales price or days on market. Firmsijt is a vector
of dummy variables indicating the listing and selling firm of the house, xijt contains the
structural characteristics of the house and an intercept, σt are time dummy variables, δj
are location dummy variables, and ijt is the error term.29.
In the first specification, Firmsijt contains dummy variables indicating whether or not the
property was listed or sold by a franchised broker and estimates the average effect of a
franchise listing broker on the sales price and the length of time it takes to locate a buyer
compared to all independent brokers. The second specification adds dummy variables
indicating whether or not the house was listed or sold by the largest independent broker so
the franchised listings are compared to small independent firms. The third specification
allows each franchise to have a separate intercept to allow for heterogeneity across
different franchises.
To see if the difference in performance of the franchised brokers is driven by the types of
agents who choose to affiliate with them, specifications one through three are re-estimated
28It is important to note that overpriced does not imply expensive. A house priced at $150,000 could take
much longer to sell than a $300,000 house if the $150,000 house is priced 30% higher than a comparable
house and the $300,000 house is priced 30% less than a comparable house. The degree of overpricing vari-
able holds constant the price of the house compared to other properties that could be considered substitutes.
29ζ is set to zero in the sales price regression.
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but fixed effects indicating whether or not the listing agent has, is, or ever will be affiliated
with a franchise are included. The first listing agent specification includes a dummy
variable indicating whether or not the listing agent has, is, or ever will be affiliated with a
franchised real estate broker and estimates the average effect of these agents. Since the
agents who choose to work for a franchised brokerage firm could be fundamentally
different from those agents who choose to work for an independent broker, it is important
to hold constant the agent characteristics to isolate the “brand name" effect of the
franchise. Since this variable is equal to one for houses listed with agents working for
independent brokers who have, or will work for a franchised broker at any time during the
sample period, it is not perfectly correlated with the variable indicating a property is listed
with a franchised broker30. In the second and more flexible listing agent specification,
each agent who is has been affiliated with a franchise at any point during the sample
period has a separate intercept. This allows for heterogeneity among the listing agents
who have been affiliated with a franchise at any point during the sample period.
To focus on franchised brokerage firms’ presumed ability to more efficiently match
out-of-state buyers and sellers, linear probability models are estimated where the
dependent variable is equal to one if the property was sold by any of the three franchised
brokerage firms (SBF) in the sample31. Separate regressions are estimated using each of
the three measures of out-of-state movers as independent variables along with the
extensive set of structural characteristics, location fixed effects (when possible), and
year-month dummy variables. Formally, the following regression is estimated:
SBFijt = OutOfStateijtγ + Firmijt∆ + xijtβ + σt + δj + ijt (3.11)
3030% of the agents in the sample worked for independent and franchised brokers.
31“Sold by a franchised broker” refers to the situation in which franchised broker acted as the selling broker
in the transaction. Probit regressions were also ran and the results are reported in the appendix. The results
are qualitatively similar. For ease of interpretation, the linear probability model estimates are presented and
discussed.
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where OutOfStateijt is the measure of out-of-state movers, Firmijt is a dummy variable
equal to one if a franchised broker listed the property, xijt contains the structural
characteristics of the house and an intercept, σt are time dummy variables, δj are location
dummy variables, and ijt is the error term. The first measure of out-of-state movers is a
dummy variable equal to one if the property is located within five miles of the Fort Knox
military base32. Even though there are properties bought and sold near the base that do not
belong to military personnel working there, people moving to that area are more likely to
be relocating from out of town than people moving to other places in the area if they are
employed at the base. If these consumers are unfamiliar with the quality of the local real
estate brokerage firms, and they associate the brand name with a certain level of quality,
they will be more likely to work with a franchised real estate broker. If the probability of
the house being sold by a franchised brokerage firm is increasing the closer it is to Fort
Knox, this gives some credibility to the argument that these types of firms are better able
to match buyers and sellers not residing in the same geographic area, and that non-local
buyers may gain a sense of quality assurance by working with a franchised brokerage firm.
The last two measures use census tract level data on migration from the 2000 Census and
the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS). One issue is that the ACS and 2000
Census long form questions are slightly different. The 2000 long form question asked
“Did this person live in this house or apartment 5 years ago (on April 1, 1995)?". If they
answered “No" they were asked about the city, county, state, and zip code of their previous
residence. One problem with this is that this question is likely be identifying people that
lived in a different state 5 years ago but their most recent move was within the same city,
county, or state. The 2010 ACS 5 year estimates are based on the question “Did this
person live in this house or apartment 1 year ago?". If the respondent answered “No,
different house in the United States or Puerto Rico" they were asked the city, county, zip
32A search was done to see which distance from Fort Knox maximized the R2. While the R2 did not change
for the different specifications, five miles was chosen because it had the correct sign and with the smallest
standard error.
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code, and state where they previously lived. Summary statistics are provided in Table 3.4
for both measures.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 List Price and Sold Own Listing
Estimates from regressions comparing the list prices of houses listed with franchised and
independent brokers are shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.5 33. This regression allows
for a test of the prediction that list prices are equal. Column 1 indicates that houses listed
with franchised brokers are listed for approximately 1.3% less than houses listed with
independent brokers and is inconsistent with the prediction of the theoretical model.
Franchised listing brokers appear to be strategically underpricing their houses for a faster
sale and a slightly lower commission compared to independent brokers. In Column 2,
each franchise has a separate intercept. The results indicate that there is variation across
franchises in how their list prices compare to independent listing brokers. RE/MAX,
Coldwell Banker, and Century 21 all list houses for less than a comparable house listed
with an independent broker, however, Keller Williams lists houses 6.8% more than a
comparable house listed with an independent broker. Even though Keller Williams lists
comparable houses for 6.8% more than an independent broker, their market share of
listings is too small (1.4%) to raise the average list price for franchised listing brokers to a
level equal to the average list price of independent listing brokers34.
Columns 3-4 of Table 3.5 report OLS estimates that allow for a test of the theoretical
33The full output is shown in Table A2.3.
34The results in Table A2.4 include a dummy variable equal to one if a house was listed with the largest inde-
pendent broker. When small independent brokers are the comparison group, there is not enough evidence
to say that franchised and small independent listing brokers choose different list prices. Coldwell Banker,
the largest independent broker, and Keller Williams list houses for about 0.60%, 8.0%, and 4.4% more than
a small independent broker, respectively. RE/MAX and Century 21 list houses for 0.40% and 1.7% less
than a small independent broker.
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model’s second prediction35. These estimates report the differences in the probability of
selling one’s own listing holding constant the structural and neighborhood characteristics
of the property. Since Table 3.4 shows that independent listing brokers have more than
twice the number of selling agents than franchised listing brokers, the number of selling
agents in the listing firm is included to hold constant the effect firm size could have on the
probability of a broker selling their own listing. Column 3 shows franchised firms are
about 2.1% less likely to sell their own listing compared to independent listing brokers
holding constant the number of selling agents in the listing firm. Comparing ΦI to ΦF in
Table 3.2b, the theoretical model predicts that a franchised listing broker is about 5% less
likely to find a buyer first compared to an independent listing broker. While the sign is
consistent with the theoretical model, the coefficient is approximately two-fifths the size
of the theoretical model’s prediction, but almost identical to the difference shown in Table
3.4. Since the theoretical model is very stylized and does not take into account the number
of selling agents in each firm, it is reassuring that the empirical estimate is smaller than
the prediction from the theoretical model36.
3.6.2 Sales Price and Days on Market with and without Agent Fixed Effects
The effect on sales price of listing with one of the franchised brokerage firms when the
omitted brokerage type is all independent brokers is shown in Column 1 of Table 3.637.
While the effect structural housing characteristics have on sales price is not the focus of
this study, it is important to point out that the coefficients are sensible and consistent with
other studies. The sales price is increasing in the number of bedrooms, full bathrooms,
partial bathrooms, square footage, lot size, and is decreasing in age. Having a fireplace,
35The marginal effects from a probit regression are shown in Table A2.14 in Columns 1 and 2.
36The theoretical model was calibrated using the percentage of own listings sold given in Table 3.4. The
ratio of own listing sold to listings sold by a different broker is equal to αli/α
s
i when L=S. If the listing and
selling agents in the sample are exerting different levels of effort, the theoretical and empirical estimates
will be different. In Table A2.4 where the comparison group is small independent brokers, the results still
show that franchised brokers are less likely to sell their own listing.
37The full output is shown in Table A2.5.
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basement, central air conditioning, a brick exterior, or a garage or carport lead to a higher
sales price. Even though a more extensive set of structural characteristics are used in this
study, the results are consistent with the estimates in Beck (2009) and Levitt and Syverson
(2008). Each of those studies use categorical variables to for the number of bedrooms,
bathrooms, house size, and lot size and find that increases in each of these variables lead
to a higher sales price. The results in this study show that a house with a fireplace sells for
4.9% more than a house without a fireplace while Beck (2009) finds that the presence of a
fireplace increases the sales price by 3.8%. Levitt and Syverson (2008) finds that brick
exterior adds 3.3% to the sales price compared to 4% in this study.
The estimates in Table 3.6 show that listing a house with a franchised listing broker leads
to a 1.3% reduction in sales price for the homeowner holding constant the structural and
neighborhood characteristics of the house being sold. This reduction is less than half of
the difference in average sales price shown in Table 3.4 and suggests that some of the
difference in the sales price can be attributed to the neighborhoods in which they list and
sell houses. This result is consistent with Yelowitz et al. (2013) who find that some firms
specialize in particular segments of the market. While listing with a franchised broker
leads to a lower sales price, franchised brokers do sell houses approximately 3.6 days
sooner (Column 2). To put this in perspective, a homeowner would need an annual return
on their investment of 131% to be indifferent between selling their house 3.6 days sooner
at a reduction in sales price of 1.3% and waiting 3.6 days and not taking the discount38.
When the reference group is only small franchised listing brokers, franchised listing
brokers still locate a buyer about 3.6 days sooner, but for only 0.4% less than a small
independent broker. Listing with the largest independent broker leads to a 3.9% increase
in sales price compared to a small independent broker. Using the average sales price from
Table A2.1, listing with a franchised broker leads to a decrease in sales price between
$670 and $2408, while listing with the largest independent broker leads to an increase of
38If (1+r/365)3.6=1.013, r=1.31.
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$7,04239.
The results in Table 3.6 suggest that homeowners would be better off listing with a large
or small independent real estate broker, however, the results could be due to the the types
of agents working in each type of firm and not the organizational structure of the firm.
Table 3.7 includes a dummy variable equal to one if the listing agent has, is, or will be
affiliated with a franchised listing broker at any point during the sample period. There are
a few reasons why the agents who affiliate with a franchise be different than those who do
not. For example, a new agent decides to affiliate with a franchise to take advantage of
their training programs and brand name recognition as they establish themselves in the
market, while a more experienced agent chooses to affiliate with a franchise to take
advantage of a more generous commission split with their broker. If the agent leaves the
franchised broker for an independent broker, some of the skills acquired while working for
the franchised broker are transferable (advertising techniques, time management, pricing,
etc.).
Since approximately 30% of the listing agents in the sample have worked for both types of
brokers, “Listed by Franchise" is still identified when the franchised listing agent variable
is included. The estimates in Columns 1 and 2 show that there is a positive “franchise
effect" of 3% for waiting an additional three days to locate a buyer. However, this
preferred performance from a seller’s perspective is negated by the performance of agents
who choose to affiliate with a franchised listing broker. Listing with an agent who has, is,
or ever will be affiliated with a franchise results in a quicker sale, however, they sell
houses on average for 5.4% less than someone who has never affiliated with a franchise.
Combining the coefficients in Rows 1 and 3 implies that controlling for agents who have
affiliated with a franchise, listing with a franchised broker leads to a quicker sale of 5.3
39Frew and Jud (1986) find that regional franchises generate more revenue than national franchises and have
more agents which is consistent with the results in Table 3.6. The largest independent broker in the sample
has the largest number of agents, multiple offices that operate in southern Indiana and the Greater Louisville
area, and are shown to perform better than small independent brokers and the national franchises.
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days at the expense of a 2.4% reduction in sales price. Similar results are found when the
base category is small independent brokers. In both specifications it appears that lead
generating systems and referral networks give the franchised brokers an edge over
independent brokers in terms of locating buyers, however, in both instances the reduction
in sales price is too large to make a selling homeowner indifferent between the quicker
sale and lower price.
The estimates in Table 3.7 assume that all agents who affiliate with a franchised listing
broker are identical. Since agents select into different franchises for different reason, fixed
effects for each listing agent who affiliates with a franchised listing broker are included.
These results are shown in Table 3.840. The estimates in Columns 1 and 2 show that
controlling for the listing agent, franchised brokers perform on par with independent
listing brokers and there is no evidence of a franchise effect. While the coefficient on
“Listed by Franchise" is approximately 80% smaller than in Table 3.7, it is still precisely
estimated. When compared to small independent listing brokers, houses listed with a
franchised broker sell for approximately 1.4% more, however, they take just as long as an
independent broker to locate a buyer.
It appears that any differences in the time it takes to locate a buyer and the sales price for
independent and franchised listing brokers are explained almost entirely by the agents
who affiliate with a franchised broker. When assuming all agents who affiliate with a
franchise are identical, listing with a franchised broker results in a 3-4% ($5,473-$7,298)
increase in sales price compared to a comparable house listed with an independent broker
for waiting an additional three days to locate a buyer. When the model allows for
heterogeneity among the agents who choose to affiliate with a franchise, listing with a
franchised broker results in at most a 1.4% ($2,554) increase in sales price. These
estimates differ substantially from the specification that did not control for the type of
40The full output is shown in Table A2.7.
85
agent who listed the property which show houses listed with a franchised brokers being
associated with a sale date four days earlier at a discount of 0.3-1.3% ($671-$2,408).
The results above show that after controlling for differences in the types of agents who
choose to affiliate with a franchise compared to those who always work for an
independent broker, there is a positive return associated with franchise listing brokers.
Comparing the results in Table 3.6 to the results in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, it appears that the
weaker agents are the ones selecting into the franchised brokerage firms (“Listed by
Franchise" is negatively correlated with ever being affiliated with a franchise). Two
plausible explanations for this result come to mind. First, a less-skilled agent has the most
to gain from the brand recognition, brand loyalty, and advertising campaigns associated
with a franchise since these are by nature public goods of which the agent can be a free
rider (Mathewson and Winter (1985); Blair and Lafontaine (2010)). For a new and
inexperienced agent, breaking into the real estate industry can be tough. In this sample,
the average agent lists about 5.5 properties per year and sells 5. At an average selling price
of $182,445, assuming the agent sells their own listings 26% of the time, a 6%
commission, and a 60/40 split with their broker, the average agent in the sample earns
approximately $20,688 in commissions before taxes and any expenses are subtracted41.
Holding all else constant, if the new agent can receive the benefits of on-the-job training, a
nationally recognized brand name, and a lead generating system to jump-start their career,
affiliating with a franchise could be the best way to increase their annual commission to a
level comparable to what they could have earned working an hourly or salaried position in
a different industry.
Another possible explanation is that agents working for franchised listing brokers have a
higher discount rate than those who work with independent brokers, and prefer a quick
commission to the slightly higher commission they could have earned by waiting a few
41The 2007-2011 median income for the study area is $43,60 according to the US Census estimates.
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additional days and selling the house closer to list price. A similar explanation is proposed
in Levitt and Syverson (2008) as a possible reason for agent-owned properties being on
the market longer and selling for more than houses that were not agent-owned. Using the
estimates from Tables 3.7 and 3.10, if the listing agent waits the additional 8.3 days to
locate a buyer without the reduction in sales price of 5.5%, the expected increase in
commission (assuming they sell their own listing 26% of the time and have a 60/40 split
with their broker) is $222. As in Levitt and Syverson (2008), the difference in discount
rates required to explain the difference is extremely large; the annual interest rate required
making the agent indifferent between the quicker commission and a commission $222
higher 8.5 days later is 243%. While a principle-agent problem could exist that
encourages the listing agent to advise the homeowner to accept the discount for a quicker
sale, it is unlikely that this problem affects franchised and independent agents differently.
Tables 3.9-3.11 allow for heterogeneity across franchises42. In Table 3.9, when compared
to all independent brokers, Century 21 sells houses three days sooner at a 3% discount,
while Keller Williams sells houses almost three weeks quicker and at a premium of
6.5%43. When compared to small independent brokers, Coldwell Banker gets a house off
the market about 5.5 days sooner without a reduction in sales price, and Keller Williams
still sells houses almost 3 weeks sooner, but a premium of 7.4%. When the dummy
variable indicating that the listing agent has been affiliated with a franchise is included
(Table 3.10), there is a positive “franchise effect" for each franchise, however, the
coefficient on the franchise listing agent variable is still negative and significant in both
the sales price and days on market regressions. Keller Williams still appears to be the
most efficient franchise selling houses nearly three weeks sooner than properties listed
with an independent broker at a premium of 5.5%44. When the model allows for
42The corresponding full output is shown in Tables A2.8-A2.10.
43This is very similar to amount above an independent listing broker that Keller Williams lists their houses.
44Keller Williams’ small market share could indicate their agents are more selective in the houses they choose
to list and sell. If within a census tract, Keller Williams disproportionately sells more expensive houses in
more desirable locations, the results presented here would over-state the “franchise effect" associated with
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heterogeneity in the agents who affiliate with a franchise (Table 3.11), Century 21 takes
about five days longer to locate a buyer, however, there is no premium in sales price for
waiting. Houses listed with Coldwell Banker are off the market about a week and a half
sooner, but sell for about 1.8% less (the homeowner needs an annual return of 61% to be
indifferent between this reduction and waiting an additional week and a half without the
reduction). The premium associated with Keller Williams listing brokers fell to 3%
compared to all independent brokers and 4.4% when compared to small independent
brokers, and they are now selling houses about seven days sooner than an independent
broker. Houses listed with RE/MAX are on the market just as long as a house listed with
an independent broker, but they receive a 1.2% premium when compared to all
independent brokers, and a 2.2% premium when compared to small independent brokers.
Even though on average it appears that weaker agents choose to affiliate with a franchise,
this does not appear to be the case for Keller Williams and RE/MAX. Keller Williams’
focus on building a local brand identity and profit sharing, and RE/MAX’s 100%
commission structure could be what attracts the stronger agents to these franchises.
3.6.3 Franchised Broker Sales in Areas with More Out-of-State Movers
The OLS results from regressions comparing the performance of franchised and
independent brokers in areas with higher concentrations of out-of-state movers are
reported in Table 3.1245. Baryla and Zumpano (1995) show that by working with a real
estate agent, consumers moving to an area in which they are unfamiliar can reduce their
transactions cost and reduce the duration of their search. As suggested in Brickley and
Dark (1987) and Frew and Jud (1986), each specification here suggests that franchised
selling brokers are more likely to find buyers for houses located in areas with a higher
their brand.
45The marginal effects from a probit regression are shown in Table A2.14 Columns 3-5. The full output is
given in Table A2.11.
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percentage of out-of-state movers46. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to
one if the property was sold by a franchised brokerage firm, so the “5 Mi Ft Knox"
variable in Column 1 says that houses located within 5 miles of the Ft. Knox military base
are 1.4% more likely to be sold by one of the three franchised brokerage firms, however, it
is not significant at conventional levels.
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3.12 include potentially more precise measures, the percentage
of out-of-state residents in the census tract where the sold property is located. Column 2
uses the estimate of out-of-state movers from the 2000 Census. Since this question asks
about the person’s residence in 1995, it is possible that some people are being labeled
out-of-state movers when in fact they moved more recently from a location within the
same state. If the data are overstating the number of out-of-state movers at the census tract
level, this estimate will be biased upwards. Using this measure, a one standard deviation
increase in percentage of out-of-state movers in a census tract, a franchised selling broker
is 1.2% more likely to sell a property located in that census tract. While there is no prior
estimate of this effect to compare the size of the coefficient, the positive and significant
coefficient is consistent with the idea of franchised sales being more prevalent in areas
where consumers are less familiar with the local market.
Column 3 uses the estimate of out-of-state movers from the 2010 ACS 5-year estimates
and also suggests franchised real estate brokers are more active in areas with larger
percentages of out-of-state movers although the effect is much smaller (a one standard
deviation increase in out-of-state movers in a census tract, a franchised selling broker is
0.6% more likely to sell a property located in that census tract). Since the estimate of
46Lambson et al. (2004) look at the prices out-of-state buyers pay for real estate and find that out-of-state
buyers do pay a premium. While the results are not shown, a regression of sales price on the structural
characteristics, year-month dummy variables, and the percentage of out of state movers in the census tract
in which the house is located shows that the sales price of a house is increasing in the percentage of out-of-
state movers in the census tract where the house is located. Using the 2010 estimate of out-of-state movers,
a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of out-of-state movers leads to a 5% increase in sales
price.
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out-of-state movers in column 3 is based on a person’s residence 1 year ago, it is less
likely to overstate the number of out-of-state movers in a census tract. The smaller
coefficient in Column 3 compared to Column 2 is consistent with the idea that the 2000
estimate used in Column 2 is overstating the number of out-of-state movers, and that the
coefficient is likely biased upwards. Because the estimate of the percentage of out of state
movers is measured at the census tract level, no census tract fixed effects can be included
in columns 2 and 3. A shortcoming of not being able to include the census tract fixed
effects is that other unobservables such as crime rates, school quality, environmental
conditions, and demographics that could be correlated with the number of people who
move to a specific area from out of town are not being held constant47.
There are a few reasons why the results in Table 3.12 should be expected. If the buyer has
worked with a particular franchise in the past, they will tend to be more willing to work
with them in the future and can be referred to an agent with the same company where they
are moving. Even if they are working with an independent broker where they are currently
selling a house, that broker could refer them to a franchised broker where they are moving
if they are less familiar with the different brokers in the new area and associate a particular
franchise with a certain level of quality. It may not be the case that the franchised broker
where the person is moving is better at attracting out-of-town buyers because of their local
advertising and marketing, but that they are a part of a larger referral network and
consumers are brand loyal. Rubin (1978) suggests that firms affiliating with a franchise
are buying a trademark that signals a certain level of quality to potential consumers. Since
out-of-state movers are unfamiliar with the quality of local real estate brokerage firms they
will be more likely to work with a franchised broker if they associate their “brand name"
with a certain level of quality48.
47While there are likely unobservables that are correlated with the percentage of out of state movers, the
correlation between those unobservables and whether or not the property is sold by a franchised firm is
likely weak.
48Results that show the probability of listing with a franchised broker in areas where sellers are less familiar
with the local market are shown in Table A3.12. The results suggest that franchised listing brokers are
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3.7 Conclusions
Home-sellers want a quick sale at a high price. While there are a few houses on the market
where the sellers are not really motived to sell but would if the “right" buyer came along,
most people with houses for sale are likely doing so because they are either purchasing a
new house, building, or relocating. With the exception of a few, sellers are willing to make
a tradeoff between the sales price of a house and the length of time it stays on the market.
Using 12 years of detailed sales data from an area in Central Kentucky, this paper
presented a model of real estate brokerage that incorporated the differences between
franchised and independent brokers, and compared the list price, sales price, and days on
market for both types of firms taking into account the possible differences in listing agents
that choose to affiliate with a franchised broker.
A comparison of the list prices for franchised and independent listings shown in Columns
1 and 2 of Table 3.5 shows that franchised listing brokers lists houses for 1.3% less than a
comparable house listed with an independent broker, a result inconsistent with the models
prediction. This suggests that franchised brokers may be strategically underpricing houses
for a quicker sale and a slightly lower commission. The estimates in Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 3.5 show that franchised listing brokers are about 2% less likely to sell their own
listing compared to an independent listing broker. The sign is consistent with the model’s
prediction, but the magnitude is approximately two-fifths as large. Since the model is very
stylized and only considers the royalty franchised brokers pay and the different marginal
costs of effort for franchised and independent brokers, it is not surprising that the
theoretical and empirical estimates diverge.
also more active in areas with a larger proportion of out-of-state movers. However, the coefficients and
R2 are smaller. For example, in the sold by franchised broker regression using the 2010 ACS estimate of
the percentage of out-of-state movers, for every one percent increase in the number of out-of-state movers
in the census tract, the probability the house is sold by a franchised broker increases by 0.032 percentage
points, and the R2 is .12. In the listed by franchised broker regression, the same increase in the percentage
of out-of-state movers leads to a 0.028 percentage point increase in the probability a house is listed with a
franchised broker with an R2 of 0.01.
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The results show that most of the difference in the time it takes to locate a buyer and the
sales price the listing broker is able to get the homeowner can be attributed to the listing
agents who choose to affiliate with each type of firm. In Table 3.6 where no agent
characteristics are included, listing with a franchised broker results in a house being sold
3.6 days sooner, but at a discount of 1.3% ($2,408). The required annual return required to
make the homeowner indifferent between this tradeoff and waiting an additional 3.6 days
without facing the reduction is 131%. When a single dummy variable is included
indicating that the listing agent has, is, or ever will be affiliated with a franchised listing
broker (Table 3.7), there is a positive “franchise effect" of 3.1% for waiting an additional
three days for a buyer to be located. This is equivalent to an annual return of 366%,
however, it appears that on average it is the weaker agents who choose to affiliate with a
franchise. This is plausible given weaker agents have more to gain by affiliating with a
franchise that has a strong brand name with brand loyal customers and a lead generating
system. In the most flexible specification (Table 3.8), the model allows for heterogeneity
in the listing agents who choose to affiliate with a franchise. There is not enough evidence
to say that homeowners are any better or worse off by listing with a franchised broker
compared to an independent broker. When the model allows the impact on days on market
and sales price to vary by franchise, and by listing agent, there is a positive “franchise
effect" associated with Keller Williams and RE/MAX, and it appears that above-average
agents are choosing to affiliate with these companies.
An area where franchised brokers differ from independent brokers is in their ability to
match buyers and sellers who move from out of state. Table 3.12 shows that franchised
brokers are more likely to sell houses in areas with a higher percentage of out-of-state
movers. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of out-of-state movers in the
census tract in which the house is located leads to a 0.6-1.2% percentage point increase in
the probability that it is sold by a franchised broker. Using the proportion of houses sold
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by a franchise in this sample (39%), a 0.6-1.2% point increase implies a 1.5-3.1% increase
in the probability that a house is sold by a franchised broker. This could be due to brand
loyalty of out-of-state movers or the nationwide referral network that franchised brokers
are able to take advantage of. This is consistent with the literature on franchising that says
franchises should be more prevalent in areas where the customers are less familiar with
the local market.
Copyright c©Stephen L. Locke, 2013
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3.8 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Revenues for Owners and Listing Brokers
Revenues for
Franchised Listing
Sold By LB Sold By DB
Owner (1-k)P (1-k) P
Listing
Broker
(1-r)kP (1−r)µkP
Revenues for
Independent Listing
Sold By LB Sold By DB
Owner (1-k)P (1-k) P
Listing
Broker
kP µkP
“LB"=Listing Broker, “DB"=Different Broker
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Table 3.2a: Model Estimates with Equal Marginal Cost of Effort
(cF = cI = 100)
LI SI ΦI ΓI ΘI Homeowner Payoff
Independent 2.236 1.764 0.282 0.378 0.66 $15,502
LF SF ΦF ΓF ΘF
Franchised 1.803 1.829 0.224 0.422 0.645 $15,166
r=.05, µ=.5, k=.06,cF=100, B=100,000,PF=50,000, αlF=.35, α
s
F=.65
cI=100, PI=50,000, αlI=.37, α
s
I=.63
Table 3.2b: Model Estimates with Different Marginal Cost of Effort
(cF = 90, cI = 100)
LI SI ΦI ΓI ΘI Homeowner Payoff
Independent 2.236 1.764 .282 .378 .66 $15,502
LF SF ΦF ΓF ΘF
Franchised 2.016 2.052 .232 .489 .671 $15,768
r=.05, µ=.5, k=.06,cF=100, B=100,000,PF=50,000, αlF=.35, α
s
F=.65
cI=100, PI=50,000, αlI=.37, α
s
I=.63
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Table 3.3: Market Shares for the Franchised Firms and Largest Independent Firm in the
Sample
Firma % Listing Agents % Listings % Selling Agents % Solds % Sold In-house
Franchised
CENTURY 21 10.79 7.69 10.89 6.97 35.69
COLDWELL BANKER 9.93 8.33 9.79 7.50 36.40
KELLER WILLIAMS 3.55 1.42 4.05 2.18 25.01
RE/MAX 13.97 24.89 14.93 22.31 34.66
Independent
SEMONIN REALTORSb 21.69 14.40 22.08 16.02 41.20
a The firm names were cleaned and combined using the method in Yelowitz et al. (2013). The listing and selling
agents names were cleaned using a similar method.
b Semonin Realtors is a real estate company that is owned by Home Services of America, a Berkshire Hathaway
affiliate. They have seven locations and operate in the Greater Louisville, Elizabethtown, and southern Indiana
markets.
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Table 3.4: Comparison of Transaction and House Characteristics for Listings
of Franchised and Independent Firms. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
Independent Sample Size=84,120, Franchised Sample Size=61,731
Mean Test Statistic
Variable Independent Franchised Independent-Franchised
Transaction
List Price (2011 Dollars)a 192,878 186,747 7.73
Sold Own Listing 0.366 0.349 7.01
Sold by Franchise 0.251 0.578 -131.49
Sales Price (2011 Dollars)a 184,740 179,317 7.31
Days on Market 85.349 83.808 3.5
% Out of State 5 Years Ago 8.866 9.126 -9.19
% Out of State 1 Year Ago 10.513 10.828 -3.04
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.076 0.118 -26.23
Degree Overpricingb 0.005 -0.007 8.8
# of Selling Agents in Listing Firm 126.346 60.651 92.45
House
Bedrooms 3.231 3.252 -5.09
Full Bathrooms 1.809 1.816 -1.59
Partial Bathrooms 0.368 0.364 1.29
Square Feet of Living Space 1,658 1,647 2.79
Lotsize (Acres) 0.801 0.901 -3.95
Lotsize Missing 0.045 0.046 -1.29
Has < in Lot Dimensionsc 0.129 0.116 7.2
Has > in Lot Dimensionsc 0.003 0.004 -1.97
Age (Years) 33.378 32.369 6.58
Age Unknown 0.009 0.012 -4.27
Fireplace 0.474 0.478 -1.5
Basement 0.600 0.600 -0.03
Finished Basement 0.162 0.19 -14.12
Central Air 0.909 0.905 2.77
Brick Exterior 0.339 0.352 -5.02
Vinyl Exterior 0.161 0.176 -7.53
Metal Roof 0.010 0.010 0.06
Composition Roof 0.944 0.932 9.25
Ranch Style 0.447 0.454 -2.78
Modular Style 0.014 0.016 -1.89
Cape Cod Style 0.088 0.078 6.72
Carport 0.057 0.058 -1.24
Garage 0.665 0.641 9.72
One Car Garage 0.167 0.169 -1.04
Multiple Car Garage 0.559 0.567 -2.82
Within 1 Mile Parkway/Interstate 0.484 0.470 5.21
Within 1 Mile Railroad 0.507 0.511 -1.47
a List and sales prices were converted to average 2011 dollars using the CPI. N=145,851.
Regressions were estimated that excluded houses that sold for less than $10,000 (1,017 ob-
servations) and similar results were found. All of the results reported below do not exclude
these observations.
b Residual from a sales price regression on housing characteristics, time, and location.
c The lot dimensions indicated the lot size was less (greater) than the listed size.
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Table 3.5: Franchised Real Estate Broker Results from OLS Regressions for List Price
and Sale of Own Listing. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(List Price) ln(List Price) Sold Own Listing Sold Own Listing
Listed by Franchise -0.0128*** -0.0206***
(0.00143) (0.00256)
Listed by RE/MAX -0.0158*** -0.0116***
(0.00171) (0.00302)
Listed by Coldwell Banker -0.00494** -0.0303***
(0.00245) (0.00467)
Listed by Century 21 -0.0280*** -0.0452***
(0.00275) (0.00476)
Listed by Keller Williams 0.0682*** 0.0109
(0.00532) (0.00968)
# of Selling Agents
in the Listing Firm 0.000173*** 0.000175***
(8.48e-06) (8.49e-06)
Constant 10.63*** 10.63*** 0.535*** 0.532***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.164) (0.164)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.861 0.861 0.067 0.067
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished base-
ment, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile parkway/interstate, 1
mile rail road, 5 miles Ft. Knox.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days On Market
for Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Franchise -0.0132*** -3.642*** -0.00368** -3.621***
(0.00156)b (0.436) (0.00172) (0.478)
Sold by Franchise 0.00186 -0.934** 0.00831*** -1.131**
(0.00154) (0.442) (0.00170) (0.482)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0387*** 0.0129
(0.00208) (0.634)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0263*** -0.721
(0.00204) (0.591)
Degree Overpricingc 31.23*** 31.26***
(0.857) (0.860)
Constant 10.56*** 150.5*** 10.55*** 150.4***
(0.143) (29.19) (0.143) (29.19)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.851 0.106 0.852 0.106
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects No No No No
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 5 miles Ft. Knox.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
c Residual from a sales price regression on housing characteristics, time, and location.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days On Market for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers using Franchised Listing Agent Fixed
Effects Specification 1. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Franchise 0.0306*** 3.020*** 0.0396*** 3.017***
(0.00271)b (0.677) (0.00278) (0.705)
Sold by Franchise 0.00184 -0.935** 0.00837*** -1.116**
(0.00154) (0.442) (0.00170) (0.482)
Listing Agent has, is, or will
be Affiliated with a Franchisec -0.0545*** -8.305*** -0.0541*** -8.303***
(0.00266) (0.672) (0.00264) (0.672)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0380*** -0.0650
(0.00208) (0.634)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0266*** -0.670
(0.00203) (0.590)
Degree Overpricingd 30.62*** 30.66***
(0.860) (0.862)
Constant 10.58*** 153.7*** 10.58*** 153.6***
(0.144) (29.01) (0.144) (29.01)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.852 0.107 0.852 0.107
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects No No No No
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet, square
feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished basement, central
air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile parkway/interstate, 1 mile rail road,
5 miles Ft. Knox.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
c This is a dummy variable equal to one if the listing agent has, is, or ever will be affiliated with a
franchise, even if the listing agent is currently working for an independent broker. This is done to avoid
perfect multicollinearity with “Listed by Franchise." 30% of the listing agents in the sample worked
for both types of brokers.
d Residual from a sales price regression on housing characteristics, time, and location.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
100
Table 3.8: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market
for Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers using Franchised Listing
Agent Fixed Effects Specification 2. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Franchise 0.00575 -1.767 0.0142*** -1.656
(0.00367)b (1.145) (0.00371) (1.165)
Sold by Franchise 0.00140 -1.242*** 0.00593*** -1.522***
(0.00147) (0.443) (0.00162) (0.484)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0338*** 0.363
(0.00215) (0.680)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0183*** -0.995*
(0.00196) (0.589)
Degree Overpricingc 24.50*** 24.51***
(0.915) (0.916)
Constant 10.59*** 144.6*** 10.59*** 144.5***
(0.123) (30.07) (0.123) (30.06)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.869 0.144 0.869 0.144
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 5 miles Ft. Knox.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
c Residual from a sales price regression on housing characteristics, time, and location.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers. Separate Firm Intercepts. Central
Kentucky Data, 2000-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Century 21 -0.0306*** -3.041*** -0.0211*** -3.011***
(0.00300)b (0.829) (0.00308) (0.852)
Sold by Century 21 1.20e-06 -0.755 0.00603** -0.943
(0.00292) (0.865) (0.00300) (0.886)
Listed by Coldwell Banker -0.00664** -5.516*** 0.00208 -5.477***
(0.00273) (0.799) (0.00281) (0.823)
Sold by Coldwell Banker -0.00117 -1.399* 0.00504* -1.589*
(0.00287) (0.827) (0.00295) (0.849)
Listed by Keller Williams 0.0654*** -19.07*** 0.0744*** -19.04***
(0.00585) (1.472) (0.00589) (1.482)
Sold by Keller Williams 0.0392*** -0.803 0.0459*** -0.996
(0.00548) (1.414) (0.00552) (1.426)
Listed by RE/MAX -0.0143*** -2.197*** -0.00458** -2.167***
(0.00185) (0.508) (0.00199) (0.544)
Sold by RE/MAX -0.000196 -0.902* 0.00641*** -1.099*
(0.00181) (0.532) (0.00195) (0.567)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0386*** 0.0553
(0.00208) (0.634)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0262*** -0.707
(0.00203) (0.591)
Degree Overpricingc 31.52*** 31.55***
(0.859) (0.862)
Constant 10.56*** 149.5*** 10.56*** 149.5***
(0.143) (29.25) (0.143) (29.25)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.852 0.107 0.852 0.107
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects No No No No
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished base-
ment, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile parkway/interstate,
1 mile rail road, 5 miles Ft. Knox.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
c Residual from a sales price regression on housing characteristics, time, and location.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers using Franchised Listing Agent Fixed
Effects Specification 1. Separate Firm Intercepts. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Century 21 0.0130*** 3.648*** 0.0220*** 3.654***
(0.00373)b (0.976) (0.00378) (0.996)
Sold by Century 21 0.000338 -0.703 0.00644** -0.875
(0.00291) (0.864) (0.00299) (0.886)
Listed by Coldwell Banker 0.0363*** 1.091 0.0445*** 1.107
(0.00348) (0.957) (0.00353) (0.978)
Sold by Coldwell Banker -0.00131 -1.419* 0.00499* -1.594*
(0.00286) (0.826) (0.00295) (0.848)
Listed by Keller Williams 0.109*** -12.38*** 0.117*** -12.38***
(0.00626) (1.559) (0.00629) (1.569)
Sold by Keller Williams 0.0389*** -0.834 0.0457*** -1.012
(0.00547) (1.413) (0.00551) (1.426)
Listed by RE/MAX 0.0294*** 4.529*** 0.0387*** 4.535***
(0.00289) (0.722) (0.00297) (0.749)
Sold by RE/MAX -0.000238 -0.908* 0.00645*** -1.090*
(0.00181) (0.532) (0.00195) (0.566)
Listing Agent has, is, or will
be Affiliated with a Franchisec -0.0542*** -8.349*** -0.0538*** -8.346***
(0.00266) (0.672) (0.00264) (0.672)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0380*** -0.0222
(0.00208) (0.633)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0265*** -0.656
(0.00203) (0.590)
Degree Overpricingd 30.91*** 30.95***
(0.862) (0.864)
Constant 10.58*** 152.7*** 10.58*** 152.7***
(0.144) (29.08) (0.144) (29.08)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.852 0.107 0.853 0.107
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects No No No No
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet, square
feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished basement, central
air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile parkway/interstate, 1 mile rail road,
5 miles Ft. Knox.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
c This is a dummy variable equal to one if the listing agent has, is, or ever will be affiliated with a
franchise, even if the listing agent is currently working for an independent broker. This is done to avoid
perfect multicollinearity with “Listed by Franchise." 30% of the listing agents in the sample worked
for both types of brokers.
d Residual from a sales price regression on housing characteristics, time, and location.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.11: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers using Franchised Listing Agent
Fixed Effects Specification 2. Separate Firm Intercepts. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Century 21 0.000471 5.053** 0.00588 5.164***
(0.00713)b (1.993) (0.00714) (2.000)
Sold by Century 21 -0.00131 -0.970 0.00294 -1.238
(0.00275) (0.866) (0.00282) (0.888)
Listed by Coldwell Banker -0.0186** -11.16*** -0.0137* -11.04***
(0.00757) (3.077) (0.00757) (3.082)
Sold by Coldwell Banker -0.00381 -2.275*** 0.000678 -2.545***
(0.00272) (0.828) (0.00280) (0.851)
Listed by Keller Williams 0.0296*** -6.729*** 0.0437*** -6.627***
(0.00811) (2.281) (0.00816) (2.292)
Sold by Keller Williams 0.0316*** -1.375 0.0365*** -1.645
(0.00523) (1.410) (0.00527) (1.422)
Listed by RE/MAX 0.0119*** -0.0445 0.0222*** 0.0501
(0.00459) (1.269) (0.00462) (1.287)
Sold by RE/MAX 0.000758 -0.970* 0.00544*** -1.251**
(0.00173) (0.531) (0.00186) (0.566)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0345*** 0.341
(0.00215) (0.680)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0184*** -0.980*
(0.00196) (0.589)
Degree Overpricing 24.48*** 24.49***
(0.915) (0.917)
Constant 10.59*** 144.8*** 10.59*** 144.7***
(0.124) (30.02) (0.123) (30.02)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.869 0.144 0.869 0.144
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished base-
ment, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile parkway/interstate,
1 mile rail road, 5 miles Ft. Knox.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
c Residual from a sales price regression on housing characteristics, time, and location.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.12: Regression Results For Comparison of Out-of-State Movers for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLESa Sold by Franchise Sold by Franchise Sold by Franchise
Listed by Franchise 0.308*** 0.322*** 0.322***
(0.00256)a (0.00250) (0.00250)
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.0138
(0.0110)
% Out of State 5 Years Ago 0.00226***
(0.000265)
% Out of State 1 Year Agoc 0.000315***
(6.47e-05)
Constant -0.121 0.184*** 0.193***
(0.0968) (0.0235) (0.0236)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.128 0.116 0.116
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes No No
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square
feet, square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement,
finished basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1
mile parkway/interstate, 1 mile rail road.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
c There were 18 observations where this variable was missing. These observations were set
to zero, and a dummy variable equal to one was included indicating there was a missing
value.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.1: Game Played by Listing Brokers, Selling Brokers, and the Homeowner
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In the game being played listing and selling brokers can choose an effort level in the interval [0,+∞). To simplify the drawing of the
game tree, it is assumed they only choose between high and low levels of effort.
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Figure 3.2: Best Reply Functions for Franchised Listings (1 Selling Broker)
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Figure 3.3: Best Reply Functions for Independent Listings (1 Selling Broker)
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Figure 3.4: Best Reply Functions for Franchised Listings (5 Selling Brokers)
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Figure 3.5: Best Reply Functions for Independent Listings (5 Selling Brokers)
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Figure 3.6: Expected Revenue for the Homeowner (Franchised Listing)
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Figure 3.7: Expected Revenue for the Homeowner (Independent Listing)
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4 Conclusion
This dissertation has sought to contribute to the body of knowledge that uses information
revealed in housing markets to value non-market goods and the value associated with
firms that choose franchising as an organizational form. Rosen (1974) shows that the sales
price of a differentiated good can be expressed as a function of its individual attributes.
With housing, these attributes can be divided into three categories: structural,
neighborhood, and environmental. In equilibrium, the implicit price of each of these
attributes, given by the partial derivative of the hedonic price function with respect to each
attribute, is an estimate of the willingness to pay for a small increase in that attribute.
Chapter 2 uses this basic framework to estimate the disamenity value associated with
communication antennas, and exploits econometric advances that have been made over
the last 40 years. Chapter 3 uses this framework to carefully control for differences in the
types of houses and for markets franchised and independent firms are active in to
determine the value associated with franchised real estate brokerage firms.
Chapter 2 uses the most recent developments in the hedonic property value model and
quasi-experimental literature to estimate the disamenity value associated with
communication antennas. Kuminoff et al. (2010) show that including spatial fixed effects
in the hedonic price function will reduce the bias caused by spatially correlated
time-invariant unobservables. This type of bias is the greatest concern in this study.
Holding all else constant, the owner of a communication antenna will locate it in an area
that will cost the least. If the endogenous antenna location is not controlled for, the
cross-section estimates of willingness to pay to avoid living near these antennas will be
biased. Kuminoff et al. (2010) also recommend using a repeat sales model or a
generalized difference-in-difference specification that eliminates the bias caused by
time-invariant spatially correlated unobservables if panel data is available. The
willingness to pay to avoid living near a communication antennas is estimated and
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compared using each of these methods.
The results in Chapter 2 show that time-invariant spatially correlated unobservables are a
concern and bias the cross-sectional estimates of the reduction in sales price caused by
nearby communication antennas. In each of the cross-section specifications that do not
included spatial fixed effects, the estimates of willingness to pay all show that houses near
communication antennas sell for more (not less!) than similar houses not located near an
antenna. Once spatial fixed effects are included that control for time-invariant
unobservables that are correlated with distance to an antenna, each measure of proximity
to an antenna indicates that communication antennas are a disamenity and that houses
near communication antennas sell for less than a similar house located further away from
an antenna. Further evidence of the correlation between the unobservables and proximity
is found when the most precise fixed effects were included. When census block-group
fixed effects were used that are more precise than census tract fixed effects, the estimated
reduction in sales price caused by a communication antenna becomes smaller and is
estimated more precisely in each of the cross-section specifications. This reinforces the
importance of the carefully controlling for spatial correlated unobservables that are
correlated with proximity to a localized disamentiy.
The results show also that the estimates are robust to functional form and that the
proximity measures used are capturing the visual disamenity associated with
communication antennas. When the quadratic specification is used, the sales price of a
house is increasing at a rate of 0.75% at a distance of 2,500 feet from an antenna, and at a
rate of 0.60% at 2,500 feet using the inverse of distance. At an average sales price of
$183,619, this amounts to a difference of $275. When the sample is reduced to only
include the large tower-type antenna structures, the quadratic specification shows that the
sales price of a house is increasing at a rate of 0.92% at a distance of 2,500 feet compared
to 0.75% when all antennas was used, a difference of $332. When all of the antennas are
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included, no sales price effect is found beyond 15,540 feet (2.94 miles) compared to a
distance of 16,269 feet (3.08 miles) when the sample included only tower-type structures.
This provides additional confidence that the spatial fixed effects are absorbing the effect of
spatially correlated unobservables and that the distance measures are capturing the visual
disamenity associated with communication antennas.
The results in Chapter 2 confirm a hypothesis made by Mastromonaco (2011). His
argument suggests that estimating the effect of communication antennas on property
values using distance to the nearest antenna is likely biased due to the presence of multiple
nearby antennas. Results from the two cross-section specifications that measure proximity
using either a dummy variable equal to one if an antenna is located within a specified
radius or by counting the number of antennas within the same radius are consistent with
his hypothesis. These results show that a house located within 600 feet of an antenna sells
for 5.7% ($10,466) less than a similar house more than 4,500 feet away from its nearest
antenna. Using the number of antennas within a specified radius shows that adding an
additional antenna within 600 feet of a house leads to a reduction in sales price of 3.1%
($5,692). Since the presence of an additional antenna leads to an even further reduction in
sales price, estimates of the disamenity value of an antenna that only consider distance to
the nearest antenna are likely biased upwards. This result has implications for the
valuation of numerous types of localized (dis)amenities in which a house could be
affected by multiple sites.
When the estimates from the repeat sales model are compared to the estimates from the
preferred cross section specification, the results show that the omitted spatial
characteristics that are correlated with proximity to a communication are time invariant,
and are being captured by the census block group fixed effects. The repeat sales method
eliminates any bias caused by time-invariant unobservables and provides results very
similar to the cross sectional estimates that include census block group fixed effects and
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uses a continuous measure of distance along with the number of nearby antennas. Using
the continuous measure of distance, the sales price of a house increasing at a rate of 0.34%
at a distance of 1,000 feet from an antenna, and the repeat sales estimates show that for
every 1,000 foot change in distance to the nearest antenna, the sales price increases by
0.39%. Using the average sales price of $183,619, this amounts to a difference of $92.
This is consistent with the findings in Kuminoff et al. (2010) and reinforces that
importance of including precise spatial fixed effects to control for time-invariant spatially
correlated unobservables when panel data is not available.
Estimation of the difference-in-differences specification recommended by Kuminoff et al.
(2010) highlights a serious shortcoming of that that technique when houses are affected by
multiple sites. Since the difference-in-differences specification takes differences over time
for the treatment and control groups, the results should be similar to the estimates from the
repeat sales specification. The results from a difference-in-differences specification that
includes census tract fixed effects to capture any effect of time-invariant spatially
correlated unobservables, and interactions between time and housing characteristics to
allow the shape of the hedonic price function to change over time, suggest that the sales
price of a house within 2,000 feet of an antenna at the time of sale is no different than the
sales price of a similar house more than 2,000 feet away from the nearest antenna. The
shortcoming of this technique is illustrated by looking at the method used to define the
treatment and control groups proposed by Linden and Rockoff (2008). Using this
technique, relationship between the sales price of a house and distance to the nearest
standing antenna is compared to the relationship between the sale price and distance to the
nearest site where an antenna will be constructed. When houses are affected by the
presence of multiple antennas, distance to the nearest site where an antenna will be
located will capture the effect of a standing antenna just beyond that site. This
complication makes defining the treatment and control groups very difficult. While the
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difference-in-differences specification has become increasing popular in the recent
literature, the nature of the disamenity evaluated here does not appear meet the criteria
necessary to successfully implement this quasi-experimental technique.
The best estimate of reduction in sales price cause by communication antennas shows that
the sales price of a house is increasing at a rate of about 0.34% ($624) at a distance of
1,000 feet from the nearest antenna. This suggests that a house within 1,000 feet of the
nearest antenna when it is sold will sell for 1.01% ($1,884) less than a similar house that is
4,500 feet from the nearest antenna. Compare this to the results that do not include spatial
fixed effects to capture the effect of time-invariant spatially correlated unobservables.
These estimates show that the sales price of a house is decreasing at a rate of 0.40%
($734) at a distance of 1,000 feet. This suggests that a house that is within 1,000 feet of
the nearest antenna will sell for 1.1% ($2,020) more than a similar house that is 4,500 feet
from the nearest antenna. This clearly demonstrates how important it is to include precise
spatial fixed effects to capture the effect of time invariant spatially correlated
unobservables.
When the sample is restricted to include only tower-type antenna structures, the results
show that a house 1,000 feet away from the nearest antenna will sell for 1.33% ($2,482)
less than a similar house that is 4,500 feet away. In this sample, there are 2,313 houses
within 1,000 feet of a tower-type structure. If for each of these houses the nearest
tower-type structure was moved to a distance of 4,500 feet, there would be an aggregate
increase in sales price would be equal to $5.74 million. This value should be compared to
the cost of camouflaging or disguising communication antennas near residential properties
to mitigate the effect they have on property values.
Chapter 3 uses the same housing data that were used to estimate the disamenity value
associated with communications to compare the performance of franchised and
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independent real estate brokers. The data contain information about the listing and selling
firms and agents for each house that sold during the 12 year period the data covered. The
data allow for a comparison of franchised and independent real estate brokerage firms
while considering the different types of agents who work for each type of firm. Although
several papers have made comparisons between franchised and independent real estate
brokerage firms, this study is the first to do so using sales data. Franchised real estate
brokers have access to a nationally recognized brand name, referral networks, and lead
generating systems that independent brokers are not able to take advantage of. These
benefits could give franchised brokers an edge over independent brokers that allow them
to more efficiently match buyers and sellers, but could also give weaker and less
experienced agents an incentive to affiliate with a franchise to boost their reputation as
they work to establish themselves in the real estate business.
A theoretical model of real estate brokerage is developed that accounts for the royalty fees
franchised real estate brokers must pay the franchisor as well as the reduced marginal cost
of effort for franchised real estate brokers that results from having a highly recognizable
brand name, referral networks, and lead generating systems. The model shows that if
franchised and independent real estate brokers have the same marginal cost of effort, the
royalty that the franchised brokers must pay acts as a tax on their effort and their effort is
reduced to a point where the homeowner is better off listing with an independent broker.
When the marginal cost of effort for a franchised broker is allowed to be lower than the
marginal cost of effort for independent brokers because of the benefits franchised brokers
are able to take advantage of, their effort levels increase to a point where a homeowner is
better off listing their house with a franchised real estate broker.
The theoretical model provides two testable hypotheses. First, it predicts that houses listed
with franchised and independent real estate brokers will have the same list price. A test of
this hypothesis shows that the list price differs between franchised and independent
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brokers and suggests that franchised listing brokers may be strategically underpricing
houses in order to obtain a slightly quicker sale. The second prediction is that franchised
real estate brokers will sell their own listings less often than an independent broker. This
result is due to the fact that the on average independent real estate brokers have a larger
number of selling agents working to locate buyers for their listings. The data confirm that
franchised brokers sell their own listings less often than independent brokers. However,
the empirical estimate of the percentage of listings that are sold “in house" is
approximately two-fifths as large as the prediction made by the theoretical model. Since
the model is very stylized and only considers the royalty franchised brokers pay and the
different marginal costs of effort for franchised and independent brokers, it is not
surprising that the theoretical and empirical estimates diverge for list prices and the
probability of selling a listing “in house."
The performance of franchised and independent real estate brokers were compared using a
method similar to the one used in Levitt and Syverson (2008) that compared the sales
price and how long it takes to locate a buyer for listings that are agent owned compared to
listings that are not owned by the listing agent. In the models that did not control for the
types of agents that choose to work for a franchised or independent broker, the estimates
show that houses listed with a franchised broker are sold 3.6 days sooner, but at a discount
of 1.3% ($2,408) compared to a comparable house listed with an independent broker.
Even though some homeowners will be willing to take a slightly lower sales price to get
their house off the market sooner, the tradeoff shown in this specification is one does not
lead to the homeowners being made better off. The required annual return required to
make the homeowner indifferent between this tradeoff and waiting an additional 3.6 days
without facing the reduction is 131%.
As discussed above, weaker and less experienced agents may choose to affiliate with a
franchised real estate firm to take advantage of a nationally recognized brand name,
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referral networks, training programs, and lead generating systems. The detailed sales data
used identify the listing and selling agents for each transaction allowing for a test of this
hypothesis. In a specification that assumes all agents who have, are, or ever will affiliate
with a franchised listing broker are franchise agents, there is a positive “franchise effect"
of a 3.1% increase in sales price for waiting an additional three days for a buyer to be
located. This is equivalent to an annual return of 366%. However, the negative coefficient
on the franchised listing agent dummy variable indicates that on average the weaker
agents who choose to affiliate with a franchise. In the most flexible specification that
allows for heterogeneity in the types of agents that affiliate with a real estate franchise
there is not enough evidence to say that homeowners are any better or worse off by listing
with a franchised broker compared to an independent broker. Using a similar specification
that allows for heterogeneity in the agents who have, are, or will be affiliated with a
franchise and heterogeneity across franchises, there is a positive “franchise effect"
associated with Keller Williams and RE/MAX, and it appears that above-average agents
are choosing to affiliate with these companies.
An area where franchised brokers differ from independent brokers is in their ability to
match buyers and sellers who move from out of state. The results show that franchised
brokers are more likely to sell houses in areas with a higher percentage of out-of-state
movers. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of out-of-state movers in the
census tract in which the house is located leads to a 0.60-1.2% increase in the probability
that it is sold by a franchised broker. This could be due to brand loyalty of out-of-state
movers or the nationwide referral network that franchised brokers are able to take
advantage of. This is consistent with the literature on franchising that says franchises
should be more prevalent in areas where the customers are less familiar with the local
market.
In summary, this dissertation uses information that was revealed in housing markets to
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estimate the disamenity value associated with communication antennas and the value of
franchised real estate brokerage firms. Both essays benefit from detailed sales data that
contain precise location information for each property and characteristics of the selling
and buying process. The richer data enables estimation that overcomes econometric issues
that limited previous studies.
There are a few areas in which future work should focus. First, since there are a lot of
houses in the dataset that were affected by multiple communication antennas, the Linden
and Rockoff (2008) method for defining treatment and control groups cannot be used
effectively. More work needs to be focused on accurately defining treatment and control
groups when houses are likely affected by the presence of multiple sites that are perceived
as localized (dis)amenities so that the difference-in-differences specification
recommended by Kuminoff et al. (2010) can be estimated with confidence.
Second, communication antennas that were camouflaged by already standing structures
such as clocks or church steeples were not identified in this dataset. The data allowed for
the estimation of specifications that only included the large tower-type structures, and, as
was expected, the bigger and more visually disruptive structures had a larger effect on
sales price and had an effect further away. If the camouflaged antennas can be identified
and are shown to have a smaller effect than when all antennas are included, this would
provide even more evidence that the proximity measures are capturing the visual
disamenity associated with communication antennas.
Finally, more work needs to be done looking at the performance of the agents who only
affiliate with a franchised broker, who affiliate with a franchised broker and then transfer
to an independent broker, and who begin with an independent broker and then transfer to a
franchised broker. In this study, agents who fit into any of these three categories were
considered to have been associated with a franchise. There are reasons to believe that
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agents who affiliate with a franchised real estate broker are different from agents who do
not, and the dynamics of how agents move between the different types of firms needs to be
investigated. By doing so, a more accurate test of the hypotheses that weaker and less
experienced agents have the most to gain from affiliating with a franchise can be
performed.
Copyright c©Stephen L. Locke, 2013
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A Appendix
A.1 Chapter 2 Appendix
Table A1.1: Summary Statistics for the Communication
Towers Proximity Measures. Central Kentucky Data,
200-2011. N=142,164.
Continuous Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Distance to Closest Standing
Tower When Sold (feet)a 6,353 4,800 59 51,663
Equal to 1 if Within Share Number
TowerDistance0to300 0.001 93
TowerDistance300to600 0.004 586
TowerDistance600to900 0.008 1,128
TowerDistance900to1200 0.013 1,879
TowerDistance1200to1500 0.02 2,832
TowerDistance1500to1800 0.024 3,457
TowerDistance1800to2100 0.028 3,934
TowerDistance2100to2400 0.034 4,886
TowerDistance2400to2700 0.036 5,187
TowerDistance2700to3000 0.040 5,670
TowerDistance3000to3300 0.042 5,959
TowerDistance3300to3600 0.042 6,033
TowerDistance3600to3900 0.046 6,528
TowerDistance3900to4200 0.047 6,659
TowerDistance4200to4500 0.044 6,239
Number Within # Equal to 1 # Equal to 2 # Equal to 3
TowerCount0to300 93 0 0
TowerCount300to600 574 13 0
TowerCount600to900 1,156 10 0
TowerCount900to1200 1,883 24 0
TowerCount1200to1500 2,897 38 0
TowerCount1500to1800 3,559 54 0
TowerCount1800to2100 4,224 91 0
TowerCount2100to2400 5,248 153 1
TowerCount2400to2700 5,903 222 2
TowerCount2700to3000 6,851 271 1
TowerCount3000to3300 7,674 319 9
TowerCount3300to3600 8,043 351 14
TowerCount3600to3900 9,173 519 44
TowerCount3900to4200 10,381 586 24
TowerCount4200to4500 10,694 652 49
a Distance in thousands of feet is used in the analysis that follows.
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Table A1.2: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas
on Property Values using a Continuous Measure of Distance. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011. All Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Distance to
any Antenna -0.00922*** -0.0113*** 0.0104*** 0.00892***
(0.000624) (0.000610) (0.00195) (0.00176)
Distance2 to
any Antenna 0.000162*** 0.000182*** -0.000324*** -0.000287***
(2.34e-05) (2.28e-05) (6.18e-05) (5.81e-05)
Bedrooms -0.00280 -0.00508*** 0.0205*** 0.0227***
(0.00188) (0.00184) (0.00388) (0.00286)
Full Bathrooms 0.110*** 0.128*** 0.0923*** 0.0895***
(0.00245) (0.00241) (0.00340) (0.00266)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0623*** 0.0722*** 0.0485*** 0.0460***
(0.00262) (0.00256) (0.00390) (0.00299)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000562*** 0.000571*** 0.000414*** 0.000401***
(6.20e-06) (6.06e-06) (1.24e-05) (1.03e-05)
Square Feet2 -3.24e-08*** -3.47e-08*** -2.10e-08*** -2.14e-08***
(1.02e-09) (9.96e-10) (2.47e-09) (1.95e-09)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0152*** 0.0152*** 0.0201*** 0.0202***
(0.000397) (0.000388) (0.00136) (0.00126)
Lotsize2 -4.05e-05*** -4.06e-05*** -5.84e-05*** -5.84e-05***
(1.91e-06) (1.86e-06) (8.78e-06) (8.77e-06)
Lotsize Missing 0.0560*** 0.0143*** -0.00999** -0.00843**
(0.00510) (0.00503) (0.00439) (0.00390)
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.0232*** -0.00626* -0.0219*** -0.0210***
(0.00325) (0.00320) (0.00356) (0.00287)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0347* 0.0172 0.00840 0.00454
(0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0124) (0.0114)
Age (Years) -0.00279*** -0.00221*** -0.00630*** -0.00692***
(0.000118) (0.000115) (0.000397) (0.000280)
Age2 -2.03e-05*** -2.22e-05*** 1.79e-05*** 2.27e-05***
(1.10e-06) (1.08e-06) (4.47e-06) (2.83e-06)
Age Unknown -0.157*** -0.159*** -0.133*** -0.126***
(0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0210) (0.0174)
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Table A1.2 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Fireplace 0.138*** 0.126*** 0.0497*** 0.0495***
(0.00260) (0.00255) (0.00396) (0.00300)
Basement 0.164*** 0.166*** 0.151*** 0.142***
(0.00261) (0.00255) (0.00439) (0.00346)
Finished Basement 0.0397*** 0.0257*** 0.0321*** 0.0326***
(0.00322) (0.00320) (0.00445) (0.00310)
Central Air 0.396*** 0.381*** 0.259*** 0.251***
(0.00390) (0.00381) (0.00929) (0.00681)
Brick Exterior 0.0602*** 0.0488*** 0.0404*** 0.0352***
(0.00243) (0.00238) (0.00340) (0.00267)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0776*** -0.0747*** -0.0180*** -0.0113**
(0.00319) (0.00312) (0.00572) (0.00489)
Metal Roof -0.0659*** -0.0235** -0.0150 -0.0121
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0164) (0.0155)
Composition Roof -0.0320*** -0.000818 0.0153** 0.0175***
(0.00491) (0.00504) (0.00684) (0.00557)
Ranch Style 0.0723*** 0.0910*** 0.0616*** 0.0559***
(0.00267) (0.00270) (0.00397) (0.00317)
Modular Style -0.504*** -0.466*** -0.477*** -0.480***
(0.00980) (0.00961) (0.0147) (0.0148)
Cape Cod Style 0.0974*** 0.108*** 0.0474*** 0.0407***
(0.00408) (0.00405) (0.00569) (0.00439)
Carport 0.0455*** 0.0481*** 0.0136** 0.00954**
(0.00514) (0.00502) (0.00530) (0.00454)
Garage 0.0863*** 0.0967*** 0.00517 0.00433
(0.00331) (0.00324) (0.00557) (0.00461)
One Car Garage 0.119*** 0.110*** 0.0926*** 0.0877***
(0.00423) (0.00413) (0.00595) (0.00529)
Multiple Car Garage 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.144*** 0.140***
(0.00392) (0.00383) (0.00657) (0.00544)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.0101*** -0.0192*** -0.0262*** -0.0179**
(0.00238) (0.00233) (0.00976) (0.00708)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0861*** -0.0917*** -0.0134 -0.0242***
(0.00230) (0.00224) (0.00917) (0.00681)
Within 1 Mile Ft. Knox -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.0765** -0.0572*
(0.00926) (0.00904) (0.0344) (0.0322)
Constant 10.37*** 10.38*** 10.50*** 10.23***
(0.0104) (0.0204) (0.0315) (0.0200)
Observations 142,161 142,161 142,161 142,161
R-squared 0.703 0.718 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
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Table A1.3: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas
on Property Values using the Inverse of Distance to the Nearest Antenna. Central
Kentucky Data, 2000-2011. All Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Inverse Distance to
Any Antenna 0.0805*** 0.0902*** -0.0358*** -0.0284***
(0.00372) (0.00364) (0.00887) (0.00755)
Bedrooms -0.00160 -0.00354* 0.0202*** 0.0226***
(0.00188) (0.00184) (0.00388) (0.00286)
Full Bathrooms 0.111*** 0.128*** 0.0927*** 0.0896***
(0.00245) (0.00241) (0.00340) (0.00267)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0647*** 0.0749*** 0.0486*** 0.0461***
(0.00261) (0.00256) (0.00389) (0.00300)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000558*** 0.000566*** 0.000415*** 0.000401***
(6.20e-06) (6.06e-06) (1.25e-05) (1.04e-05)
Square Feet2 -3.20e-08*** -3.41e-08*** -2.11e-08*** -2.14e-08***
(1.02e-09) (9.96e-10) (2.51e-09) (1.96e-09)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0142*** 0.0138*** 0.0202*** 0.0203***
(0.000391) (0.000382) (0.00137) (0.00126)
Lotsize2 -3.70e-05*** -3.59e-05*** -5.90e-05*** -5.88e-05***
(1.89e-06) (1.85e-06) (8.90e-06) (8.84e-06)
Lotsize Missing 0.0573*** 0.0171*** -0.0103** -0.00829**
(0.00509) (0.00504) (0.00437) (0.00389)
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.0264*** -0.00144 -0.0221*** -0.0211***
(0.00324) (0.00320) (0.00359) (0.00288)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0363** 0.0197 0.00840 0.00433
(0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0125) (0.0115)
Age (Years) -0.00256*** -0.00191*** -0.00632*** -0.00693***
(0.000117) (0.000115) (0.000396) (0.000280)
Age2 -2.23e-05*** -2.47e-05*** 1.80e-05*** 2.27e-05***
(1.10e-06) (1.07e-06) (4.47e-06) (2.84e-06)
Age Unknown -0.162*** -0.166*** -0.134*** -0.126***
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0211) (0.0175)
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Table A1.3 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Fireplace 0.139*** 0.128*** 0.0496*** 0.0494***
(0.00260) (0.00255) (0.00397) (0.00300)
Basement 0.163*** 0.165*** 0.151*** 0.142***
(0.00261) (0.00256) (0.00436) (0.00347)
Finished Basement 0.0387*** 0.0249*** 0.0323*** 0.0326***
(0.00322) (0.00320) (0.00444) (0.00310)
Central Air 0.398*** 0.385*** 0.259*** 0.251***
(0.00390) (0.00381) (0.00932) (0.00682)
Brick Exterior 0.0599*** 0.0489*** 0.0404*** 0.0352***
(0.00243) (0.00239) (0.00342) (0.00267)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0798*** -0.0776*** -0.0179*** -0.0110**
(0.00319) (0.00312) (0.00569) (0.00489)
Metal Roof -0.0736*** -0.0354*** -0.0127 -0.0101
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0163) (0.0154)
Composition Roof -0.0307*** -0.000630 0.0156** 0.0176***
(0.00491) (0.00505) (0.00682) (0.00555)
Ranch Style 0.0708*** 0.0878*** 0.0619*** 0.0560***
(0.00266) (0.00269) (0.00396) (0.00317)
Modular Style -0.516*** -0.484*** -0.476*** -0.479***
(0.00977) (0.00957) (0.0147) (0.0149)
Cape Cod Style 0.0970*** 0.106*** 0.0475*** 0.0407***
(0.00408) (0.00405) (0.00570) (0.00438)
Carport 0.0451*** 0.0475*** 0.0131** 0.00930**
(0.00514) (0.00502) (0.00531) (0.00454)
Garage 0.0855*** 0.0953*** 0.00487 0.00418
(0.00331) (0.00324) (0.00556) (0.00463)
One Car Garage 0.121*** 0.112*** 0.0927*** 0.0877***
(0.00423) (0.00413) (0.00595) (0.00531)
Multiple Car Garage 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.144*** 0.140***
(0.00392) (0.00383) (0.00659) (0.00546)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.00258 -0.00855*** -0.0288*** -0.0212***
(0.00232) (0.00226) (0.00953) (0.00699)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0817*** -0.0855*** -0.0153* -0.0258***
(0.00227) (0.00222) (0.00907) (0.00685)
Within 1 Mile Ft. Knox -0.205*** -0.202*** -0.0749** -0.0574*
(0.00926) (0.00904) (0.0348) (0.0332)
Constant 10.29*** 10.28*** 10.56*** 10.28***
(0.00994) (0.0202) (0.0302) (0.0187)
Observations 142,161 142,161 142,161 142,161
R-squared 0.703 0.717 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
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Table A1.4: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of Towers Only
on Property Values using a Continuous Measure of Distance. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011. All Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Distance to
Tower -0.00446*** -0.00737*** 0.0119*** 0.0109***
(0.000597)b (0.000585) (0.00213) (0.00187)
Distance2 to
Tower 2.23e-05 6.31e-05*** -0.000357*** -0.000335***
(2.24e-05) (2.19e-05) (6.54e-05) (6.04e-05)
Bedrooms -0.00246 -0.00462** 0.0204*** 0.0227***
(0.00188) (0.00184) (0.00388) (0.00285)
Full Bathrooms 0.110*** 0.127*** 0.0925*** 0.0896***
(0.00245) (0.00241) (0.00343) (0.00266)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0631*** 0.0729*** 0.0485*** 0.0461***
(0.00262) (0.00257) (0.00391) (0.00300)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000559*** 0.000567*** 0.000414*** 0.000401***
(6.20e-06) (6.06e-06) (1.24e-05) (1.03e-05)
Square Feet2 -3.21e-08*** -3.43e-08*** -2.10e-08*** -2.15e-08***
(1.02e-09) (9.97e-10) (2.48e-09) (1.94e-09)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0148*** 0.0148*** 0.0200*** 0.0202***
(0.000397) (0.000387) (0.00135) (0.00126)
Lotsize2 -3.90e-05*** -3.94e-05*** -5.83e-05*** -5.83e-05***
(1.91e-06) (1.86e-06) (8.76e-06) (8.76e-06)
Lotsize Missing 0.0569*** 0.0154*** -0.00987** -0.00852**
(0.00510) (0.00504) (0.00440) (0.00390)
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.0247*** -0.00480 -0.0218*** -0.0210***
(0.00325) (0.00320) (0.00356) (0.00287)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0339* 0.0165 0.00923 0.00477
(0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0124) (0.0114)
Age (Years) -0.00263*** -0.00205*** -0.00629*** -0.00692***
(0.000118) (0.000115) (0.000396) (0.000280)
Age2 -2.12e-05*** -2.33e-05*** 1.80e-05*** 2.28e-05***
(1.10e-06) (1.08e-06) (4.45e-06) (2.83e-06)
Age Unknown -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.133*** -0.126***
(0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0209) (0.0174)
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Table A1.4 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Fireplace 0.138*** 0.126*** 0.0498*** 0.0495***
(0.00260) (0.00256) (0.00394) (0.00300)
Basement 0.164*** 0.167*** 0.151*** 0.142***
(0.00262) (0.00256) (0.00440) (0.00346)
Finished Basement 0.0391*** 0.0254*** 0.0320*** 0.0325***
(0.00323) (0.00320) (0.00443) (0.00309)
Central Air 0.397*** 0.383*** 0.259*** 0.251***
(0.00390) (0.00381) (0.00927) (0.00680)
Brick Exterior 0.0606*** 0.0494*** 0.0404*** 0.0351***
(0.00243) (0.00239) (0.00340) (0.00267)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0786*** -0.0759*** -0.0178*** -0.0112**
(0.00320) (0.00312) (0.00573) (0.00489)
Metal Roof -0.0683*** -0.0256** -0.0153 -0.0124
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0164) (0.0155)
Composition Roof -0.0316*** -0.000844 0.0154** 0.0175***
(0.00492) (0.00505) (0.00686) (0.00559)
Ranch Style 0.0711*** 0.0901*** 0.0613*** 0.0560***
(0.00267) (0.00270) (0.00399) (0.00318)
Modular Style -0.508*** -0.470*** -0.478*** -0.481***
(0.00981) (0.00961) (0.0147) (0.0148)
Cape Cod Style 0.0974*** 0.108*** 0.0473*** 0.0406***
(0.00409) (0.00405) (0.00570) (0.00440)
Carport 0.0463*** 0.0494*** 0.0135** 0.00966**
(0.00514) (0.00502) (0.00532) (0.00455)
Garage 0.0872*** 0.0977*** 0.00524 0.00437
(0.00331) (0.00324) (0.00557) (0.00461)
One Car Garage 0.119*** 0.110*** 0.0928*** 0.0876***
(0.00423) (0.00414) (0.00593) (0.00528)
Multiple Car Garage 0.127*** 0.123*** 0.143*** 0.140***
(0.00392) (0.00383) (0.00654) (0.00543)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.00583** -0.0160*** -0.0240** -0.0163**
(0.00238) (0.00233) (0.00983) (0.00709)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0849*** -0.0909*** -0.0132 -0.0239***
(0.00230) (0.00224) (0.00924) (0.00698)
Within 1 Mile Ft. Knox -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.0768** -0.0569*
(0.00928) (0.00905) (0.0342) (0.0319)
Constant 10.34*** 10.36*** 10.49*** 10.22***
(0.0104) (0.0204) (0.0315) (0.0205)
Observations 142,161 142,161 142,161 142,161
R-squared 0.702 0.717 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
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Table A1.5: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas
on Property Values Using the Nearest Antenna Method with the Closest Rings
Combined. Central Kentucky Sales Data. 2000-2011. All Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Distance0to600 0.131*** 0.140*** -0.0630*** -0.0572***
(0.0136) (0.0133) (0.0196) (0.0178)
Distance600to900 0.0982*** 0.111*** -0.0756*** -0.0699***
(0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0168) (0.0152)
Distance900to1200 0.105*** 0.121*** -0.0697*** -0.0727***
(0.00829) (0.00809) (0.0160) (0.0141)
Distance1200to1500 0.110*** 0.122*** -0.0509*** -0.0581***
(0.00689) (0.00672) (0.0119) (0.0107)
Distance1500to1800 0.0798*** 0.0911*** -0.0600*** -0.0687***
(0.00634) (0.00619) (0.0114) (0.0106)
Distance1800to2100 0.0623*** 0.0736*** -0.0516*** -0.0544***
(0.00603) (0.00589) (0.0113) (0.0102)
Distance2100to2400 0.0425*** 0.0565*** -0.0511*** -0.0536***
(0.00554) (0.00541) (0.0114) (0.00964)
Distance2400to2700 0.0413*** 0.0547*** -0.0476*** -0.0448***
(0.00535) (0.00523) (0.0106) (0.00862)
Distance2700to3000 0.0115** 0.0239*** -0.0512*** -0.0457***
(0.00510) (0.00499) (0.0108) (0.00849)
Distance3000to3300 0.00454 0.0164*** -0.0525*** -0.0489***
(0.00504) (0.00492) (0.00990) (0.00825)
Distance3300to3600 0.0232*** 0.0337*** -0.0406*** -0.0360***
(0.00507) (0.00495) (0.00940) (0.00778)
Distance3600to3900 0.0130*** 0.0230*** -0.0419*** -0.0356***
(0.00501) (0.00489) (0.00918) (0.00712)
Distance3900to4200 0.0239*** 0.0327*** -0.0275*** -0.0201***
(0.00505) (0.00493) (0.00837) (0.00660)
Distance4200to4500 0.0210*** 0.0270*** -0.0168** -0.00857
(0.00521) (0.00509) (0.00707) (0.00627)
Bedrooms -0.00126 -0.00326* 0.0203*** 0.0228***
(0.00188) (0.00184) (0.00373) (0.00269)
Full Bathrooms 0.110*** 0.128*** 0.0919*** 0.0891***
(0.00244) (0.00241) (0.00329) (0.00262)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0645*** 0.0748*** 0.0480*** 0.0459***
(0.00261) (0.00256) (0.00368) (0.00288)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000559*** 0.000567*** 0.000415*** 0.000401***
(6.19e-06) (6.06e-06) (1.23e-05) (1.04e-05)
Square Feet2 -3.19e-08*** -3.40e-08*** -2.11e-08*** -2.15e-08***
(1.02e-09) (9.95e-10) (2.47e-09) (1.97e-09)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0142*** 0.0140*** 0.0201*** 0.0203***
(0.000392) (0.000382) (0.00134) (0.00126)
Lotsize2 -3.71e-05*** -3.64e-05*** -5.87e-05*** -5.86e-05***
(1.89e-06) (1.85e-06) (8.85e-06) (8.84e-06)
Lotsize Missing 0.0574*** 0.0169*** -0.0100** -0.00844**
(0.00509) (0.00503) (0.00422) (0.00377)
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.0269*** -0.00157 -0.0218*** -0.0209***
(0.00324) (0.00319) (0.00343) (0.00281)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0369** 0.0203 0.00781 0.00404
(0.0182) (0.0178) (0.0122) (0.0114)
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Table A1.5 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Age (Years) -0.00258*** -0.00197*** -0.00632*** -0.00693***
(0.000117) (0.000115) (0.000375) (0.000277)
Age2 -2.27e-05*** -2.50e-05*** 1.82e-05*** 2.30e-05***
(1.10e-06) (1.07e-06) (4.24e-06) (2.81e-06)
Age Unknown -0.162*** -0.164*** -0.134*** -0.126***
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0203) (0.0174)
Fireplace 0.138*** 0.126*** 0.0499*** 0.0497***
(0.00260) (0.00255) (0.00385) (0.00291)
Basement 0.162*** 0.165*** 0.151*** 0.142***
(0.00261) (0.00255) (0.00434) (0.00336)
Finished Basement 0.0391*** 0.0254*** 0.0320*** 0.0326***
(0.00322) (0.00319) (0.00434) (0.00308)
Central Air 0.397*** 0.383*** 0.259*** 0.251***
(0.00389) (0.00381) (0.00905) (0.00683)
Brick Exterior 0.0602*** 0.0492*** 0.0403*** 0.0350***
(0.00243) (0.00238) (0.00323) (0.00251)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0798*** -0.0775*** -0.0172*** -0.0110**
(0.00319) (0.00312) (0.00553) (0.00481)
Metal Roof -0.0719*** -0.0320*** -0.0148 -0.0117
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0163) (0.0154)
Composition Roof -0.0308*** -0.000276 0.0151** 0.0172***
(0.00491) (0.00504) (0.00667) (0.00539)
Ranch Style 0.0714*** 0.0891*** 0.0618*** 0.0560***
(0.00266) (0.00269) (0.00391) (0.00305)
Modular Style -0.515*** -0.481*** -0.476*** -0.479***
(0.00977) (0.00957) (0.0154) (0.0150)
Cape Cod Style 0.0958*** 0.105*** 0.0477*** 0.0408***
(0.00408) (0.00405) (0.00565) (0.00440)
Carport 0.0448*** 0.0471*** 0.0138*** 0.00985**
(0.00514) (0.00502) (0.00520) (0.00456)
Garage 0.0845*** 0.0942*** 0.00528 0.00452
(0.00330) (0.00324) (0.00542) (0.00452)
One Car Garage 0.121*** 0.112*** 0.0926*** 0.0875***
(0.00422) (0.00413) (0.00585) (0.00523)
Multiple Car Garage 0.129*** 0.127*** 0.144*** 0.140***
(0.00391) (0.00383) (0.00647) (0.00536)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.00430* -0.0118*** -0.0281*** -0.0192**
(0.00234) (0.00229) (0.00977) (0.00751)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0815*** -0.0852*** -0.0149* -0.0255***
(0.00227) (0.00222) (0.00905) (0.00692)
Within 1 Mile Ft. Knox -0.206*** -0.204*** -0.0734** -0.0535
(0.00926) (0.00904) (0.0320) (0.0328)
Constant 10.29*** 10.28*** 10.56*** 10.30***
(0.00993) (0.0201) (0.0295) (0.0194)
Observations 142,164 142,164 142,164 142,164
R-squared 0.703 0.718 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
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Table A1.6: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of Towers Only
on Property Values Using the Nearest Antenna Method with the Closest Rings
Combined. Central Kentucky Sales Data. 2000-2011. All Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
TowerDistance0to600 0.124*** 0.135*** -0.0645*** -0.0503**
(0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0232) (0.0213)
TowerDistance600to900 0.0828*** 0.0960*** -0.0798*** -0.0680***
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0185) (0.0175)
TowerDistance900to1200 0.0894*** 0.106*** -0.0726*** -0.0726***
(0.00940) (0.00918) (0.0205) (0.0165)
TowerDistance1200to1500 0.0897*** 0.104*** -0.0567*** -0.0620***
(0.00772) (0.00754) (0.0132) (0.0121)
TowerDistance1500to1800 0.0592*** 0.0732*** -0.0652*** -0.0720***
(0.00702) (0.00686) (0.0126) (0.0119)
TowerDistance1800to2100 0.0494*** 0.0625*** -0.0554*** -0.0596***
(0.00660) (0.00645) (0.0128) (0.0112)
TowerDistance2100to2400 0.0267*** 0.0426*** -0.0538*** -0.0582***
(0.00597) (0.00583) (0.0126) (0.0105)
TowerDistance2400to2700 0.0212*** 0.0364*** -0.0538*** -0.0540***
(0.00579) (0.00566) (0.0116) (0.00930)
TowerDistance2700to3000 -0.0122** 0.00154 -0.0558*** -0.0546***
(0.00555) (0.00542) (0.0116) (0.00916)
TowerDistance3000to3300 -0.0199*** -0.00485 -0.0522*** -0.0516***
(0.00541) (0.00529) (0.0108) (0.00902)
TowerDistance3300to3600 -0.00121 0.0114** -0.0471*** -0.0424***
(0.00539) (0.00526) (0.0103) (0.00842)
TowerDistance3600to3900 0.000655 0.0134*** -0.0445*** -0.0411***
(0.00519) (0.00507) (0.00888) (0.00757)
TowerDistance3900to4200 0.0222*** 0.0327*** -0.0279*** -0.0253***
(0.00514) (0.00502) (0.00843) (0.00723)
TowerDistance4200to4500 0.0182*** 0.0276*** -0.0201*** -0.0139**
(0.00529) (0.00517) (0.00717) (0.00662)
Bedrooms -0.00110 -0.00298 0.0202*** 0.0227***
(0.00188) (0.00184) (0.00375) (0.00268)
Full Bathrooms 0.110*** 0.127*** 0.0923*** 0.0893***
(0.00245) (0.00241) (0.00329) (0.00260)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0646*** 0.0747*** 0.0484*** 0.0461***
(0.00261) (0.00256) (0.00370) (0.00287)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000558*** 0.000565*** 0.000414*** 0.000401***
(6.20e-06) (6.06e-06) (1.24e-05) (1.04e-05)
Square Feet2 -3.19e-08*** -3.39e-08*** -2.10e-08*** -2.14e-08***
(1.02e-09) (9.96e-10) (2.49e-09) (1.96e-09)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0140*** 0.0137*** 0.0201*** 0.0203***
(0.000392) (0.000382) (0.00134) (0.00126)
Lotsize2 -3.62e-05*** -3.55e-05*** -5.87e-05*** -5.85e-05***
(1.89e-06) (1.85e-06) (8.86e-06) (8.85e-06)
Lotsize Missing 0.0579*** 0.0179*** -0.0102** -0.00853**
(0.00510) (0.00504) (0.00419) (0.00377)
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.0278*** -0.000432 -0.0218*** -0.0210***
(0.00324) (0.00320) (0.00342) (0.00281)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0349* 0.0185 0.00824 0.00406
(0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0122) (0.0114)
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Table A1.6 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Age (Years) -0.00246*** -0.00183*** -0.00629*** -0.00693***
(0.000117) (0.000115) (0.000375) (0.000277)
Age2 -2.33e-05*** -2.58e-05*** 1.81e-05*** 2.30e-05***
(1.10e-06) (1.08e-06) (4.23e-06) (2.80e-06)
Age Unknown -0.166*** -0.168*** -0.134*** -0.126***
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0203) (0.0173)
Fireplace 0.138*** 0.127*** 0.0498*** 0.0497***
(0.00260) (0.00256) (0.00385) (0.00292)
Basement 0.163*** 0.165*** 0.151*** 0.142***
(0.00261) (0.00256) (0.00434) (0.00334)
Finished Basement 0.0380*** 0.0246*** 0.0322*** 0.0325***
(0.00322) (0.00320) (0.00432) (0.00307)
Central Air 0.398*** 0.385*** 0.258*** 0.251***
(0.00390) (0.00381) (0.00905) (0.00682)
Brick Exterior 0.0609*** 0.0502*** 0.0402*** 0.0350***
(0.00243) (0.00239) (0.00325) (0.00251)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0801*** -0.0780*** -0.0171*** -0.0108**
(0.00319) (0.00312) (0.00555) (0.00481)
Metal Roof -0.0735*** -0.0343*** -0.0145 -0.0115
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0163) (0.0155)
Composition Roof -0.0304*** -0.000416 0.0153** 0.0172***
(0.00491) (0.00505) (0.00667) (0.00540)
Ranch Style 0.0703*** 0.0878*** 0.0619*** 0.0562***
(0.00267) (0.00270) (0.00394) (0.00305)
Modular Style -0.518*** -0.484*** -0.476*** -0.479***
(0.00977) (0.00958) (0.0154) (0.0150)
Cape Cod Style 0.0962*** 0.106*** 0.0475*** 0.0406***
(0.00408) (0.00405) (0.00567) (0.00439)
Carport 0.0458*** 0.0484*** 0.0135*** 0.00989**
(0.00514) (0.00502) (0.00521) (0.00456)
Garage 0.0856*** 0.0952*** 0.00524 0.00453
(0.00331) (0.00324) (0.00541) (0.00452)
One Car Garage 0.121*** 0.112*** 0.0925*** 0.0874***
(0.00423) (0.00413) (0.00581) (0.00522)
Multiple Car Garage 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.144*** 0.140***
(0.00392) (0.00383) (0.00644) (0.00535)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.000183 -0.00760*** -0.0263*** -0.0180**
(0.00233) (0.00228) (0.00973) (0.00746)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0808*** -0.0846*** -0.0145 -0.0252***
(0.00227) (0.00222) (0.00913) (0.00700)
Within 1 Mile Ft. Knox -0.206*** -0.205*** -0.0727** -0.0527
(0.00927) (0.00905) (0.0319) (0.0326)
Constant 10.30*** 10.29*** 10.55*** 10.30***
(0.00993) (0.0202) (0.0295) (0.0196)
Observations 142,164 142,164 142,164 142,164
R-squared 0.703 0.717 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
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Table A1.7: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of All Antennas
on Property Values Using the Antenna Count Method with the Closest Rings
Combined. Central Kentucky Sales Data. 2000-2011. All Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Count0to600 0.0993*** 0.100*** -0.0384** -0.0307**
(0.0129) (0.0126) (0.0166) (0.0148)
Count600to900 0.0636*** 0.0693*** -0.0502*** -0.0458***
(0.00981) (0.00957) (0.0146) (0.0133)
Count900to1200 0.0697*** 0.0784*** -0.0432*** -0.0483***
(0.00766) (0.00748) (0.0131) (0.0118)
Count1200to1500 0.0732*** 0.0787*** -0.0307*** -0.0371***
(0.00617) (0.00602) (0.00973) (0.00900)
Count1500to1800 0.0493*** 0.0536*** -0.0397*** -0.0480***
(0.00551) (0.00538) (0.00810) (0.00769)
Count1800to2100 0.0453*** 0.0494*** -0.0291*** -0.0315***
(0.00502) (0.00490) (0.00795) (0.00719)
Count2100to2400 0.0299*** 0.0363*** -0.0264*** -0.0303***
(0.00451) (0.00440) (0.00870) (0.00702)
Count2400to2700 0.0305*** 0.0362*** -0.0289*** -0.0277***
(0.00418) (0.00408) (0.00706) (0.00635)
Count2700to3000 0.00339 0.00958** -0.0307*** -0.0286***
(0.00385) (0.00376) (0.00739) (0.00608)
Count3000to3300 0.00398 0.00951*** -0.0299*** -0.0311***
(0.00362) (0.00353) (0.00694) (0.00557)
Count3300to3600 0.0167*** 0.0213*** -0.0251*** -0.0239***
(0.00349) (0.00340) (0.00608) (0.00482)
Count3600to3900 0.00973*** 0.0147*** -0.0291*** -0.0274***
(0.00323) (0.00315) (0.00626) (0.00504)
Count3900to4200 0.0255*** 0.0304*** -0.0237*** -0.0196***
(0.00306) (0.00299) (0.00652) (0.00465)
Count4200to4500 0.0215*** 0.0266*** -0.0191*** -0.0140***
(0.00302) (0.00295) (0.00613) (0.00458)
Bedrooms -0.00113 -0.00309* 0.0205*** 0.0229***
(0.00188) (0.00184) (0.00376) (0.00270)
Full Bathrooms 0.110*** 0.127*** 0.0920*** 0.0891***
(0.00244) (0.00241) (0.00330) (0.00263)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0649*** 0.0754*** 0.0486*** 0.0462***
(0.00261) (0.00256) (0.00371) (0.00288)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000560*** 0.000568*** 0.000414*** 0.000400***
(6.20e-06) (6.06e-06) (1.23e-05) (1.04e-05)
Square Feet2 -3.20e-08*** -3.42e-08*** -2.10e-08*** -2.13e-08***
(1.02e-09) (9.95e-10) (2.48e-09) (1.97e-09)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0141*** 0.0139*** 0.0201*** 0.0202***
(0.000390) (0.000381) (0.00136) (0.00127)
Lotsize2 -3.70e-05*** -3.61e-05*** -5.86e-05*** -5.84e-05***
(1.89e-06) (1.84e-06) (8.94e-06) (8.87e-06)
Lotsize Missing 0.0581*** 0.0172*** -0.0103** -0.00854**
(0.00509) (0.00503) (0.00418) (0.00376)
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.0272*** -0.00113 -0.0221*** -0.0211***
(0.00324) (0.00319) (0.00345) (0.00283)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0367** 0.0199 0.00671 0.00363
(0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0121) (0.0113)
131
Table A1.7 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Age (Years) -0.00256*** -0.00192*** -0.00637*** -0.00697***
(0.000117) (0.000115) (0.000378) (0.000280)
Age2 -2.35e-05*** -2.61e-05*** 1.88e-05*** 2.34e-05***
(1.10e-06) (1.08e-06) (4.23e-06) (2.83e-06)
Age Unknown -0.165*** -0.168*** -0.136*** -0.128***
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0207) (0.0175)
Fireplace 0.138*** 0.126*** 0.0496*** 0.0496***
(0.00260) (0.00255) (0.00381) (0.00290)
Basement 0.162*** 0.165*** 0.152*** 0.143***
(0.00261) (0.00255) (0.00431) (0.00337)
Finished Basement 0.0398*** 0.0259*** 0.0324*** 0.0327***
(0.00322) (0.00319) (0.00434) (0.00308)
Central Air 0.396*** 0.383*** 0.258*** 0.251***
(0.00389) (0.00381) (0.00904) (0.00684)
Brick Exterior 0.0597*** 0.0485*** 0.0406*** 0.0354***
(0.00243) (0.00238) (0.00326) (0.00252)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0800*** -0.0778*** -0.0170*** -0.0107**
(0.00319) (0.00311) (0.00558) (0.00483)
Metal Roof -0.0728*** -0.0329*** -0.0176 -0.0138
(0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0162) (0.0155)
Composition Roof -0.0327*** -0.00198 0.0127* 0.0152***
(0.00491) (0.00504) (0.00654) (0.00538)
Ranch Style 0.0722*** 0.0900*** 0.0616*** 0.0562***
(0.00266) (0.00269) (0.00394) (0.00307)
Modular Style -0.514*** -0.482*** -0.477*** -0.480***
(0.00977) (0.00957) (0.0156) (0.0151)
Cape Cod Style 0.0944*** 0.104*** 0.0477*** 0.0412***
(0.00408) (0.00405) (0.00567) (0.00443)
Carport 0.0465*** 0.0488*** 0.0142*** 0.0104**
(0.00514) (0.00502) (0.00526) (0.00458)
Garage 0.0850*** 0.0949*** 0.00566 0.00498
(0.00330) (0.00324) (0.00544) (0.00450)
One Car Garage 0.121*** 0.113*** 0.0923*** 0.0871***
(0.00422) (0.00413) (0.00585) (0.00515)
Multiple Car Garage 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.143*** 0.139***
(0.00392) (0.00383) (0.00643) (0.00528)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.00640*** -0.0139*** -0.0281*** -0.0193**
(0.00234) (0.00229) (0.00964) (0.00771)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0838*** -0.0882*** -0.0128 -0.0232***
(0.00228) (0.00222) (0.00906) (0.00691)
Within 1 Mile Ft. Knox -0.204*** -0.201*** -0.0747** -0.0555
(0.00925) (0.00903) (0.0327) (0.0339)
Constant 10.29*** 10.29*** 10.56*** 10.31***
(0.00992) (0.0201) (0.0294) (0.0206)
Observations 142,164 142,164 142,164 142,164
R-squared 0.703 0.718 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
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Table A1.8: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of Towers Only
on Property Values Using Antenna Count Method with the Closest Rings Combined.
Central Kentucky Sales Data. 2000-2011. All Variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
TowerCount0to600 0.103*** 0.106*** -0.0459** -0.0317*
(0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0211) (0.0188)
TowerCount600to900 0.0602*** 0.0669*** -0.0661*** -0.0555***
(0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0164) (0.0155)
TowerCount900to1200 0.0670*** 0.0772*** -0.0586*** -0.0591***
(0.00909) (0.00887) (0.0183) (0.0152)
TowerCount1200to1500 0.0634*** 0.0715*** -0.0490*** -0.0521***
(0.00736) (0.00718) (0.0133) (0.0113)
TowerCount1500to1800 0.0374*** 0.0452*** -0.0581*** -0.0614***
(0.00663) (0.00648) (0.0103) (0.00973)
TowerCount1800to2100 0.0318*** 0.0395*** -0.0451*** -0.0474***
(0.00603) (0.00589) (0.0100) (0.00906)
TowerCount2100to2400 0.0125** 0.0223*** -0.0407*** -0.0452***
(0.00536) (0.00524) (0.0109) (0.00908)
TowerCount2400to2700 0.0164*** 0.0255*** -0.0402*** -0.0422***
(0.00499) (0.00487) (0.00895) (0.00763)
TowerCount2700to3000 -0.00973** -0.000863 -0.0403*** -0.0419***
(0.00464) (0.00454) (0.00987) (0.00804)
TowerCount3000to3300 -0.0140*** -0.00411 -0.0425*** -0.0446***
(0.00437) (0.00427) (0.00865) (0.00714)
TowerCount3300to3600 -0.00606 0.00189 -0.0393*** -0.0384***
(0.00425) (0.00415) (0.00759) (0.00637)
TowerCount3600to3900 -0.00697* 0.00108 -0.0392*** -0.0385***
(0.00388) (0.00379) (0.00748) (0.00614)
TowerCount3900to4200 0.0218*** 0.0284*** -0.0279*** -0.0274***
(0.00369) (0.00361) (0.00754) (0.00583)
TowerCount4200to4500 0.0165*** 0.0243*** -0.0203*** -0.0185***
(0.00360) (0.00352) (0.00716) (0.00558)
Bedrooms -0.00136 -0.00316* 0.0204*** 0.0229***
(0.00188) (0.00184) (0.00376) (0.00269)
Full Bathrooms 0.110*** 0.127*** 0.0920*** 0.0890***
(0.00245) (0.00241) (0.00330) (0.00260)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0649*** 0.0751*** 0.0486*** 0.0462***
(0.00261) (0.00257) (0.00371) (0.00288)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000558*** 0.000565*** 0.000413*** 0.000400***
(6.20e-06) (6.07e-06) (1.24e-05) (1.03e-05)
Square Feet2 -3.19e-08*** -3.39e-08*** -2.09e-08*** -2.13e-08***
(1.02e-09) (9.97e-10) (2.48e-09) (1.95e-09)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0138*** 0.0136*** 0.0200*** 0.0201***
(0.000391) (0.000382) (0.00136) (0.00127)
Lotsize2 -3.60e-05*** -3.52e-05*** -5.85e-05*** -5.83e-05***
(1.89e-06) (1.85e-06) (8.93e-06) (8.87e-06)
Lotsize Missing 0.0581*** 0.0182*** -0.0102** -0.00871**
(0.00510) (0.00504) (0.00417) (0.00375)
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.0279*** 5.40e-06 -0.0219*** -0.0212***
(0.00325) (0.00320) (0.00343) (0.00283)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0345* 0.0180 0.00789 0.00386
(0.0183) (0.0179) (0.0121) (0.0113)
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Table A1.8 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Age (Years) -0.00244*** -0.00179*** -0.00634*** -0.00696***
(0.000117) (0.000115) (0.000377) (0.000279)
Age2 -2.33e-05*** -2.63e-05*** 1.88e-05*** 2.35e-05***
(1.11e-06) (1.08e-06) (4.20e-06) (2.81e-06)
Age Unknown -0.169*** -0.171*** -0.136*** -0.128***
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0206) (0.0174)
Fireplace 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.0496*** 0.0495***
(0.00260) (0.00256) (0.00381) (0.00290)
Basement 0.163*** 0.165*** 0.151*** 0.142***
(0.00262) (0.00256) (0.00431) (0.00334)
Finished Basement 0.0383*** 0.0248*** 0.0328*** 0.0329***
(0.00323) (0.00320) (0.00432) (0.00307)
Central Air 0.398*** 0.385*** 0.258*** 0.250***
(0.00390) (0.00381) (0.00903) (0.00683)
Brick Exterior 0.0606*** 0.0497*** 0.0405*** 0.0354***
(0.00243) (0.00239) (0.00327) (0.00252)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0798*** -0.0778*** -0.0168*** -0.0104**
(0.00320) (0.00312) (0.00558) (0.00484)
Metal Roof -0.0750*** -0.0360*** -0.0174 -0.0139
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0163) (0.0155)
Composition Roof -0.0322*** -0.00226 0.0128* 0.0150***
(0.00492) (0.00505) (0.00653) (0.00537)
Ranch Style 0.0701*** 0.0875*** 0.0618*** 0.0562***
(0.00267) (0.00270) (0.00396) (0.00307)
Modular Style -0.518*** -0.485*** -0.477*** -0.480***
(0.00979) (0.00959) (0.0156) (0.0151)
Cape Cod Style 0.0960*** 0.105*** 0.0475*** 0.0407***
(0.00409) (0.00406) (0.00565) (0.00441)
Carport 0.0468*** 0.0494*** 0.0144*** 0.0107**
(0.00515) (0.00503) (0.00526) (0.00458)
Garage 0.0865*** 0.0964*** 0.00581 0.00517
(0.00331) (0.00325) (0.00542) (0.00447)
One Car Garage 0.121*** 0.113*** 0.0918*** 0.0867***
(0.00423) (0.00414) (0.00580) (0.00512)
Multiple Car Garage 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.143*** 0.139***
(0.00392) (0.00384) (0.00638) (0.00525)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate 0.000163 -0.00718*** -0.0261*** -0.0181**
(0.00233) (0.00228) (0.00977) (0.00753)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0808*** -0.0854*** -0.0134 -0.0235***
(0.00228) (0.00223) (0.00927) (0.00702)
Within 1 Mile Ft. Knox -0.204*** -0.203*** -0.0741** -0.0536
(0.00927) (0.00906) (0.0328) (0.0337)
Constant 10.30*** 10.29*** 10.56*** 10.34***
(0.00993) (0.0202) (0.0294) (0.0216)
Observations 142,164 142,164 142,164 142,164
R-squared 0.702 0.717 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
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Table A1.9: Cross-Section Regression Results Showing the Effect of Towers Only
on Property Values using a Continuous Measure of Distance with the Density of
Nearby Antennas. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price) ln(Sales Price)
Distance to
Tower -0.00279*** -0.00530*** 0.00646*** 0.00477**
(0.000781)b (0.000763) (0.00227) (0.00203)
Distance2 to
Tower -3.25e-05 -2.04e-06 -0.000210*** -0.000171***
(2.67e-05) (2.60e-05) (6.43e-05) (6.12e-05)
Constant 10.34*** 10.35*** 10.53*** 10.31***
(0.0110) (0.0207) (0.0339) (0.0234)
Observations 142,161 142,161 142,161 142,161
R-squared 0.703 0.717 0.853 0.862
Year-Month Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Block Group Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Density of Towersc Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 1 mile Ft. Knox.
b Standard errors are clustered at the level of included fixed effects.
c Density is measured as the the number of antennas located within specified distances from the
property.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A1.10: Repeat Sales Regression Results Showing the Effect of Towers
Only on Property Values Using a Continuous Measure of Distance. Constant
Structural Characteristics. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price)
∆ Distance to
Tower 0.0106*** 0.0106*** 0.0103*** 0.00627***
(0.00104)a (0.00104) (0.00106) (0.00111)
Constant 0.0560*** 0.0568*** 0.0625*** 0.151***
(0.00308) (0.00311) (0.00332) (0.00525)
Observations 29,886 29,719 28,387 20,976
R-squared 0.105 0.105 0.109 0.145
All Repeats Yes No No No
Four or Less No Yes No No
Three or Less No No Yes No
Sold Twice No No No Yes
a Standard errors are clustered at the property level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A1.11: Repeat Sales Regression Results Showing the Effect of Towers Only on
Property Values Using a Continuous Measure of Distance. Changing Structural
Characteristics. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price) ∆ ln(Sold Price)
∆ Distance to
Tower 0.00977*** 0.00971*** 0.00950*** 0.00600***
(0.000977)a (0.000979) (0.000997) (0.00105)
∆ Bedrooms 0.0783*** 0.0768*** 0.0738*** 0.0619***
(0.00557) (0.00554) (0.00557) (0.00621)
∆ Full Bathrooms 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.168***
(0.00791) (0.00793) (0.00812) (0.00896)
∆ Partial Bathrooms 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.110***
(0.00950) (0.00951) (0.00979) (0.0113)
∆ Finished Basement 0.0210*** 0.0213*** 0.0210*** 0.00978**
(0.00383) (0.00383) (0.00393) (0.00455)
∆ Central Air 0.254*** 0.255*** 0.250*** 0.243***
(0.00974) (0.00978) (0.0100) (0.0115)
∆ Carport 0.0595*** 0.0604*** 0.0558*** 0.0395***
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0151)
∆ Garage 0.0157** 0.0155** 0.0136* 0.0203**
(0.00771) (0.00775) (0.00792) (0.00898)
Constant 0.0367*** 0.0374*** 0.0424*** 0.122***
(0.00287) (0.00289) (0.00309) (0.00489)
Observations 29,886 29,719 28,387 20,976
R-squared 0.203 0.204 0.205 0.231
All Repeats Yes No No No
Four or Less No Yes No No
Three or Less No No Yes No
Sold Twice No No No Yes
a Standard errors are clustered at the property level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.2 Chapter 3 Appendix
First Order Conditions
Home Owner:
ΘF (L, S)(1− F (PF )− PFf(PF ))+
(
∂ΘF (L, S)
∂L
dL
dPF
+
∂ΘF (L, S)
∂S
dS
dPF
)
PF (1− F (PF )) = 0 (Franchised)
ΘI(L, S)(1− F (PI)− PIf(PI))+
(
∂ΘI(L, S)
∂L
dL
dPI
+
∂ΘI(L, S)
∂S
dS
dPI
)
PI(1− F (PI)) = 0 (Independent)
Listing Broker:
(1− r)kPF (1− F (PF ))
[
∂Γ(L, S)
∂L
µ+
∂ΦF (L, S)
∂L
]
= C ′(L) (Franchised)
kPI(1− F (PI))
[
∂Γ(L, S)
∂L
µ+
∂ΦI(L, S)
∂L
]
= C ′(L) (Independent)
Selling Broker:
∂Γ(L, S)i
∂S
(1− µ)kPi(1− F (Pi)) = C ′(S) (i=I,F)
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Best Reply Functions
L∗F =
−2cF (αlF + nSαlFαsF ) +
√
BcFk(−1 + r)αlF 3(−1 + nSαsF (−1 + µ))
2cFαlF
2
S∗F =
−2cFn(1 + LαlF )αsF +
√
−BcFkn2(1 + LαlF )αsF 3(−1 + µ)
2cFn2αsF
2
L∗I =
−2cI(αlI + nSαlIαsI) +
√
BcIkαlI
3
(−1 + nSαsI(−1 + µ))
2cIαlI
2
S∗I =
−2cIn(1 + LαlI)αsI +
√
−BcIkn2(1 + LαlI)αsI3(−1 + µ)
2cIn2αsI
2
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Table A2.1: Summary Statistics for Transaction and House
Characteristics. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011. Sample
Size=145,851
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Transaction
Sales Price (2011 Dollars)a 182,445 142,179 1,028 4,859,483
List Price (2011 Dollars)a 190,283 152,444 1,021 5,441,564
Degree Overpricingb 0 0.263 -2.831 2.71
Days on Market 84.697 83.872 0 1949
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.094 0.292 0 1
% Out of State 5 Years Ago 8.976 5.297 0 74.02
% Out of State 1 Year Ago 10.646 19.444 0 115.52
Listed by Franchise 0.423 0.494 0 1
Sold by Franchise 0.39 0.488 0 1
# of Selling Agents in Listing Firm 98.54 158.032 0 573
Sold Own Listing 0.359 0.48 0 1
House
Bedrooms 3.239 0.783 1 13
Full Bathrooms 1.812 0.749 1 9
Partial Bathrooms 0.366 0.521 0 6
Square Feet of Living Space 1,653 714 500 9688
Lotsize (Acres) 0.844 4.713 0 436
Lotsize Missing 0.045 0.208 0 1
Has < in Lot Dimensionsc 0.124 0.329 0 1
Has > in Lot Dimensionsc 0.003 0.057 0 1
Age (Years) 32.951 29.04 0 235
Age Unknown 0.01 0.102 0 1
Fireplace 0.475 0.499 0 1
Basement 0.6 0.49 0 1
Finished Basement 0.174 0.379 0 1
Central Air 0.908 0.29 0 1
Brick Exterior 0.345 0.475 0 1
Vinyl Exterior 0.167 0.373 0 1
Metal Roof 0.01 0.102 0 1
Composition Roof 0.939 0.24 0 1
Ranch Style 0.45 0.497 0 1
Modular Style 0.015 0.121 0 1
Cape Cod Style 0.084 0.277 0 1
Carport 0.057 0.232 0 1
Garage 0.655 0.475 0 1
One Car Garage 0.168 0.374 0 1
Multiple Car Garage 0.563 0.496 0 1
Within 1 Mile Parkway/Interstate 0.478 0.50 0 1
Within 1 Mile Railroad 0.509 0.50 0 1
a List and sales prices were converted to average 2011 dollars using the CPI.
b Residual from a sales price regression on housing characteristics, time, and loca-
tion.
c The lot dimensions indicated the lot size was less than or greater than the listed
value.
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Table A2.2: Comparison of Transaction and House Characteristics for Listings
of Large Independent, Small Independent, and Franchised Listing Brokers.
Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
Means
Variable Large Independent Small Independent Franchised
Transaction
List Price (2011 Dollars) 218,011 184,513 186,747
Sold Own Listing 0.412 0.351 0.349
Sold by Franchise 0.283 0.241 0.578
Sales Price (2011 Dollars) 208,855 176,715 179,317
Days on Market 81.425 86.655 83.808
% Out of State 5 Years Ago 9.602 8.621 9.126
% Out of State 1 Year Ago 12.042 10.004 10.828
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.044 0.087 0.118
Degree Overpricing 0.037 -0.005 -0.007
# of Selling Agents in Listing Firm 467.654 12.756 60.651
House
Bedrooms 3.312 3.203 3.252
Full Bathrooms 1.873 1.788 1.816
Partial Bathrooms 0.414 0.352 0.364
Square Feet of Living Space 1750 1627 1647
Lotsize (Acres) 0.747 0.82 0.901
Lotsize Missing 0.055 0.042 0.046
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.188 0.109 0.116
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.005 0.002 0.004
Age (Years) 35.461 32.684 32.369
Age Unknown 0.006 0.011 0.012
Fireplace 0.578 0.439 0.478
Basement 0.667 0.577 0.600
Finished Basement 0.220 0.142 0.190
Central Air 0.938 0.900 0.905
Brick Exterior 0.366 0.330 0.352
Vinyl Exterior 0.125 0.173 0.176
Metal Roof 0.009 0.011 0.010
Composition Roof 0.940 0.945 0.932
Ranch Style 0.413 0.458 0.454
Modular Style 0.005 0.017 0.016
Cape Cod Style 0.089 0.087 0.078
Carport 0.063 0.055 0.058
Garage 0.729 0.644 0.641
One Car Garage 0.175 0.164 0.169
Multiple Car Garage 0.592 0.549 0.567
Within 1 Mile Parkway/Interstate 0.543 0.465 0.470
Within 1 Mile Railroad 0.511 0.506 0.511
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Table A2.3: Franchised Real Estate Broker Results from OLS Regressions for List Price
and Sale of Own Listing. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011. Full Output.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(List Price) ln(List Price) Sold Own Listing Sold Own Listing
Listed by Franchise -0.0128*** -0.0206***
(0.00143) (0.00256)
# of Selling Agents in
the Listing Firm 0.000173*** 0.000175***
(8.48e-06) (8.49e-06)
Listed by RE/MAX -0.0158*** -0.0116***
(0.00171) (0.00302)
Listed by Coldwell Banker -0.00494** -0.0303***
(0.00245) (0.00467)
Listed by Century 21 -0.0280*** -0.0452***
(0.00275) (0.00476)
Listed by Keller Williams 0.0682*** 0.0109
(0.00532) (0.00968)
Bedrooms 0.0154*** 0.0152*** -0.0180*** -0.0181***
(0.00155) (0.00155) (0.00225) (0.00225)
Full Bathrooms 0.0950*** 0.0950*** -0.00267 -0.00262
(0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00290) (0.00290)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0481*** 0.0482*** -0.00626** -0.00631**
(0.00174) (0.00174) (0.00307) (0.00307)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000406*** 0.000406*** -1.08e-05 -1.15e-05
(6.50e-06) (6.50e-06) (7.80e-06) (7.79e-06)
Square Feet2 -1.81e-08*** -1.80e-08*** 4.72e-09*** 4.79e-09***
(1.24e-09) (1.24e-09) (1.29e-09) (1.29e-09)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0208*** 0.0208*** 0.000953* 0.000963*
(0.00113) (0.00113) (0.000500) (0.000500)
Lotsize2 -6.14e-05*** -6.15e-05*** -5.29e-06** -5.37e-06**
(8.97e-06) (8.99e-06) (2.38e-06) (2.39e-06)
Lotsize Missing -0.0112*** -0.0108*** 0.0102* 0.00982
(0.00292) (0.00293) (0.00616) (0.00616)
Has < in Lot Dimensions -0.0216*** -0.0200*** -0.00725* -0.00615
(0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00392) (0.00393)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.00924 0.00918 0.0301 0.0316
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0218) (0.0218)
Age (Years) -0.00594*** -0.00593*** -0.000548*** -0.000535***
(0.000120) (0.000120) (0.000167) (0.000167)
Age2 1.89e-05*** 1.88e-05*** 8.88e-06*** 8.81e-06***
(1.36e-06) (1.36e-06) (1.56e-06) (1.56e-06)
Age Unknown -0.119*** -0.119*** 0.0648*** 0.0647***
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0129) (0.0129)
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Table A2.3 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(List Price) ln(List Price) Sold Own Listing Sold Own Listing
Fireplace 0.0499*** 0.0497*** -0.00709** -0.00693**
(0.00174) (0.00174) (0.00310) (0.00310)
Basement 0.146*** 0.146*** -0.00394 -0.00377
(0.00190) (0.00190) (0.00321) (0.00320)
Finished Basement 0.0369*** 0.0367*** -0.0118*** -0.0122***
(0.00182) (0.00182) (0.00377) (0.00377)
Central Air 0.240*** 0.239*** -0.0281*** -0.0275***
(0.00401) (0.00401) (0.00463) (0.00463)
Brick Exterior 0.0381*** 0.0381*** 0.000967 0.000712
(0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00289) (0.00289)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0247*** -0.0244*** -0.00823** -0.00858**
(0.00262) (0.00261) (0.00383) (0.00383)
Metal Roof -0.00200 -0.00189 0.0306** 0.0306**
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0138)
Composition Roof 0.0210*** 0.0209*** -0.0135** -0.0133**
(0.00395) (0.00395) (0.00612) (0.00612)
Ranch Style 0.0591*** 0.0591*** -0.0133*** -0.0133***
(0.00196) (0.00195) (0.00332) (0.00332)
Modular Style -0.445*** -0.444*** 0.101*** 0.101***
(0.00932) (0.00933) (0.0117) (0.0118)
Cape Cod Style 0.0437*** 0.0433*** -0.0191*** -0.0191***
(0.00283) (0.00282) (0.00482) (0.00482)
Carport 0.0145*** 0.0144*** 0.0126** 0.0122**
(0.00340) (0.00339) (0.00613) (0.00613)
Garage 0.0111*** 0.0112*** 0.00819* 0.00758*
(0.00293) (0.00293) (0.00452) (0.00452)
One Car Garage 0.0831*** 0.0830*** -0.0130** -0.0126**
(0.00335) (0.00335) (0.00527) (0.00526)
Multiple Car Garage 0.138*** 0.138*** 1.15e-05 0.000477
(0.00311) (0.00311) (0.00493) (0.00493)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.0285*** -0.0286*** -0.00956** -0.00967**
(0.00235) (0.00235) (0.00449) (0.00448)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0136*** -0.0137*** 0.00583 0.00577
(0.00225) (0.00225) (0.00427) (0.00427)
5 Miles Ft. Knox -0.00154 -0.00157 -0.0233* -0.0234*
(0.00622) (0.00622) (0.0122) (0.0122)
Constant 10.63*** 10.63*** 0.535*** 0.532***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.164) (0.164)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.861 0.861 0.067 0.067
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A2.4: Franchised Real Estate Broker Results from OLS Regressions for List
Price and Sale of Own Listing With Only Small Independent Brokers in the Omitted
Category. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(List Price) ln(List Price) Sold Own Listing Sold Own Listing
Listed by Franchise -0.00153 -0.00868***
(0.00157)a (0.00315)
Listed by RE/MAX -0.00436** -0.00210
(0.00184) (0.00344)
Listed by Coldwell Banker 0.00572** -0.0183***
(0.00252) (0.00512)
Listed by Century 21 -0.0169*** -0.0325***
(0.00282) (0.00526)
Listed by Keller Williams 0.0790*** 0.0228**
(0.00536) (0.00990)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0440*** 0.0438*** 0.101*** 0.0905***
(0.00192) (0.00192) (0.0158) (0.0160)
# of Selling Agents
in Listing Firm -3.82e-05 -1.42e-05
(3.42e-05) (3.45e-05)
Constant 10.62*** 10.62*** 0.535*** 0.532***
(0.144) (0.145) (0.163) (0.163)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.861 0.862 0.067 0.067
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished base-
ment, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile parkway/interstate, 1
mile rail road, 5 miles Ft. Knox.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
144
Table A2.5: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011.
Full Output.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Franchise -0.0132*** -3.642*** -0.00368** -3.621***
(0.00156) (0.436) (0.00172) (0.478)
Sold by Franchise 0.00186 -0.934** 0.00831*** -1.131**
(0.00154) (0.442) (0.00170) (0.482)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0387*** 0.0129
(0.00208) (0.634)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0263*** -0.721
(0.00204) (0.591)
Degree Overpricing 31.23*** 31.26***
(0.857) (0.860)
Bedrooms 0.0199*** -1.483*** 0.0198*** -1.482***
(0.00166) (0.393) (0.00165) (0.393)
Full Bathrooms 0.0935*** -0.588 0.0932*** -0.586
(0.00189) (0.521) (0.00189) (0.521)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0484*** -1.116** 0.0481*** -1.114**
(0.00182) (0.534) (0.00182) (0.534)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000417*** 0.00889*** 0.000417*** 0.00890***
(6.56e-06) (0.00158) (6.56e-06) (0.00158)
Square Feet2 -2.15e-08*** 5.82e-07** -2.14e-08*** 5.80e-07**
(1.23e-09) (2.94e-07) (1.23e-09) (2.94e-07)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0199*** 0.488*** 0.0198*** 0.488***
(0.00107) (0.144) (0.00107) (0.144)
Lotsize2 -5.83e-05*** -0.00201*** -5.80e-05*** -0.00201***
(8.38e-06) (0.000682) (8.35e-06) (0.000682)
Lotsize Missing -0.00983*** 1.296 -0.0109*** 1.302
(0.00311) (1.003) (0.00311) (1.003)
Has < in Lot Dimensions -0.0208*** -3.495*** -0.0237*** -3.480***
(0.00226) (0.556) (0.00225) (0.556)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.00863 2.601 0.00446 2.633
(0.0115) (3.426) (0.0115) (3.426)
Age (Years) -0.00650*** -0.495*** -0.00656*** -0.494***
(0.000128) (0.0336) (0.000128) (0.0336)
Age2 1.92e-05*** 0.00372*** 1.97e-05*** 0.00372***
(1.46e-06) (0.000331) (1.45e-06) (0.000331)
Age Unknown -0.134*** 15.17*** -0.133*** 15.15***
(0.0122) (2.924) (0.0122) (2.924)
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Table A2.5 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Fireplace 0.0493*** 3.936*** 0.0477*** 3.945***
(0.00185) (0.533) (0.00185) (0.534)
Basement 0.151*** 0.829 0.151*** 0.827
(0.00205) (0.551) (0.00205) (0.551)
Finished Basement 0.0347*** -1.823*** 0.0335*** -1.810***
(0.00192) (0.627) (0.00192) (0.627)
Central Air 0.266*** 7.489*** 0.264*** 7.509***
(0.00435) (0.757) (0.00434) (0.758)
Brick Exterior 0.0410*** -1.238** 0.0409*** -1.238**
(0.00154) (0.492) (0.00154) (0.492)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0188*** -2.942*** -0.0188*** -2.943***
(0.00286) (0.675) (0.00285) (0.675)
Metal Roof -0.0105 5.320* -0.0126 5.348*
(0.0133) (2.812) (0.0133) (2.812)
Composition Roof 0.0176*** 2.037* 0.0171*** 2.048*
(0.00420) (1.096) (0.00420) (1.096)
Ranch Style 0.0618*** -3.542*** 0.0615*** -3.541***
(0.00210) (0.579) (0.00210) (0.579)
Modular Style -0.480*** -1.745 -0.478*** -1.757
(0.0103) (2.493) (0.0102) (2.493)
Cape Cod Style 0.0471*** -2.647*** 0.0469*** -2.644***
(0.00304) (0.810) (0.00304) (0.810)
Carport 0.0154*** -1.957* 0.0147*** -1.955*
(0.00366) (1.013) (0.00365) (1.013)
Garage 0.00865*** -9.152*** 0.00815** -9.148***
(0.00319) (0.829) (0.00318) (0.829)
One Car Garage 0.0911*** 7.262*** 0.0913*** 7.260***
(0.00364) (0.937) (0.00363) (0.937)
Multiple Car Garage 0.144*** 7.110*** 0.144*** 7.106***
(0.00336) (0.915) (0.00335) (0.915)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.0291*** -4.932*** -0.0291*** -4.933***
(0.00251) (0.764) (0.00251) (0.764)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0153*** 0.343 -0.0153*** 0.340
(0.00238) (0.782) (0.00238) (0.782)
5 Miles Ft. Knox -0.000438 -5.353** -0.00104 -5.357**
(0.00666) (2.538) (0.00662) (2.539)
Constant 10.56*** 150.5*** 10.55*** 150.4***
(0.143) (29.19) (0.143) (29.19)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.851 0.106 0.852 0.106
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects No No No No
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Table A2.6: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers with Agent Fixed Effects Specification
1. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011. Full Output.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Franchise 0.0306*** 3.020*** 0.0396*** 3.017***
(0.00271) (0.677) (0.00278) (0.705)
Sold by Franchise 0.00184 -0.935** 0.00837*** -1.116**
(0.00154) (0.442) (0.00170) (0.482)
Listing Agent has, is, or will
be Affiliated with a Franchise -0.0545*** -8.305*** -0.0541*** -8.303***
(0.00266) (0.672) (0.00264) (0.672)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0380*** -0.0650
(0.00208) (0.634)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0266*** -0.670
(0.00203) (0.590)
Degree Overpricing 30.62*** 30.66***
(0.860) (0.862)
Bedrooms 0.0198*** -1.489*** 0.0198*** -1.488***
(0.00165) (0.393) (0.00165) (0.393)
Full Bathrooms 0.0934*** -0.603 0.0931*** -0.600
(0.00189) (0.521) (0.00189) (0.521)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0483*** -1.132** 0.0480*** -1.130**
(0.00182) (0.534) (0.00182) (0.534)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000416*** 0.00877*** 0.000416*** 0.00877***
(6.56e-06) (0.00158) (6.56e-06) (0.00158)
Square Feet2 -2.14e-08*** 5.97e-07** -2.13e-08*** 5.96e-07**
(1.23e-09) (2.94e-07) (1.23e-09) (2.94e-07)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0199*** 0.488*** 0.0198*** 0.488***
(0.00107) (0.144) (0.00107) (0.144)
Lotsize2 -5.82e-05*** -0.00200*** -5.80e-05*** -0.00200***
(8.39e-06) (0.000678) (8.35e-06) (0.000678)
Lotsize Missing -0.00898*** 1.426 -0.00999*** 1.433
(0.00311) (1.002) (0.00311) (1.002)
Has < in Lot Dimensions -0.0209*** -3.517*** -0.0238*** -3.499***
(0.00226) (0.555) (0.00225) (0.556)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.00987 2.790 0.00573 2.825
(0.0114) (3.420) (0.0114) (3.420)
Age (Years) -0.00649*** -0.493*** -0.00654*** -0.493***
(0.000128) (0.0335) (0.000128) (0.0336)
Age2 1.91e-05*** 0.00370*** 1.96e-05*** 0.00370***
(1.46e-06) (0.000331) (1.45e-06) (0.000331)
Age Unknown -0.133*** 15.35*** -0.132*** 15.34***
(0.0122) (2.921) (0.0122) (2.921)
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Table A2.6 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Fireplace 0.0495*** 3.957*** 0.0479*** 3.968***
(0.00185) (0.533) (0.00185) (0.534)
Basement 0.151*** 0.817 0.151*** 0.816
(0.00205) (0.551) (0.00204) (0.551)
Finished Basement 0.0347*** -1.832*** 0.0334*** -1.817***
(0.00192) (0.627) (0.00192) (0.627)
Central Air 0.267*** 7.659*** 0.265*** 7.679***
(0.00435) (0.757) (0.00434) (0.757)
Brick Exterior 0.0415*** -1.165** 0.0414*** -1.164**
(0.00154) (0.492) (0.00154) (0.492)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0187*** -2.921*** -0.0186*** -2.922***
(0.00285) (0.675) (0.00284) (0.675)
Metal Roof -0.0104 5.333* -0.0125 5.361*
(0.0133) (2.814) (0.0133) (2.813)
Composition Roof 0.0180*** 2.100* 0.0175*** 2.111*
(0.00420) (1.096) (0.00420) (1.096)
Ranch Style 0.0616*** -3.569*** 0.0613*** -3.568***
(0.00210) (0.579) (0.00210) (0.579)
Modular Style -0.480*** -1.776 -0.478*** -1.790
(0.0103) (2.492) (0.0102) (2.492)
Cape Cod Style 0.0471*** -2.649*** 0.0469*** -2.646***
(0.00304) (0.809) (0.00303) (0.809)
Carport 0.0154*** -1.959* 0.0147*** -1.955*
(0.00365) (1.013) (0.00364) (1.012)
Garage 0.00903*** -9.095*** 0.00852*** -9.091***
(0.00318) (0.829) (0.00317) (0.829)
One Car Garage 0.0908*** 7.215*** 0.0909*** 7.213***
(0.00363) (0.937) (0.00362) (0.937)
Multiple Car Garage 0.144*** 7.061*** 0.144*** 7.057***
(0.00335) (0.915) (0.00334) (0.915)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.0294*** -4.974*** -0.0293*** -4.975***
(0.00250) (0.763) (0.00250) (0.763)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0155*** 0.315 -0.0155*** 0.313
(0.00238) (0.782) (0.00238) (0.782)
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.000443 -5.219** -0.000152 -5.221**
(0.00666) (2.540) (0.00662) (2.540)
Constant 10.58*** 153.7*** 10.58*** 153.6***
(0.144) (29.01) (0.144) (29.01)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.852 0.107 0.852 0.107
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects No No No No
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Table A2.7: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers using Franchised Listing Agent Fixed
Effects Specification 2. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011. Full Output.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Franchise 0.00575 -1.767 0.0142*** -1.656
(0.00367) (1.145) (0.00371) (1.165)
Sold by Franchise 0.00140 -1.242*** 0.00593*** -1.522***
(0.00147) (0.443) (0.00162) (0.484)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0338*** 0.363
(0.00215) (0.680)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0183*** -0.995*
(0.00196) (0.589)
Degree Overpricing 24.50*** 24.51***
(0.915) (0.916)
Bedrooms 0.0191*** -1.492*** 0.0191*** -1.491***
(0.00158) (0.392) (0.00158) (0.392)
Full Bathrooms 0.0904*** -0.553 0.0901*** -0.553
(0.00182) (0.519) (0.00182) (0.519)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0469*** -1.113** 0.0467*** -1.113**
(0.00176) (0.531) (0.00175) (0.531)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000407*** 0.00922*** 0.000406*** 0.00923***
(6.40e-06) (0.00157) (6.39e-06) (0.00157)
Square Feet2 -2.00e-08*** 5.12e-07* -2.00e-08*** 5.11e-07*
(1.20e-09) (2.93e-07) (1.20e-09) (2.93e-07)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0197*** 0.483*** 0.0197*** 0.483***
(0.00111) (0.144) (0.00111) (0.144)
Lotsize2 -5.96e-05*** -0.00191*** -5.95e-05*** -0.00191***
(8.63e-06) (0.000643) (8.59e-06) (0.000642)
Lotsize Missing -0.0107*** 2.238** -0.0114*** 2.237**
(0.00303) (1.005) (0.00303) (1.005)
Has < in Lot Dimensions -0.0106*** -2.040*** -0.0130*** -2.041***
(0.00218) (0.577) (0.00218) (0.577)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0168 2.787 0.0132 2.807
(0.0113) (3.440) (0.0113) (3.440)
Age (Years) -0.00632*** -0.437*** -0.00637*** -0.438***
(0.000126) (0.0339) (0.000125) (0.0339)
Age2 1.86e-05*** 0.00334*** 1.90e-05*** 0.00334***
(1.41e-06) (0.000335) (1.41e-06) (0.000335)
Age Unknown -0.136*** 14.56*** -0.135*** 14.54***
(0.0117) (2.938) (0.0117) (2.938)
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Table A2.7 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Fireplace 0.0444*** 3.057*** 0.0431*** 3.057***
(0.00179) (0.539) (0.00178) (0.539)
Basement 0.152*** 0.891 0.152*** 0.891
(0.00196) (0.549) (0.00196) (0.549)
Finished Basement 0.0252*** -1.752*** 0.0243*** -1.741***
(0.00189) (0.630) (0.00189) (0.630)
Central Air 0.247*** 6.810*** 0.245*** 6.823***
(0.00428) (0.789) (0.00427) (0.789)
Brick Exterior 0.0409*** -1.505*** 0.0408*** -1.506***
(0.00152) (0.500) (0.00152) (0.500)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0142*** -2.459*** -0.0142*** -2.461***
(0.00272) (0.674) (0.00272) (0.674)
Metal Roof -0.0333** 4.080 -0.0351*** 4.100
(0.0130) (2.833) (0.0130) (2.833)
Composition Roof 0.0126*** 1.288 0.0120*** 1.296
(0.00421) (1.144) (0.00420) (1.144)
Ranch Style 0.0584*** -3.706*** 0.0581*** -3.709***
(0.00204) (0.585) (0.00204) (0.585)
Modular Style -0.472*** -1.246 -0.471*** -1.255
(0.0102) (2.502) (0.0101) (2.502)
Cape Cod Style 0.0402*** -3.391*** 0.0401*** -3.388***
(0.00292) (0.813) (0.00291) (0.813)
Carport 0.00465 -0.525 0.00404 -0.524
(0.00352) (1.022) (0.00351) (1.021)
Garage 0.00200 -5.232*** 0.00131 -5.226***
(0.00321) (0.867) (0.00320) (0.866)
One Car Garage 0.0902*** 4.580*** 0.0905*** 4.575***
(0.00355) (0.960) (0.00354) (0.960)
Multiple Car Garage 0.142*** 4.420*** 0.142*** 4.412***
(0.00329) (0.938) (0.00328) (0.938)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.0302*** -4.742*** -0.0302*** -4.744***
(0.00243) (0.764) (0.00243) (0.764)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0161*** 0.408 -0.0161*** 0.403
(0.00233) (0.778) (0.00232) (0.778)
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.0117* -3.127 0.0110* -3.133
(0.00660) (2.552) (0.00657) (2.552)
Constant 10.59*** 144.6*** 10.59*** 144.5***
(0.123) (30.07) (0.123) (30.06)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.869 0.144 0.869 0.144
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A2.8: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers. Separate Firm Intercepts. Central
Kentucky Data, 2000-2011. Full Output.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Century 21 -0.0306*** -3.041*** -0.0211*** -3.011***
(0.00300) (0.829) (0.00308) (0.852)
Sold by Century 21 1.20e-06 -0.755 0.00603** -0.943
(0.00292) (0.865) (0.00300) (0.886)
Listed by Coldwell Banker -0.00664** -5.516*** 0.00208 -5.477***
(0.00273) (0.799) (0.00281) (0.823)
Sold by Coldwell Banker -0.00117 -1.399* 0.00504* -1.589*
(0.00287) (0.827) (0.00295) (0.849)
Listed by Keller Williams 0.0654*** -19.07*** 0.0744*** -19.04***
(0.00585) (1.472) (0.00589) (1.482)
Sold by Keller Williams 0.0392*** -0.803 0.0459*** -0.996
(0.00548) (1.414) (0.00552) (1.426)
Listed by RE/MAX -0.0143*** -2.197*** -0.00458** -2.167***
(0.00185) (0.508) (0.00199) (0.544)
Sold by RE/MAX -0.000196 -0.902* 0.00641*** -1.099*
(0.00181) (0.532) (0.00195) (0.567)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0386*** 0.0553
(0.00208) (0.634)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0262*** -0.707
(0.00203) (0.591)
Degree Overpricing 31.52*** 31.55***
(0.859) (0.862)
Bedrooms 0.0196*** -1.438*** 0.0195*** -1.437***
(0.00166) (0.393) (0.00165) (0.393)
Full Bathrooms 0.0935*** -0.587 0.0932*** -0.585
(0.00189) (0.521) (0.00189) (0.521)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0484*** -1.121** 0.0481*** -1.120**
(0.00182) (0.534) (0.00182) (0.534)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000417*** 0.00885*** 0.000417*** 0.00886***
(6.56e-06) (0.00158) (6.55e-06) (0.00158)
Square Feet2 -2.14e-08*** 5.76e-07* -2.13e-08*** 5.74e-07*
(1.23e-09) (2.94e-07) (1.23e-09) (2.94e-07)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0199*** 0.486*** 0.0198*** 0.486***
(0.00107) (0.143) (0.00107) (0.143)
Lotsize2 -5.83e-05*** -0.00201*** -5.80e-05*** -0.00201***
(8.41e-06) (0.000678) (8.37e-06) (0.000678)
Lotsize Missing -0.00947*** 1.200 -0.0105*** 1.204
(0.00311) (1.003) (0.00311) (1.004)
Has < in Lot Dimensions -0.0191*** -3.692*** -0.0220*** -3.680***
(0.00226) (0.558) (0.00225) (0.558)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.00904 2.714 0.00495 2.741
(0.0115) (3.425) (0.0115) (3.425)
Age (Years) -0.00649*** -0.495*** -0.00654*** -0.494***
(0.000128) (0.0335) (0.000128) (0.0335)
Age2 1.91e-05*** 0.00373*** 1.95e-05*** 0.00373***
(1.46e-06) (0.000330) (1.45e-06) (0.000331)
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Table A2.8 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Age Unknown -0.134*** 15.00*** -0.133*** 14.99***
(0.0122) (2.925) (0.0122) (2.924)
Fireplace 0.0491*** 3.993*** 0.0475*** 4.001***
(0.00185) (0.534) (0.00185) (0.534)
Basement 0.152*** 0.790 0.152*** 0.789
(0.00205) (0.551) (0.00205) (0.551)
Finished Basement 0.0345*** -1.802*** 0.0332*** -1.789***
(0.00192) (0.627) (0.00192) (0.627)
Central Air 0.265*** 7.681*** 0.263*** 7.698***
(0.00435) (0.759) (0.00434) (0.759)
Brick Exterior 0.0410*** -1.270*** 0.0409*** -1.270***
(0.00154) (0.492) (0.00154) (0.492)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0185*** -3.034*** -0.0185*** -3.035***
(0.00285) (0.675) (0.00284) (0.675)
Metal Roof -0.0103 5.296* -0.0124 5.322*
(0.0133) (2.810) (0.0133) (2.809)
Composition Roof 0.0177*** 2.058* 0.0172*** 2.068*
(0.00420) (1.096) (0.00419) (1.096)
Ranch Style 0.0619*** -3.558*** 0.0615*** -3.558***
(0.00210) (0.579) (0.00210) (0.579)
Modular Style -0.479*** -1.845 -0.477*** -1.856
(0.0103) (2.493) (0.0102) (2.493)
Cape Cod Style 0.0467*** -2.569*** 0.0465*** -2.566***
(0.00304) (0.809) (0.00303) (0.809)
Carport 0.0153*** -1.969* 0.0146*** -1.967*
(0.00366) (1.013) (0.00365) (1.012)
Garage 0.00877*** -9.259*** 0.00825*** -9.255***
(0.00319) (0.829) (0.00318) (0.829)
One Car Garage 0.0911*** 7.314*** 0.0913*** 7.312***
(0.00364) (0.936) (0.00362) (0.936)
Multiple Car Garage 0.144*** 7.196*** 0.144*** 7.192***
(0.00336) (0.915) (0.00335) (0.915)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.0292*** -4.918*** -0.0292*** -4.919***
(0.00250) (0.764) (0.00251) (0.764)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0155*** 0.364 -0.0155*** 0.361
(0.00238) (0.781) (0.00238) (0.781)
5 Miles Ft. Knox -0.000456 -5.352** -0.00105 -5.356**
(0.00667) (2.536) (0.00663) (2.536)
Constant 10.56*** 149.5*** 10.56*** 149.5***
(0.143) (29.25) (0.143) (29.25)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.852 0.107 0.852 0.107
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects No No No No
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Table A2.9: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers with Agent Fixed Effects Specification
1. Separate Firm Intercepts. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011. Full Output.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Century 21 0.0130*** 3.648*** 0.0220*** 3.654***
(0.00373) (0.976) (0.00378) (0.996)
Sold by Century 21 0.000338 -0.703 0.00644** -0.875
(0.00291) (0.864) (0.00299) (0.886)
Listed by Coldwell Banker 0.0363*** 1.091 0.0445*** 1.107
(0.00348) (0.957) (0.00353) (0.978)
Sold by Coldwell Banker -0.00131 -1.419* 0.00499* -1.594*
(0.00286) (0.826) (0.00295) (0.848)
Listed by Keller Williams 0.109*** -12.38*** 0.117*** -12.38***
(0.00626) (1.559) (0.00629) (1.569)
Sold by Keller Williams 0.0389*** -0.834 0.0457*** -1.012
(0.00547) (1.413) (0.00551) (1.426)
Listed by RE/MAX 0.0294*** 4.529*** 0.0387*** 4.535***
(0.00289) (0.722) (0.00297) (0.749)
Sold by RE/MAX -0.000238 -0.908* 0.00645*** -1.090*
(0.00181) (0.532) (0.00195) (0.566)
Listing Agent has, is, or will
be Affiliated with a Franchisec -0.0542*** -8.349*** -0.0538*** -8.346***
(0.00266) (0.672) (0.00264) (0.672)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0380*** -0.0222
(0.00208) (0.633)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0265*** -0.656
(0.00203) (0.590)
Bedrooms 0.0195*** -1.443*** 0.0195*** -1.442***
(0.00165) (0.393) (0.00165) (0.393)
Full Bathrooms 0.0934*** -0.601 0.0931*** -0.599
(0.00189) (0.521) (0.00188) (0.521)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0483*** -1.137** 0.0480*** -1.135**
(0.00182) (0.533) (0.00182) (0.533)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000416*** 0.00872*** 0.000416*** 0.00873***
(6.56e-06) (0.00158) (6.56e-06) (0.00158)
Square Feet2 -2.13e-08*** 5.91e-07** -2.12e-08*** 5.90e-07**
(1.23e-09) (2.94e-07) (1.23e-09) (2.94e-07)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0199*** 0.486*** 0.0198*** 0.486***
(0.00107) (0.143) (0.00107) (0.143)
Lotsize2 -5.82e-05*** -0.00200*** -5.80e-05*** -0.00200***
(8.41e-06) (0.000674) (8.37e-06) (0.000674)
Lotsize Missing -0.00864*** 1.328 -0.00967*** 1.334
(0.00311) (1.003) (0.00311) (1.003)
Has < in Lot Dimensions -0.0193*** -3.718*** -0.0222*** -3.702***
(0.00226) (0.558) (0.00225) (0.558)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0103 2.911 0.00625 2.941
(0.0114) (3.419) (0.0114) (3.419)
Age (Years) -0.00648*** -0.493*** -0.00653*** -0.493***
(0.000128) (0.0335) (0.000128) (0.0335)
Age2 1.90e-05*** 0.00371*** 1.94e-05*** 0.00371***
(1.46e-06) (0.000330) (1.45e-06) (0.000331)
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Table A2.9 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLESa ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Age Unknown -0.132*** 15.18*** -0.132*** 15.17***
(0.0122) (2.922) (0.0122) (2.921)
Fireplace 0.0492*** 4.016*** 0.0477*** 4.025***
(0.00185) (0.533) (0.00185) (0.534)
Basement 0.152*** 0.779 0.152*** 0.778
(0.00205) (0.551) (0.00204) (0.551)
Finished Basement 0.0344*** -1.810*** 0.0332*** -1.797***
(0.00192) (0.627) (0.00192) (0.627)
Central Air 0.266*** 7.855*** 0.265*** 7.873***
(0.00435) (0.759) (0.00434) (0.759)
Brick Exterior 0.0415*** -1.196** 0.0414*** -1.196**
(0.00154) (0.492) (0.00154) (0.492)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0184*** -3.014*** -0.0184*** -3.015***
(0.00285) (0.675) (0.00284) (0.675)
Metal Roof -0.0102 5.308* -0.0123 5.335*
(0.0133) (2.811) (0.0133) (2.811)
Composition Roof 0.0181*** 2.123* 0.0176*** 2.133*
(0.00420) (1.096) (0.00419) (1.096)
Ranch Style 0.0617*** -3.586*** 0.0613*** -3.585***
(0.00210) (0.579) (0.00209) (0.579)
Modular Style -0.479*** -1.878 -0.477*** -1.890
(0.0103) (2.492) (0.0102) (2.493)
Cape Cod Style 0.0467*** -2.571*** 0.0465*** -2.568***
(0.00303) (0.809) (0.00303) (0.809)
Carport 0.0153*** -1.970* 0.0146*** -1.967*
(0.00365) (1.012) (0.00364) (1.012)
Garage 0.00914*** -9.203*** 0.00861*** -9.199***
(0.00318) (0.829) (0.00317) (0.829)
One Car Garage 0.0908*** 7.267*** 0.0910*** 7.264***
(0.00363) (0.936) (0.00362) (0.936)
Multiple Car Garage 0.144*** 7.147*** 0.144*** 7.143***
(0.00335) (0.915) (0.00334) (0.915)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.0295*** -4.960*** -0.0295*** -4.961***
(0.00250) (0.763) (0.00250) (0.763)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0157*** 0.336 -0.0157*** 0.334
(0.00238) (0.781) (0.00238) (0.781)
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.000418 -5.217** -0.000170 -5.220**
(0.00667) (2.537) (0.00662) (2.537)
Degree Overpricing 30.91*** 30.95***
(0.862) (0.864)
Constant 10.58*** 152.7*** 10.58*** 152.7***
(0.144) (29.08) (0.144) (29.08)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.852 0.107 0.853 0.107
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects No No No No
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Table A2.10: Regression Results for Comparison of Sales Price and Days on Market
for Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers using Franchised Listing Agent
Fixed Effects Specification 2. Separate Firm Intercepts. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011. Full Output.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Listed by Century 21 0.000471 5.053** 0.00588 5.164***
(0.00713) (1.993) (0.00714) (2.000)
Sold by Century 21 -0.00131 -0.970 0.00294 -1.238
(0.00275) (0.866) (0.00282) (0.888)
Listed by Coldwell Banker -0.0186** -11.16*** -0.0137* -11.04***
(0.00757) (3.077) (0.00757) (3.082)
Sold by Coldwell Banker -0.00381 -2.275*** 0.000678 -2.545***
(0.00272) (0.828) (0.00280) (0.851)
Listed by Keller Williams 0.0296*** -6.729*** 0.0437*** -6.627***
(0.00811) (2.281) (0.00816) (2.292)
Sold by Keller Williams 0.0316*** -1.375 0.0365*** -1.645
(0.00523) (1.410) (0.00527) (1.422)
Listed by RE/MAX 0.0119*** -0.0445 0.0222*** 0.0501
(0.00459) (1.269) (0.00462) (1.287)
Sold by RE/MAX 0.000758 -0.970* 0.00544*** -1.251**
(0.00173) (0.531) (0.00186) (0.566)
Listed by Largest Indep. 0.0345*** 0.341
(0.00215) (0.680)
Sold by Largest Indep. 0.0184*** -0.980*
(0.00196) (0.589)
Degree Overpricing 24.48*** 24.49***
(0.915) (0.917)
Bedrooms 0.0190*** -1.495*** 0.0191*** -1.494***
(0.00158) (0.392) (0.00158) (0.392)
Full Bathrooms 0.0904*** -0.533 0.0902*** -0.532
(0.00182) (0.519) (0.00182) (0.519)
Partial Bathrooms 0.0469*** -1.106** 0.0467*** -1.106**
(0.00176) (0.531) (0.00175) (0.531)
Square Feet of Living Space 0.000407*** 0.00920*** 0.000406*** 0.00921***
(6.40e-06) (0.00157) (6.39e-06) (0.00157)
Square Feet2 -2.00e-08*** 5.13e-07* -2.00e-08*** 5.11e-07*
(1.20e-09) (2.93e-07) (1.20e-09) (2.93e-07)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.0197*** 0.481*** 0.0197*** 0.481***
(0.00111) (0.144) (0.00111) (0.144)
Lotsize2 -5.96e-05*** -0.00191*** -5.95e-05*** -0.00191***
(8.65e-06) (0.000647) (8.62e-06) (0.000647)
Lotsize Missing -0.0109*** 2.215** -0.0116*** 2.215**
(0.00303) (1.005) (0.00303) (1.005)
Has < in Lot Dimensions -0.0105*** -2.121*** -0.0130*** -2.121***
(0.00218) (0.577) (0.00218) (0.577)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.0172 2.945 0.0136 2.966
(0.0113) (3.441) (0.0113) (3.440)
Age (Years) -0.00632*** -0.437*** -0.00637*** -0.437***
(0.000126) (0.0339) (0.000125) (0.0339)
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Table A2.10 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Sold Price) Days On Market ln(Sold Price) Days On Market
Age2 1.85e-05*** 0.00334*** 1.89e-05*** 0.00334***
(1.42e-06) (0.000335) (1.41e-06) (0.000335)
Age Unknown -0.136*** 14.49*** -0.135*** 14.48***
(0.0117) (2.938) (0.0117) (2.938)
Fireplace 0.0444*** 3.052*** 0.0431*** 3.053***
(0.00179) (0.539) (0.00178) (0.539)
Basement 0.152*** 0.898 0.152*** 0.897
(0.00196) (0.549) (0.00196) (0.549)
Finished Basement 0.0252*** -1.750*** 0.0244*** -1.739***
(0.00189) (0.630) (0.00189) (0.630)
Central Air 0.247*** 6.830*** 0.245*** 6.843***
(0.00428) (0.789) (0.00427) (0.790)
Brick Exterior 0.0409*** -1.508*** 0.0407*** -1.509***
(0.00152) (0.500) (0.00152) (0.500)
Vinyl Exterior -0.0141*** -2.464*** -0.0141*** -2.466***
(0.00272) (0.674) (0.00272) (0.674)
Metal Roof -0.0329** 4.199 -0.0348*** 4.219
(0.0130) (2.832) (0.0130) (2.832)
Composition Roof 0.0129*** 1.396 0.0122*** 1.404
(0.00421) (1.144) (0.00420) (1.144)
Ranch Style 0.0584*** -3.740*** 0.0581*** -3.743***
(0.00204) (0.585) (0.00204) (0.585)
Modular Style -0.472*** -1.359 -0.471*** -1.368
(0.0102) (2.502) (0.0101) (2.502)
Cape Cod Style 0.0402*** -3.385*** 0.0400*** -3.383***
(0.00292) (0.813) (0.00291) (0.813)
Carport 0.00465 -0.527 0.00402 -0.525
(0.00352) (1.022) (0.00351) (1.022)
Garage 0.00199 -5.252*** 0.00128 -5.246***
(0.00321) (0.866) (0.00320) (0.866)
One Car Garage 0.0902*** 4.586*** 0.0905*** 4.580***
(0.00355) (0.960) (0.00354) (0.960)
Multiple Car Garage 0.142*** 4.433*** 0.142*** 4.426***
(0.00329) (0.937) (0.00328) (0.937)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate -0.0302*** -4.743*** -0.0302*** -4.744***
(0.00243) (0.764) (0.00243) (0.764)
Within 1 Mile Railroad -0.0162*** 0.381 -0.0162*** 0.377
(0.00233) (0.779) (0.00232) (0.779)
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.0118* -3.095 0.0110* -3.102
(0.00661) (2.551) (0.00658) (2.552)
Constant 10.59*** 144.8*** 10.59*** 144.7***
(0.124) (30.02) (0.123) (30.02)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.869 0.144 0.869 0.144
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Franchise Listing Agent
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A2.11: Regression Results for Comparison of Out-of-state Movers for
Franchised and Independent Real Estate Brokers. Central Kentucky Data,
2000-2011. Full Output.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Sold by Franchise Sold by Franchise Sold by Franchise
Listed by Franchise 0.308*** 0.322*** 0.322***
(0.00256) (0.00250) (0.00250)
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.0138
(0.0110)
% Out of State 5 Years Ago 0.00226***
(0.000265)
% Out of State 1 Year Ago 0.000315***
(6.47e-05)
% Out of State (2010) Missing -0.00187
(0.104)
Bedrooms 0.00280 0.00480** 0.00453**
(0.00214) (0.00210) (0.00210)
Full Bathrooms 0.000470 -0.000219 0.000661
(0.00284) (0.00279) (0.00279)
Partial Bathrooms 0.00130 0.00365 0.00473
(0.00302) (0.00299) (0.00299)
Square Feet of Living Space -5.83e-06 -1.00e-05 -4.89e-06
(7.29e-06) (6.93e-06) (6.90e-06)
Square Feet2 -1.45e-10 -3.86e-10 -8.28e-10
(1.17e-09) (1.12e-09) (1.12e-09)
Lotsize (Acres) 0.000341 0.000646 0.000442
(0.000463) (0.000451) (0.000441)
Lotsize2 -1.89e-06 -3.24e-06 -2.59e-06
(2.34e-06) (2.45e-06) (2.32e-06)
Lotsize Missing -0.00674 -0.0139** -0.0131**
(0.00589) (0.00587) (0.00587)
Has < in Lot Dimensions 0.0170*** 0.0120*** 0.0113***
(0.00388) (0.00380) (0.00380)
Has > in Lot Dimensions 0.00580 0.00888 0.00746
(0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0200)
Age (Years) 0.000159 -0.000322** -0.000400***
(0.000153) (0.000130) (0.000130)
Age2 4.53e-07 1.78e-06 1.89e-06
(1.38e-06) (1.21e-06) (1.21e-06)
Age Unknown -0.00419 -0.0103 -0.0105
(0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0112)
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Table A2.11 (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Sold by Franchise Sold by Franchise Sold by Franchise
Fireplace 0.0103*** 0.0111*** 0.0135***
(0.00305) (0.00298) (0.00296)
Basement -0.00207 -0.00151 -0.00142
(0.00310) (0.00295) (0.00295)
Finished Basement 0.00116 -0.000264 0.000559
(0.00382) (0.00379) (0.00379)
Central Air 0.00472 0.0102** 0.0101**
(0.00430) (0.00425) (0.00425)
Brick Exterior 0.00190 0.00208 0.00134
(0.00287) (0.00280) (0.00280)
Vinyl Exterior 0.00900** 0.0150*** 0.0148***
(0.00366) (0.00354) (0.00354)
Metal Roof 0.00455 -0.000551 -0.00151
(0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Composition Roof 0.0200*** 0.0118** 0.0113**
(0.00578) (0.00574) (0.00575)
Ranch Style 0.00339 0.00851*** 0.00716**
(0.00322) (0.00312) (0.00312)
Modular Style 0.0281*** 0.0248** 0.0218**
(0.0101) (0.00973) (0.00972)
Cape Cod Style -0.00867* -0.00888* -0.0108**
(0.00483) (0.00471) (0.00471)
Carport -0.0138** -0.0323*** -0.0340***
(0.00590) (0.00578) (0.00578)
Garage -0.0161*** -0.0521*** -0.0527***
(0.00429) (0.00361) (0.00361)
One Car Garage 0.0152*** 0.0477*** 0.0486***
(0.00504) (0.00468) (0.00468)
Multiple Car Garage 0.0185*** 0.0541*** 0.0545***
(0.00470) (0.00431) (0.00431)
Within 1 Mile
Parkway/Interstate 0.00405 -0.0121*** -0.00940***
(0.00442) (0.00264) (0.00263)
Within 1 Mile Railroad 0.000138 -0.00575** -0.00563**
(0.00414) (0.00258) (0.00258)
Constant -0.121 0.184*** 0.193***
(0.0968) (0.0235) (0.0236)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.128 0.116 0.116
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes No No
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Table A3.12: Regression Results For Comparison of Listing Brokers and
Out-of-State Movers. Central Kentucky Data, 2000-2011
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Listed by Franchise Listed by Franchise Listed by Franchise
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.0123
(0.0118)
% Out of State 5 Years Ago 0.00296***
(0.000280)
% Out of State 1 Year Ago 0.000277***
(6.77e-05)
Constant 0.521*** 0.442*** 0.454***
(0.160) (0.0259) (0.0260)
Observations 145,851 145,851 145,851
R-squared 0.046 0.012 0.011
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes No No
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet,
square feet2, lot size, lot size missing, age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished
basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile park-
way/interstate, 1 mile rail road.
b Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
c There were 18 observations where this variable was missing. These observations were set to
zero, and a dummy variable equal to one was included indicating there was a missing value.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A2.13: Average Number of Listing Agents Per Year & Number
of Observations for Each Franchised Broker
Firm
Agents
Per Year Obs. Firm
Agents
Per Year Obs.
C21_List_159 1.31 13 Remax_List_748 20.94 2124
C21_List_160 7.58 321 Remax_List_749 3.69 87
C21_List_161 9.30 142 Remax_List_750 10.15 1221
C21_List_162 20.99 927 Remax_List_751 50.17 5879
C21_List_163 14.03 677 Remax_List_752 10 49
C21_List_164 5.74 115 Remax_List_753 2.59 132
C21_List_165 4.62 468 Remax_List_754 1 7
C21_List_166 1.53 72 Remax_List_755 19.41 5977
C21_List_167 91.16 5904 Remax_List_756 3 13
C21_List_168 2 2 Remax_List_757 6.47 47
C21_List_169 9.80 922 Remax_List_758 1 3
C21_List_170 73.72 1308 Remax_List_759 1 3
C21_List_171 5.92 150 Remax_List_760 15.06 251
C21_List_172 7.33 187 Remax_List_761 2 2
Coldwell_List_192 10.53 470 Remax_List_762 4.47 47
Coldwell_List_193 25.21 1458 Remax_List_763 9.79 547
Coldwell_List_194 1 3 Remax_List_764 1.33 15
Coldwell_List_195 18.77 1252 Remax_List_765 12.43 743
Coldwell_List_1033 20.21 746 Remax_List_766 1 45
Coldwell_List_1034 22.23 1133 Remax_List_767 1.77 13
Coldwell_List_1035 99.37 6524 Remax_List_1038 25.81 1632
Coldwell_List_1036 10.3 560 Remax_List_1039 35.42 2629
Coldwell_List_1037 1 2 Remax_List_1040 14.82 1196
Keller_List_506 1 2 Remax_List_1041 18.42 724
Keller_List_507 2 4 Remax_List_1042 10.27 813
Keller_List_509 40.4 1071 Remax_List_1043 28.48 1805
Keller_List_1045 47.34 998 Remax_List_1044 96.46 10296
This table shows how many listing agents each individual franchise
had per year and the total number of times each franchise appears in
the sample. The numbers corresponding to an individual firm have
no significance and are only used to anonymously identify the firms.
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Table A2.14: Marginal Effects for Dummy Variables Regressions Evaluated at the Sample Means. Central Kentucky
Data, 2000-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Sold Own Listing Sold Own Listing Sold by Franchise Sold by Franchise Sold by Franchise
Listed by RE/MAX -0.0116
Listed by Coldwell Banker -0.0311
Listed by Century 21 -0.0456
Listed by Keller Williams 0.0109
# of Selling Agents in Listing Firm 0.000179 0.000181
Listed by Franchise -0.0213 0.312 0.323 0.324
5 Miles Ft. Knox 0.0147
% Out of State 5 Years Ago 0.00251
% Out of State 1 Year Ago 0.000347
Observations 145,686 145,686 145,533 145,851 145,851
Year-Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
a Also included in each regression are: bedrooms, full bathrooms, partial bathrooms, square feet, square feet2, lot size, lot size missing,
age, age2, age unknown, fireplace, basement, finished basement, central air, exterior type, roof type, style of home, garage, carport, 1 mile
parkway/interstate, 1 mile rail road, 5 miles Ft. Knox.
b The OLS results are presented in Table 3.5
c The OLS results are presented in Table 3.12
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Table A2.15: Hypotheses, Specifications, and Results
Hypothesis Equation Expected
Result
Empirical
Result
Interpretation
PF = PI (Theory
Model Prediction)
ln(List Price)ijt = Franchisedijtω + xijtψ + σt + δj + ijt ω = 0 ω < 0 Reject the null hypothesis
that franchised and indepen-
dent listing brokers choose
the same list price.
ΦF < ΦI (Theory
Model Prediction)
SoldOwnijt = Franchisedijtρ+ xijtψ + σt + δj + ijt ρ < 0 ρ < 0 Franchised listing brokers
are about 2% less likely to
sell their own listings com-
pared to independent listing
brokers.
Sales prices for fran-
chised listings should
be ≥ independent
brokers listings.
ln(SalesPrice)ijt = Firmsijtω + xijtψ + σt + δj + ijt ω ≥ 0 ω = 0 Result depends on the speci-
fication
Days on market for
franchised listings
should be ≤ in-
dependent brokers
listings.
DOMijt = Firmsijtω + xijtψ +DOPζ + σt + δj + ijt ω ≤ 0 ω < 0 On average, houses listed
with franchised brokers sell
sooner.
Franchised Firms are
more active in ar-
eas with more out-of-
state movers
SBFijt = OutOfStateijtγ + Firmijt∆ + xijtβ + σt + δj + ijt γ > 0 γ > 0 Franchised brokers are more
likely to sell houses in ar-
eas where a higher percent-
age of the residents are mov-
ing from out of state.
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